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Abstract 
Like its counterparts in other provinces, the Alberta New Democratic Party has a 
formal relationship with organized labour. This thesis will examine the logic of the 
underlying relationship that persists between the two parties despite the difficult 
political and economic environment in Alberta.  This thesis will discuss the complex and 
changing relationship between labour and the NDP in Alberta, making use of data from 
a variety of sources, but will rely heavily on data gathered from a series of interviews 
conducted with union and party officials in 2008. The thesis will deal particularly with 
the increasing fragmentation of the union movement in Alberta and the increasing 
independence of labour union campaigns during elections as challenges for the Alberta 
NDP in the future.    
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
The relationship between organized labour and the New Democratic Party of 
Canada (NDP) faces an uncertain future.  The purpose of this thesis will be to examine 
the logic of the continued co-operation between the NDP and organized labour in what 
may be the most challenging environment for such relationships, Alberta.  
 The Alberta New Democrats face the same challenges that other left-of-center 
parties in advanced industrial economies struggle with. The recent popularity of neo-
liberal economic thought has placed considerable strains on historic union-party 
relationships and eroded traditional support bases.  Notwithstanding the economic 
downturn in 2008 and 2009,   the Keynesian economic assumptions that supported the 
rationale for welfare state politics have given way to balanced budgets and fiscal 
prudence.   The era that produced “the golden age” for social democracy seems to be 
firmly in the rearview mirror.   
In Canada, recent federal and provincial elections have seen the NDP distance 
itself from its traditional public links with organized labour and shift its policy platform 
to the center, in an attempt to broaden its voter appeal (Piazza, 2001: 414).  Now, in 
place of traditional social democratic promises and union friendly politics, the party 
seeks to champion the “economic security of working families” and “close the 
prosperity gap” between the average Canadian and the corporate elite (Layton, 2007).  
Recently the performance of the party has been mixed. The NDP surrendered the long 
term provincial stronghold of Saskatchewan and failed to capitalize on an electoral  
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1 
opening in British Columbia, but has held Manitoba and most recently made a 
major breakthrough in the Maritimes, forming the government in Nova Scotia.    
For the party, Alberta continues to present the most difficult of environments.  
Unlike its counterparts in the other Prairie Provinces, the NDP in Alberta has failed to 
achieve long term electoral success.  The NDP has never formed a government and has 
attained the status of official opposition twice since Confederation (1986 and 1993).  
Alberta’s conservative political culture, surging economy and strong identification with 
business friendly politics have been a long standing foil for the Alberta New Democrats  
(Tupper, 1986: 92).  In addition, Alberta’s labour movement is among the weakest in 
number and visibility in Canada (Reshef and Rastin, 2003: 15). The movement today 
battles for some of the most basic legislation that unions in other provinces enjoy, 
including first contract negotiation and anti-scab legislation.  Recent public opinion 
surveys indicate that the majority of Albertans view political activity by organized labour 
in a negative light (Marshall, 2008: 3).   
Despite these structural difficulties, some unions and the NDP continue to co-
operate in much the same fashion as the rest of Canada, but without any of the tangible 
rewards.   The question this thesis proposes to answer is this:  why do labour unions and 
the Alberta NDP continue to work together in spite of the general weakness of the 
labour movement and the NDP’s inability to exert policy influence in a consistent way?  
Logic would seem to dictate that the forces that have pushed political parties away from 
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traditional associations with organized labour in other contexts should have an 
exaggerated effect in politically conservative Alberta.  
Based on interviews with a variety of labour and party officials and volunteers, as 
well as a statistical analysis of current financial and membership data, I will argue that 
the relationship between the Alberta NDP and labour is in an important transitional 
phase.  On one hand, the party can claim modest growth in affiliated union locals, a 
slight increase in monetary donations during the most recent provincial election and a 
significant percentage of union affiliated candidates  contesting seats for the Alberta 
New Democrats in the 2008 election.   On the other hand, the 2008 election cycle also 
saw a pronounced effort on behalf of the labour movement to further political 
ambitions without co-operation with the party.  The labour movement in Alberta spent 
hundreds of thousands of dollars on independent parallel advertising campaigns 
without any consultation with the party.  At the 2008 NDP convention, the provinces 
most important labour organization introduced a motion calling for the dissolution of 
the party to establish a new united left, comprised of elements from the provincial 
Liberal and Green party.  In addition, the leadership of the NDP party and the leadership 
of the provincial labour federation are in the middle of a public feud over campaign 
finance laws. 
Research conducted for this project will demonstrate that for some unions 
rational approaches to the relationship are an important component of political 
calculations, but not the only consideration.  For these unions, the logic for continued 
co-operation with the party is buttressed by a shared world view and a historical sense 
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of ideological affinity.  However, for a growing portion of the labour movement in 
Alberta, the strains of a difficult political environment and a weak party are pushing 
labour’s political strategy towards a more non-partisan and opportunistic style of 
political interaction.  The promotion of the policy preferences of the union membership 
is increasingly taking precedence over support for the NDP.    
 To examine these complicated developments in the relationship between the 
Alberta New Democrats and the province’s unions and representative bodies, this thesis 
will be divided into four parts.  In the first section, the thesis will examine theoretical 
accounts of union and political party co-operation and present a review of party theory 
literature.  Jansen and Young (2009) examined the effects of federal campaign finance 
changes and their effects on party and union relationships.  In their study, Jansen and 
Young break down the theoretical literature on union-party co-operation into 
comparative literature, political economy reasoning and a third set of literature that 
focuses on ideological similarities.  I will examine the Alberta context within this 
framework, highlighting the importance of the rational calculations unions consider 
when formulating their political strategy.   
The second part of the project is a survey of the history of organized labour and 
political parties in Alberta.  The history of labour and party interaction traces back to 
radical labour unrest at the turn of the century.  After a series of attempts by labour and 
socialist parties to unify labour support behind a single party, the movement developed 
lasting ties with the CCF through formal affiliation between union locals and the party.  
Finally, 1961 marked the establishment of English speaking Canada’s first national 
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labour-endorsed political party, when the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) partnered 
with the CCF to create the NDP.   
From the history of the party and the province’s labour movement, the third 
section of the thesis will examine the current political, economic and cultural climate 
and discuss its effects on the dynamics and viability of union and party interaction.  The 
politics of Alberta and the tendency towards single party dominance have been the 
focus of numerous studies.  The classic explanation marshaled by C.B. Macpherson, built 
on the assumption of Alberta as a primary resource center for the east coupled with the 
dominance of the provinces electorate by a capital owning petit bourgeoisie class, has 
been challenged and revised numerous times.   Today, leadership and boom cycles in 
the Alberta economy appear to play the most substantial role in electoral outcome.  This 
thesis will present Alberta’s political culture as predominantly conservative and fairly 
unsupportive of traditional left-of center politics, be they union or party supported.   
The final portion of the thesis will present the primary field research component.  
To measure the relationship between the two parties, I conducted over 30 interviews 
with a wide array of individuals in leadership and volunteer positions with unions, the 
party and other relevant bodies, including the Alberta Federation of Labour.  Interviews 
were conducted in a semi-structured fashion based on a set of questions formulated 
specifically for the organization each individual represented. (See Appendix 1 for 
interview question samples.)  At the end of each interview, the interviewee was allowed 
a portion of time for open comments on relevant issues related to the study.  The field 
research also included attendance at relevant meetings and functions, including the 
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annual party convention after the 2008 election.  The primary research component of 
the project also examines monetary and membership data provided during visits to the 
party head quarters in Edmonton, as well as information provided by the Alberta 
Federation of Labour (AFL) during similar visits.    
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Chapter 2: The Theoretical Context for  
Union and Party Relations 
Introduction 
The first chapter of this thesis will provide the theoretical background for the 
discussion of the relationship between the Alberta New Democrats and organized 
labour.  The chapter will address several things.  First, the nature of the mass party itself 
will be examined against the evolution of party types in Europe and other advanced 
industrial democracies.  The ramifications for our study of the Alberta context are 
related to the difficulties the mass party type has had in Canada and, more particularly, 
in Alberta.  The chapter will move to a discussion of the different types of unions found 
in the comparative literature and draw the discussion into the Alberta context.   Next, 
the chapter will examine how the New Democratic Party can be understood 
comparatively within the Canadian party system.  Finally, the chapter will examine the 
logic for party and union co-operation.  To this end, the project will briefly review 
accounts from the comparative and political economy literature in order to build a 
theoretical backdrop for subsequent discussion of the Alberta example.   
Theoretical Discussion of Modern Party Types 
Understanding and developing a taxonomy of political parties in democratic 
systems is an ongoing and contested project.  Comparative literature dating from the 
1950s has been revised and amended based on the evolution of party systems in various 
countries.  As parties have evolved in democratic systems, their relationships with their 
voting bases have evolved as well.  The social and economic frameworks that provide 
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the rationale for the mass party have shifted in Europe, leading to the evolution of social 
democratic parties with ties to organized labour.  The emergence of new strategies for 
mass parties, most notably the “New Labour” movement in Britain provides a 
framework for analysis for the intra-party dialogue in Alberta that will be discussed at 
length in Chapter 5.   To that end, the first portion of this chapter will review the 
theoretical literature on political parties, with particular attention to changes in party 
types over time, and attempt to place the NDP within a proper theoretical setting.  The 
chapter will argue that the NDP is best understood in the family of policy seeking mass 
parties developed by among others (Wolinetz, 2000; Pomper, 1980). 
The current pluralism of party types owes its collective roots to the late 18th and 
early 19th centuries, when early political parties were developed in a context of limited 
voting rights and elite-driven politics.  Edmund Burke conceptualized the parties of this 
era as “a body of men united for promoting their joint endeavors the national interest, 
upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed” (1981: 317).  Katz and Mair 
refer to this initial phase of party development as the “regime censitaire” (1995: 9).  
Party activity and organization was driven by a need to represent and protect the 
limited interest of wealthy enfranchised voters on the national stage.   Parties were 
loosely organized and had little relevance beyond elections (Katz and Mair, 1995: 11).  
Elections were contests between competing elite visions for the nation.  This era was 
marked by an interpenetration of politically relevant elements of civil society and those 
who occupied power. This party type has been discussed in the literature in different 
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forms; Duverger’s cadre party (1961) and Neuman’s party of individual representation 
(1956) are the classic forms that are referenced today. 
  The first evolutionary step in party literature analyzed the growth of parties 
that arose as a direct result of the enfranchisement of the general population in various 
democracies.  The newly empowered electorate saw little utility in the elite centered, 
closed parties of the past and began to mobilize according to defined commonalities in 
class and social structure.  Duverger’s conception of a mass party emerged as a 
functional intermediary between the growing political aspirations of civil society and the 
state (1961: 89).  The mass party type is defined in the literature as having an open, 
organized power structure, a large membership centered in the electorate and a bottom 
up policy development.  Mass parties in this model had a distinctly left leaning ideology 
and were often patterned organizationally after unions.  This was due in part to strong 
ties to the working class (Duverger, 1961: 107). As a result of the emergence of the mass 
party, the primary responsibly of the party shifted from promoting a particular elite-
driven understanding of the best course for the state to representing the particular 
policy interests of a set segment of the population. 
The success of a single party type often influences party systems; the success of 
the mass party resulted in an evolutionary move by the political right in many 
democratic party systems (Wolinetz, 2000: 139).  Katz and Mair argue that the mass 
party model was so successful at enacting policy gains for the working class, most 
notably the European welfare state, that the older elitist cadre parties were forced to 
adopt some the organizational characteristics that defined the mass party (1995: 11).  
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Cadre parties began to adopt regular membership branches, a party congress, and a 
party press.  Cadre parties continued to differentiate themselves from mass parties by 
rejecting the notion of policy development from within and by continuing to raise funds 
from wealthy middle and upper class supporters.  Duverger defined this influence of the 
political left mass party on party systems as a contagion from the left (1961: 176). 
The evolutionary steps taken by the cadre parties spawned the second major 
shift in party development, according to Katz and Mair (1995: 12).  As the great social 
projects of the left-of-center mass parties were completed, the need for class solidarity 
began to erode.  This left the traditional mass party model vulnerable to populist 
challenges.  The cadre parties, in adopting mass membership but not advocating 
representation of a single social demographic, found utility in building large support 
bases that appealed to a variety of voters from all social classes.  Here the Downsian 
notion that parties should form policy to win elections, as opposed to win elections to 
form policy, is demonstrated (Downs, 1957: 27).  The growing affluence of industrial 
democracies resulted in a blurring of class lines that eroded the traditional foundation 
of the mass party.   In order to maintain parliamentary presence, European parties 
became more accepting of a broader policy range. The result of these system changes 
was the emergence of the catch-all party model (Katz and Mair 1995: 15).  
Kirchheimer and Epstein both developed a theoretical model for the catch all 
party built on elite-driven party politics and flexible membership.  For Kirchheimer the 
shift from the mass party model resulted in a more professionalized and capital 
intensive campaign strategy (1966: 181).  This shift came at the expense of the rank and 
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file party member’s ability to shape party policy, as was common in the older mass party 
model.  The marketing of party leadership via mass media and policy flexibility replaced 
the rigid policy agenda set by party membership.  This resulted in the diminution of the 
party as a transmission belt between civil society and the state.  During this phase of 
evolution, the political party moved from a representational role for likeminded social 
groups to agent suppliers to consumerist voters (Kirchheimer, 1966: 185).   
For Epstein, this shift away from accountability to individual membership 
represented a positive evolution.  The policy preferences of limited cohorts of society 
stood in the way of the rational formation of policy and acted as a barrier to the free 
market exchange of ideas and competition between political parties (1967: 257).  
Epstein labeled the shift to a more market based conception of political party behavior 
the contagion of the right, and he also argued that the declining influence of left-
inspired party behavior was a positive system change (1967: 265). 
The catch all party became the dominant political party type in most modern 
party systems (Wolinetz, 2000: 144).  In general terms, the modern catch all parties are 
defined by large mass memberships, flexible policies, an ideology geared for winning 
elections, and a reliance on mass media and electoral specialists.  Katz and Mair explain 
the catch all strategy in the following terms: “Instead of emphasizing social 
homogeneity, the party accepts members wherever it finds them, and moreover 
recruits members on the basis of policy agreement rather than social identity” (1995: 
10).  In this changing environment parties become more and more alike; ideology and 
policy distinctness are traded at election time for direct appeals to voters via mass 
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media and the increased importance of marketability of the party leader (Koole, 508: 
1996). 
The catch all party has settled as the starting point for modern theoretical 
explanation for the political party in most democracies.  A series of alternate 
explanations has emerged in the literature in response to the overly general nature of 
the catch all model.    Katz and Mair argue for a change in focus from the interaction of 
civil society and party to that between party and state.  They find that party and state 
are increasingly fused, and that the reliance on public funding in many democracies has 
fundamentally altered the way parties, state and civil society interact (Katz and Mair, 
1995:16).  With this change in the way parties finance elections, the spoils of electoral 
wins are less significant than in the past.  Nearly all major parties have access to power 
in some regard; even long periods of opposition or minority status do not eliminate 
access to patronage appointments or the ability to shape policy.  Moreover, the most 
important means of communication with the public, mass media attention, is scarcely 
affected by seat count or popular vote (Katz and Mair, 1995: 17).  
The results of these system changes, an increased reliance on state funding, and 
a reduced reward matrix once elections are won, have resulted in the emergence of 
cartel-like behavior among parties. Acting out of rational self interest, cartel parties 
collude to keep challengers to the cartel at bay in order to maintain a monopoly on 
power (Katz and Mair, 1995: 18).  Challenges to the cartel model have come from a 
variety of angles (Young, 1998; Scarrow, 2005: 621; Detterbeck, 2005: 174; Koole, 1996: 
508).  In general, the theory seems to have merit in several Western European examples 
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but is not applicable to all situations where state subsidies make up the bulk of political 
party finances.   
Other recent contributions to party theory include Panebianco’s electoral 
professional model as well as Poguntke’s new politics party.  Panebianco’s work 
highlights the evolution of political parties from mass populist entities to professionally 
run organizations.  In place of representation of social classes and/or civil society 
interest, Panebianco argues competition between parties as the defining characteristics 
of emergent party systems.  The electoral professional party therefore is marked by the 
increasing importance of a cadre of communication, polling, advertising and public 
relations experts.  These parties are headed by elite, educated professionals designed to 
beat other competing parties at election time (Panebianco, 1990: 62).   
Poguntke added the “new politics party” to the body of literature on party types 
(1988: 12).  This party type arose in response to the rise of new ideological (both right 
and left) and single issue based parties in many Western European countries.  These 
new politics parties emerged from the vacuum created from the gradual decline in 
number and strength of older European mass parties.  The emergence of the new 
politics party is therefore a result of the decline of European political parties and not 
systemic change inherent in other evolutionary accounts of political parties (Ignazi, 
1996: 554).  Poguntke defined new party politics in terms of a more post materialistic 
emphasis expressed in practical terms by Green, New Left and New Right parties and 
contrasted their electoral behavior with more traditional European party families 
including the conservative, Christian, agrarian, liberal, social-democratic, and 
14 
 
communist parties (Poguntke, 1987: 76).  The new politics party seeks to advocate 
policy-based platforms to the wider public with the hopes of gaining policy movement.   
Party Classification Systems 
The proliferation of party concepts has in many cases acted to muddy the 
theoretical waters for the simple labeling of particular parties.  The large number of 
party theories has demonstrated if nothing else that the method of studying party 
systems is as important as the outcome.  Differing approaches in the literature have 
attacked the problem of party labeling from a variety of angles.  Parties are studied in 
the context of their relationship with civil society, the state, each other, organizational 
structure, principal organizational objective, and social basis of representation, as well 
as in reaction to existing and newly suggested theoretical models.  Gunther and 
Diamond point out that the application of models based on European social and 
economic contexts to situations outside the European tradition often makes for 
complicated analytical frameworks (2003: 169-171).   
A branch of theoretical literature has emerged in response this proliferation of 
approaches and argues that parties in democratic systems are best understood in terms 
of a variety of specialized party types, and that the search for one new dominant 
typology may be misplaced (Gunther and Diamond, 2003; Koole, 1996; Pomper 1990; 
and Wolinetz, 2000).  This challenges the assumption that the success of one party type 
in a system will result in the evolution of competing parties along similar lines.  For 
example, Gunther and Diamond propose the adoption of a “taxonomy of parties” 
borrowing the genus and species hierarchy from biology.  The system utilizes three 
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criteria: the nature of subject party’s formal organization on a thick to thin horizon, the 
programmatic commitments, and typical strategy and behavioral norms. The taxonomy 
produces a flow chart organized vertically by time and horizontally by evolutionary party 
type.  Five genera emerge: the elite base, the mass base, the electoralist, the movement 
base and the ethnic base. From each of these genera a variety of evolutionary forms 
branch down.   
The Gunther and Diamond approach does well to represent the variety of 
evolutionary leftist party types internationally. A close examination reveals a strong 
synthesis of a multitude of party theory types from Duverger (the distinction between 
mass and elite parties) on to the work of more modern theorists including Poguntke 
(movement based).  However, the system is bound to large conceptual divisions 
between the differing genera.  Of particular concern is the placement of ideological 
parties that compete in catch all environments.     
Wolinetz proposes an alternative to the party species approach with his party 
schema.  The Wolinetz schema is based on the most prominent (however not the single) 
functional role of a party.  The characteristics of the party types are drawn out by 
examining six primary behavioral characteristics.  The system allows considerable 
flexibility and partial transition between schema classifications.  The schema allows for 
the analysis of parties from a variety of angles, including the level of involvement by 
rank and file membership, policy formation and electoral strategy.  This variety of 
indicators allows the Wolinetz approach to encompass a variety of existent party types, 
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while also allowing for hybrid types.  Figure 2.1 illustrates the three party types in the 
Wolinetz schema.  
Figure 2.1 Wolinetz Schema  
Possible Indicators  Parties     
  Policy -Seeking  Vote- Seeking  Office -Seeking 
Internal Policy Debate       
Time spent on at party meetings  High  Low  Low 
Character of debate  Intense, issue focused  
Pro Foma, diffuse, 
unfocused  Pro Foma, diffuse, unfocused 
Extent and level of involvement  Extensive  
Confined to leadership or 
policy committee  
Confined to leadership or 
policy committee 
       
Consistency of Policy Positions        
Internal policy accepted by party leadership  High  
Med to low prone to 
change depending on 
leader direction and 
electoral opportunity  Med to low 
Election Campaigns       
Prominence of Policy  High  Varies  Low 
Determination of Strategy  Follows from policy  
Policy developed to 
maximize votes  
Preference for low risk 
strategies 
Use of new electoral techniques  Low to medium  High  Low to Medium 
       
Infrastructure to Support Policies       
Active research bureau, think tanks, affiliated 
organizations  Present  Minimal  Minimal 
 
Source: Adapted from Wolintez, 2002: 155. 
 
The NDP within the Canadian Party System 
Identifying party types within the Canadian system context presents a challenge.  
The Canadian party system has not evolved along the same lines as its Western 
European counterparts; this renders analytic frameworks developed from the study of 
European parties less applicable.  In general, the Canadian party system evolved in three 
phases (Carty, 1993: 567) with the emergence of a fourth phase taking shape since the 
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1993 election (Patten, 2007: 56).  Unlike European examples, the two major Canadian 
political parties (the federal Liberal and Conservative) abandoned specific class, religious 
or ethnic bases early on.  These bases common to European parties were left in favor of 
brokerage style politics that revolved around consensus on weak Keynesian assumptions 
until the 1980s, and have since evolved along a neo-liberal market consensus (Brodie 
and Jenson, 2007: 41).  Canada’s two major parties have mass memberships and rely on 
funding from both large corporations and smaller individual donations.  Policy formation 
has traditionally been the domain of elites within the party machinery, much to the 
frustration of individual members and party activists (Cross, 2004: 33).   
The two-party dynamic has enjoyed stability in Canadian party politics; however, 
the system has been home to a long standing tradition of third parties.  Pinard offers an 
explanation for the rise of third parties in Canada.  Using the performance of Social 
Credit in the 1962 federal election in Quebec as a case study, Pinard argues that the 
presence of a strong single party in a party system, structural economic woes, and 
distortional electoral results rendered by single member plurality (SMP) systems acted 
as catalysts for third party growth (Pinard, 1967: 369).  Hiller expands on Pinard’s 
theory, isolating the idea of protest against an outside threat, and focuses attention on 
the specific case of Alberta.  By analyzing the Social Credit era in Alberta, Hiller argues 
that the rise of third parties can be understood as an internally developed solution to 
deal with critical problems that threaten a region.  The internal nature of the protest 
party in Western Canada can be used to understand the failure of these parties to 
succeed outside their regions, along with the diversity among parties with the same 
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name in different provinces (Hiller, 1977: 56).  More recently, the importance of 
brokerage politics, as well as a perceived sense of grievance, has been reaffirmed in the 
formation of third parties in Canada.   Studies examining the rise of the Reform party in 
Western Canada and the Bloc in Québec during the 1990s have reaffirmed the 
foundation of Pinard’s theory (Belanger, 2007: 88). 
The New Democratic Party of Canada and its provincial counterparts are the 
perennial example of protest movement parties that developed as a reaction to 
brokerage politics and dominant party tendencies.  The party owes its roots to Western 
Canadian dissatisfaction with the party system during the Great Depression.  However, 
unlike many other third parties in Canadian history, the CCF/NDP have managed to 
break out of a regional mold.  Whitehorn argues that the formation of the NDP from the 
CCF represented a concerted attempt at creating a Duvergian mass party in Canada, 
transcending regional grievances (2007: 139).   
However, as the discussion in the previous portion of this chapter suggested, the 
success of a single party type and the evolution of structural economic factors can 
pressure political parties to evolve from their historical models.  Since 1961, the NDP 
has enjoyed success at the provincial level, forming governments in Ontario, British 
Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and most recently Nova Scotia.  However, a 
combination of unstable partisan identification (Cross, 2004: 16), regional politics, and 
ideological and policy flexibility by the federal Conservative and Liberal parties (Brodie 
and Jenson, 2007: 39) have kept the NDP from ever moving outside of the third party 
role in national politics.  The party has also been hesitant to make any major changes in 
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response to the party system changes that have emerged since 1993.  Lawson and 
Poguntke argue that the party must decide between two competing camps within the 
party leadership.  The first option is to sever ties with some founding organizations, 
including organized labour, and pattern the party after the “New Labour” initiative from 
England in the 1990s.  The second option is to steer the party sharply to the left and 
align party policy with European “new politics” parties that focus on environmental and 
anti-globalization platforms (Lawson and Poguntke 2004: 169).  Despite efforts from 
within, most notably the New Party Initiative in the early 2000s that argued for the new 
politics approach, the party has been hesitant to make any major moves.  At the 
provincial level a variety of strategies has emerged; the discussion of the Alberta party 
branch and its relationship with organized labour in the following chapters fits into this 
ongoing dialogue within the party. 
Classifying the New Democratic Party    
 The NDP differentiates itself from the other brokerage style parties in Canada in 
several important ways.  Historically the party assumed the mass party model, built on 
the concept of a broad membership with organizational ties to other progressive 
organizations.  These mass party roots have had broad ranging implication for the party 
over the last forty years.  Unlike the other major Canadian parties, the NDP has relied on 
small financial donations from a large membership pool as opposed to relying on funds 
from large corporations or wealthy individuals (Jansen and Young, 2009: 674).  Mass 
party type democratic traditions have dictated the policy direction of the party,. 
Historically, many of the major NDP policies were developed in consultation with mass 
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party membership at convention (Horowitz, 1968).  Most policy positions leading up to 
elections are subject to the approval of the membership at convention, and 
representation from partner organizations by committee (Cross, 2004: 33).   Mass party 
tendencies are visible in the leadership selection process as well; the NDP has a long 
tradition of weighted voting among membership and affiliated organizations for 
leadership selection (Cross, 2004: 76).  The provincial wings of the party function in a 
similar way.  As the two levels are fused by the same organizational constitution, policy 
formation and leadership selection are identical.  Provincial parties form regionally 
specific policy in consultation with both membership and the federal party.  Figure 2.2 
presents the Wolinetz classification system with the NDP included.  The chart shows 
that the party can be understood as a policy seeking party with mass party roots within 
the Canadian party system.    
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Figure 2.2 Wolinetz Schema applied to the NDP 
Possible Indicators  Parties       
  Policy –Seeking  Vote- Seeking  
Office -
Seeking  
Alberta 
NDP 
Internal Policy Debate         
Time spent on at party meetings  High  Low  Low  High 
Character of debate  
Intense, issue 
focused  Pro Foma, diffuse, unfocused  
Pro Foma, 
diffuse, 
unfocused  
Intense, 
Issue 
Focused, 
Policy 
Focus 
Extent and level of involvement  Extensive  
Confined to leadership or 
policy committee  
Confined to 
leadership 
or policy 
committee  Extensive 
         
Consistency of Policy Positions          
Internal policy accepted by party 
leadership  High  
Med to low prone to change 
depending on leader 
direction and electoral 
opportunity  Med to low   High 
Election Campaigns         
Prominence of Policy  High  Varies  Low  High 
Determination of Strategy  Follows from policy  
Policy developed to 
maximize votes  
Preference 
for low risk 
strategies  
Follows 
from 
Policy, as 
well as 
strategy 
from Fed 
Use of new electoral techniques  Low to medium  High  
Low to 
Medium  Medium1 
         
Infrastructure to Support Policies         
Active research bureau, think tanks, 
affiliated organizations  Present  Minimal  Minimal  Present2 
 
Source: Adapted from Wolinetz, 2002:155 
The policy seeking categorization highlights among other items the importance 
of both bottom up policy development and the role of affiliated organizations.  We find 
in this context the importance of labour unions for the NDP in Alberta.  For policy 
seeking mass party types like the NDP to be successful, the party must maintain strong 
                                                          
1
 See for example the discussion of the use of Facebook by the NDP in Federal Elections in a forthcoming 
thesis by Noorin Chatour. 
2
 This is present via consultation with formally affiliated organization like the CLC and by informal links 
with progressive organizations like the Howe Institute, Parkland Institute, etc.  
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links with the organizations and individuals that make up its core membership.  
Supportive labour unions and organizations have in the past provided the backbone to 
many successful left of center political parties that fit the Wolinetz schema.  However, 
strains on the links between parties and unions have had lasting effects on party 
systems in several advanced industrial economies including Britain and Sweden 
(Haugsgjerd 2007),( Quinn 2002).   The remainder of this chapter will examine the 
theoretical context for union-party relationships; first a discussion of union interaction 
in political economy context from the theoretical perspective will be presented.  This 
section will be followed by a review of three explanations for the relationships that 
exists between left-of-center parties and labour movements.                                                                                                                          
Union Objectives in and Political Interaction from a Theoretical Perspective                                
 The following section will discuss the role that unions play from a theoretical 
perspective, place the Canadian labour movement within a theoretical context, and 
present a brief discussion of the impact of globalization on the Canadian and Alberta 
context.  This section will argue that the Alberta labour movement as part of the 
Canadian movement exhibits characteristics of the Anglo/American style of conflict-
driven union behavior as part of the Canadian pluralist labour relations tradition. 
Theoretical Role of Unions    
Unions occupy an interesting role in civil society, acting as both agents in and 
products of the democratic process (Wood, 2004: 4). The traditional explanation of the 
role of unions in the democratic process has revolved around this dual role.  First, 
unions occupy an important role in civil society as a major representative body for 
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workers’ interests in industrial economies. Within this role unions act as a 
counterbalance to business interests and further the agenda of their membership 
through collective bargaining (Campbell, 1992: 4).  This process historically resulted in 
the establishment of a standardized work day and week and minimum age and safety 
requirements in the work place.  In its contemporary setting, collective bargaining works 
out agreements on compensation structures, benefits and pension details.  Unions rely 
on strikes and the threat of work stoppages at the bargaining table with employers. 
Alternately, in domestic economies where more cooperative traditions have evolved, 
unions make up an important part of the tripartite negotiation model with business and 
government (Hanann, 2004: 126).  
Unions occupy a secondary position in democratic systems, acting as agents for 
social movements driven by membership, and leadership or elite concerns.  These social 
justice aims are often conducted in concert with other civil society actors.  Unions 
behave in a quasi lobbyist role in this capacity, interacting with governments and in 
some cases via international bodies (Ficher and Greer, 2004: 79).  The agenda of unions 
acting in this capacity tends to focus on perceptions of social and material inequality, 
placing unions as natural partners with other social actors concerned with the politics of 
social identity, the environment and globalization (Ferge et al., 2004: 138).      
Corporatist and Pluralist Systems 
The bulk of theoretical literature analyzes the nature and objective of unions in 
their domestic settings in terms of their history and behavior within the national 
political economy, and actions in response to set system wide factors (Hayward, 2004: 
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3).  This approach produces a continuum.  On one side are the corporatist political 
economies.  Industrial and labour relations in these countries exhibit cooperative 
tendencies.  Government policy that directly affects unions and business is designed in 
consultation with major stakeholders.  This style of corporatist behavior tends to occur 
in national economies with a specific set of structural factors.  These include the strong 
presents of labour friendly social democratic traditions occurring in advanced industrial 
economies, a large and homogeneous union population with relatively few unions, a 
significant degree of centralization in the business community, and a centralized 
powerful, interventionist state (Siaroff, 1999: 178).     
Austria, Norway and Sweden are generally agreed to demonstrate the strongest 
examples of corporatist behavior (Siaroff, 1999: 180). In large part these traditions 
developed out of a specific pattern of historical interaction.   Sweden, for example, has 
seen formal co-operation between the Social Democratic Party (SPA) and the National 
Labour Federation (LO) as far back as 1932 (Amark, 1992: 431).  Both organizations 
worked from a shared sense of solidarity; the SPA spend the post-Second World War 
period consolidating the Swedish labour movement, while the SPA until the late 1980s 
provided favorable social democratic policy and constructive negotiations with business 
interests on major issues.  The two organizations share considerable interpenetration of 
leadership, with membership from SPA making up the bulk of political representation on 
the LO congress (Amark, 1992: 440).  The Swedish political economy also benefits from a 
lack of factionalism (ethnic, language, religious) that has negatively affected the 
cohesiveness of other European labour movements (Campbell, 1992: 5). 
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The other side of the continuum is the Anglo/American style of labour relations 
where the cooperative tendencies in the corporatist systems have not developed. 
Systems that have evolved without the shared sense of solidarity found in Scandinavia 
and Austria are generally referred to as pluralist systems.  Canada, the UK and the USA 
are the most commonly agreed upon examples of pluralistic industrial relations systems, 
as these countries have weaker social democratic traditions, small and divided union 
populations, and decentralized negotiations between government, labour and business 
(Siaroff, 1999: 182). 
Like the Swedish example, the pluralist reality in many countries owes its current 
state to the particular history of labour relations in the country.  Britain, for example, 
has a history of bitter relationships between labour, business, and government.  The 
British labour movement traces its roots to the transition from pastoral to industrial 
economy.  Early English unions fought a difficult battle for basic rights during the 
industrial revolution with little co-operation from government (Campbell, 1992: 4).  
Despite being home to a political party with strong ties to organized labour (until the 
1980s), the British labour movement has had a long, difficult relationship with 
government and business (Bamber and Snape, 1993: 28). British unions have relied on 
bitter strikes in key industries in attempts to pry concessions from employers (Taylor, 
1991: 177).  The economic shocks in the 1970s and the resulting combination of 
inflation and unemployment placed considerable strains on the English Keynesian 
system.  The subsequent strong-arm tactics by both the Labour and Conservative 
governments, including attempts at wage control and price fixing, produced decades of 
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difficult industrial relations.  The process culminated in a series of long and unpopular 
strikes in several major industries during “the winter of discontent”(Delling, 1991: 123). 
The Canadian political economy represents perhaps an even more difficult 
situation for organized labour, demonstrating strong pluralist tendencies (Siaroff, 1999: 
181).  Canada inherited its industrial relations from Britain and has also been heavily 
influenced by the US.  Unlike its counterpart in the UK, the Canadian NDP has never 
occupied power, and labour has never enjoyed a stable access to government at the 
federal level.  The Canadian economy is marked by confrontational relationships 
between unions and employers, a lack of cohesiveness in the labour movement 
(particularly between public and private, as well as French and English unions), a long 
history of government hostility towards labour, and the frequent use of strikes by 
organized labour (Cox, 1974: 804).                    
Globalization and Changes to Labour, Business and Government Relationships   
A large body of literature examines the effects of the globalized economy on 
traditional union politics, and its effects on the structural factors that shape union 
behavior.  In general, the globalization of the world economy has placed considerable 
strains on the unions in advanced industrial economies, marking the most important 
developments in tripartite relationships in recent history.  Since the 1970s the combined 
forces of “increased international competition, new technologies, capital mobility, harsh 
labour market conditions and the spread of neo liberal ideologies” have eroded the 
traditional union position in many democratic economies (Goddard, 2004: 159). The net 
effect of globalization on unions in most industrial economies has been a steady decline 
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of density in unionized sectors of the work force.  The outsourcing of manufacturing and 
other blue collar industries to cheaper labour markets has resulted in a loss of the 
previous political power organized labour wielded.  This has resulted in the gradual 
erosion of traditional relationships between political parties and unions as well; New 
Labour in Britain and the gradual divorce of the LO and SPA are clear examples (Howell, 
2001; Pontusson, 1995).   
The focus of theoretical work based on the globalized economy and its effects on 
organized labour has been directed to the strategies employed by unions to revitalize 
membership and rebuild to traditional levels of influence. Goddard notes that the 
intensity of the effects of globalization tend to be felt in economies with weaker overall 
union positions, or economies previously labeled more pluralistic (2004:160).  Generally, 
unions have developed two different coping strategies in response to pressure that has 
come as a result of the globalizing economy.  Unions focus on attempts at cross 
organizational mobilization, or concentrate efforts on institutional bargaining and 
position (Ferge et al., 2004: 7).  The mobilization strategy sees unions focusing on their 
role as players in social movements.  Turner notes this strategy has been popular in both 
the UK and the USA where unions face strong neo-liberal political pressure.  The 
involvement of American unions and the AFL-CIO in the “Battle in Seattle,” anti-
sweatshop campaigns and the “justice for janitors” campaign, along with the British 
TUC’s co-operation with anti globalization movements, are cited examples of the 
dovetailing of union revitalization attempts into other social justice causes (Turner, 
2004: 9).    
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The opposite of this approach has been the tendency of some unions to attempt 
to re-establish their traditional position and rebuild their position in the economy by 
lobbying formally for government policy and working within traditional institutional 
channels. German unions, for example, have worked within long established corporatist 
channels in response to globalization pressure to oppose unfriendly policy towards 
unions.  The German labour movement has also seen consolidation, with the country’s 
largest union Ver.di absorbing several smaller unions to help defend public sector jobs 
(Turner, 2004: 11). 
Canadian Labour Relations and the Global Economy    
 Shifting focus to an analysis of Canadian unions during this change in the global 
economy and politics produces some important developments for our analysis of 
Alberta. The health and potential future of the Canadian labour movement is subject to 
debate within the theoretical literature.  Working from the globalization thesis, with a 
strong focus on private sector unions, Godard places the Canadian labour movement in 
a state of gradual decline, with the important caveat that the movement has fared 
better than its counterparts in the US (Goddard, 2004: 170).  This stability compared to 
the American labour movement will be lessened in time, according to Goddard, as the 
Canadian economy continues to integrate into the new global paradigm and lower 
union density service industry jobs replace blue collar unionized jobs (2004, 168).  
Goddard’s study also claims that there are differences in the state approach to unions, 
arguing that some of the stability in the Canadian case can be attributed to more 
favorable governance from both federal provincial legislative bodies than in the USA. 
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Again, the argument is made that this will not be sufficient to protect the Canadian 
labour market from global pressure (Goddard, 2004: 171).  The tradition of 
confrontational negotiations between union and business and the inability of Canadian 
unions to change this paradigm will act to drag union influence and density down in the 
long term.    
In contrast, Murray argues that the relative stability of Canadian union density 
over the 1990s and early 2000s indicates an important strength and vitality for the 
movement3  (2002: 93).  Murray looks to the growth in white collar and in particular 
public unions as an important trend in Canadian labour relations that should protect the 
movement from some of the effects felt in the US.  In terms of union specific coping 
strategies, Murray notes the importance of partisan flexibility of white collar unions as a 
significant trend in Canada; he also argues that rigid support for the NDP by many blue 
collar unions is a potentially harmful strategy (Murray 2002, 96).  
A full discussion of Alberta’s labour movement will follow in Chapters 2 to 5 of 
this thesis.  This review of some of the theoretical literature on unions has important 
ramifications for the Alberta context.  The disunity between progressive social 
movements and in particular the environmental lobby and organized labour will be 
explored later in this thesis.  Unions and progressive social bodies have worked 
successfully in other contexts; the posture taken by some of the leadership in Alberta’s 
labour movement  is significant.  Chapters 4 and 5 will also detail the inability of 
Alberta’s labour movement and government to work co-operatively, and will argue that 
                                                          
3
 Union density in Canada has remained somewhat consistent since the early 1990s, a more complete 
analysis of Canadian and Alberta union density will be presented in Chapter 5 
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the relationship has declined overtime.  The discussion will show that this pluralistic 
tendency is detrimental to vitality of the labour movement in Alberta.  Finally the 
public/private dichotomy will be demonstrated as a rift in the Alberta context; the non 
partisan tendency of the larger public unions will be contrasted with the support for the 
NDP among some larger national private sector unions.                                          
Examining the Logic for Union and Party Co-Operation 
The NDP has important links to many progressive organizations.  Organized 
labour in particular occupies an important position within the party machinery and was 
one of the driving forces for the party’s metamorphosis in 1961.  However, the realities 
of the internal party structure and political economy of Canada create a unique 
environment for the interaction of labour and politics.  In order to understand why the 
two groups continue to co-operate, particularly in the difficult conditions in Alberta, a 
summary of literature on the logic for union political party co-operation will be 
presented.   
  Discussion in the literature on the relationship between organized labour and 
political parties is sourced for the most part from three different approaches in political 
science.  Jansen and Young divide these explanations into three groups:  rational choice 
explanations, political economy reasoning and a set of literature that focuses on 
ideological similarities and a common set of goals (2009: 659).  Research on the Alberta 
relationship between party and unions has suggested a fourth theoretical approach that 
is premised on the relationship between elites within the exchange. 
The Rational Choice Account 
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The rational choice perspective seeks answers for social and political phenomena 
by the application of economic principles and market assumptions (Cohn, 1999: 26).  In 
its application to union party relations a series of assumptions are made.  Both unions 
and parties are assumed to act based on what decisions and associations will produce 
the greatest utility for their individual situations.  The rules of market behavior are 
assumed to dictate the interaction between the two organizations, with party leaders 
and unions making all strategic decisions.  Unions enter the market as policy seekers, 
with labour and capital as a commodity for exchange.  In theory, union leaders may 
consider a variety of market options including entering political competition directly, 
working via interest groups or supporting any number of parties.  However, the cost to 
benefit ratio dictates that union interests are best served by support of a political party 
and not direct action (Ware, 1992: 73).  Political parties are viewed as both vote and 
resource seeking with policy concessions as a commodity for exchange.  The rational 
choice approach also indicates that a breakdown in the exchange between the two 
actors would have a negative effect in terms of the commodities utilized in the 
relationship, namely electoral support, financial support, and policy preference (Quinn, 
2002: 210). 
Strom and Muller demonstrate that the exchange logic is built into many left-of-
center parties via organizational constitutions (2002: 210).  This formalization of 
exchange rules in the relationship is necessary to protect the interests of both parties.  
The relationship between unions and the party in the rational model is based on a non-
simultaneous logic of exchange.  Unions provide money, resources and votes with the 
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anticipation of preferential policy treatment once the party reaches power or a 
favorable position within a coalition (Strom and Muller, 1999: 13).  Without a means to 
withdraw spent money and labour hours, unions are left with no guarantee that their 
investment not be wasted.  This risk is mitigated by the party constitution; unions are 
allotted a preferred position on many internal party committees and/or a 
predetermined amount of delegates at party conventions to reflect the strong levels of 
support for the party.  This provides organized labour with a strong influence on internal 
party dynamics, policy formation and leadership selection.   
Quinn argues for a secondary set of benefits for unions within the exchange 
relationship.  The policy preference and activities of many unions places them outside 
the mainstream of politics. By adding financial support within an institutionalized 
arrangement between party and union, unions are able to buy a mainstream audience 
for their more radical policy preferences, as well as a mechanisms for their own 
members to lobby for policy without appearing too politically extreme (Quinn, 2002: 
209).    
The rational exchange model is illustrated by the relationship the British Labour 
Party and the Trades and Union Congress (TUC) from the 1950s on until the advent of 
“new labour” policies in the late 1980s (Quinn, 2002: 207).  During this golden age for 
social democracy, the Labour Party relied on affiliated union members for an electoral 
base, financial support during elections, and grass roots activist activity (Delling, 1991: 
23).  By capitalizing on the exchange model the Labour party was able to replace the 
British Liberal party position in the British two party system (Hamilton, 1989: 64).  The 
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Labour party occupied power following the Second World War, and again from 1964 to 
1970 as well from 1974 till 1979. Labour benefited during this era. Fielding explains the 
benefits to organized labour as “Labourism, characterized by many as a myopic 
preoccupation with the defense of male industrial workers' material interests” (2001: 
241).  Labour governments benefited from a stable voting platform, at times as high as 
70 per cent of unionized voters as well as a significant and stable financial foundation 
(Pontusson, 2001: 512).  
The exchange between both parties in the British example was far from stable.  
Hanham points to the break down in exchange between the party and the TUC as the 
key element to the Labour’s decisive loss in the 1951 general election (1956: 377).  
Hanham argues that the support and grass roots activity by unions that was crucial for 
the Labour party success had waned as British unions became content to “relax in the 
sun of full employment” (Hanham 1956: 380). The exchange relationship broke down 
again during the Labour government of the 1970s. As inflation and unemployment 
gripped the country, the government was forced to adopt policies unpopular among its 
union support base.  The resulting wave of strikes by unions, the “Winter of Discontent,” 
resulted in electoral loss to the Conservatives and opposition status in the House of 
Commons until 1997 (Taylor, 1991: 175).   
The British example illustrates the contours of the rational choice explanation for 
party union co-operation as well as its limitations.  The party enjoyed success when 
finances, votes, and material consideration were exchanged for policy preference and 
access to power structure.  However, when the exchange broke down in 1951 due to 
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union apathy and in 1979 due to unfavorable policy changes, the exchange declined and 
both parties suffered.   
Political Economy Account 
A second explanation for the logic of union and party co-operation is grounded 
in political economy literature.  The political economy logic argues that unions and 
political parties work together based on the dynamics of social and economic structural 
factors.  Accordingly, a bargain exists where parties provide wage restraint and stability 
in the economic sphere and a stable electoral base in the social sphere.  Parties in return 
benefit electorally from a stable vote base and are able to promote the material 
interests of this segment, while also benefiting from a co-operative labour movement 
that allows for an efficient state level market organization and beneficial dialogue with 
other industrial actors (Howell, 2002: 23).  The basic approach employed by political 
economists is to seek out explanations that highlight structural economic commonalities 
between different national examples (Howell, 2001: 12).  Some political economists 
argue that the overlap in material interests that precipitated the great union-party era 
of the 1950s and 1960s was a direct result of the unique economic and social conditions 
that existed during that period.  With the importance of structural economic factors 
established, the political economy logic looks to cross cutting changes during the 1950s 
and 1960s that could be responsible for the decline of the union- party relationship.  
Rational choice theorists and political economists both highlight an exchange or bargain; 
the primary difference between the two schools is the nature of the bargain/exchange.  
Political economists argue that the bargain is dependent on the existing structural 
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economic, social and political factors while rational choice theorists attribute the 
exchange to the rational realization of individual and organizational utility. 
Drawing on the Western European tradition, political economists point to the 
decline of Keynesian economic assumptions and Fordist manufacturing paradigms for 
the gradual erosion of union/party relations.  The golden age for social democracy was 
based on manufacturing and heavy industry for export where the political leanings of 
semi-skilled production workers represented a stable foundation for electoral success.  
Howell explains the predominant economics of the era as an intensive universalized 
growth cycle (2001: 14).  “Fordist economic models were built on the assumption of 
productivity gains, that resulted in higher real wages, feeding an expanding mass 
demand, permitting increased profits and investment, which in turn resulted in higher 
productivity” (Howell, 2001:15).  The role of the state was to regulate the economy 
through Keynesian economics and full employment to allow the circle to close and 
repeat.   
Unions represented a critical conduit in this economic calculus.  Unions held 
control over a major cost component in the manufacturing loop, the cost of labour.  If 
unions increased the cost of labour prematurely and productivity was not able to offset 
the increase, the cycle would slow and thus be unable push economic growth.  The 
importance of the labour movement in the political economy explanation is tied to the 
ability of unions to control a large portion of the most important national industries and 
to act as the sole source of labour in those situations.  This vulnerability was exposed 
after the mid 1970s when advanced industrial economies experienced “a double shift in 
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power away from the nation state and outward to the international economy and 
downward to the firm” (Quinn, 2001: 15).  These dual shifts exposed the union position 
in the Fordist paradigm to pressure from more cost effective labour pools in developing 
economies, pronounced volatility in the price of raw goods and increased international 
competition.  Piazza argues this economic change is a direct result of the international 
economic effects of globalization and that the changes inherent to the globalized 
economy have contrubited to the de-linking of unions and social democratic parties 
(2001: 214).  The changes that came with globalization have eroded the position of 
unions in national economies to the point where it is no longer political beneficial for 
parties to participate in the social economic bargain of the 1960s and 1970s       
While this set of economic structural shifts challenged the union party dynamic, 
a series of simultaneous social shifts were set in motion.  Advanced industrial economies 
began an evolution away from blue collar semi-skilled orientated industries towards 
service industries and public employment (Pontusson, 1995: 499).  As this trend 
continued a polarization between the material interests of the more highly skilled 
middle class and the declining semi skilled blue collar laborer class emerged.  A new 
electoral base surfaced in policy leanings of the new and growing middle class that came 
at the expense of the political capital of the older blue collar segment.  Unions in 
general have had more difficulty organizing non public service industries, as well as 
women and white collar employees.  Along with the slow decline in manufacturing and 
heavy industry, the net result for unions has been a decline in membership and 
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affiliation rates in some countries (with the exception of Northern Europe) (Scuggs and 
Lang, 2002: 134), with a proportional decline in political influence (Quinn, 2002: 18).   
The decline in the relationship between the Swedish unions represented by the 
LO and the Social Democratic party illustrates the political economy logic.  During the 
post war boom years (1950s-1960s) a particular set of economic and social conditions 
facilitated a beneficial relationship between the highly centralized LO unions and the 
Social Democrats.  Howell calls the relationship a “solidarisitc wage bargain” (2002: 23). 
The LO was able to contain competitive behavior within the unions and provided stable 
and realistic wage demands. Because of its electoral dominance, the Social Democratic 
party invested in a comprehensive welfare state, favorable industrial regulations, 
managed inflation and employment levels, and acted as a major employer.  During this 
era the Social Democrats enjoyed considerable electoral support from manual labour 
segments of the population that were mobilized by the politically active LO who were de 
facto members of the party in most cases (Howell, 2002: 21). 
By the end of the 1970s the political and economic bargain in Sweden began to 
collapse.  This collapse was precipitated by a series of economic and political structural 
changes.  The unions remained strong in number, with overall all union number and 
density rates steadily increasing and then peaking in the 1980s (Scuggs and Lang, 2002: 
133).  However, this increase in union number and density came as a result of the 
absorption of many skilled white collar and public employee unions.  The increase in 
diversity and number came at the expense of the LO to formulate union policy 
preference into a single voice.  During the 1950s the LO represented 80 percent of 
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organized workers, but by 1989 this figure had shrunk to under 60 percent with several 
rival labour organizations emerging to represent non industrial workers (Howell, 2002: 
26).   
The Social Democratic party faced newfound difficulties as a result in the gradual 
shift in the Swedish work force from blue collar to white.  Previous corporatist models 
allowed the party when in power to act as an arbitrator in disputes between unions and 
firms.  As the state expanded its role as an employer, the party found itself as the 
protagonist in many industrial relations disputes.  The LO no longer held a monopoly on 
the representation of unionized workers, especially in the white collar and public sector.  
An indicator of the change in the Swedish system is present in the 1990 decision to 
attempt to eliminate the right of certain elements of the public work force to strike to 
protect wage and price control attempts by the party (Haugsgjerd et al., 2007: 611).  
Neither the party nor the LO were able to rely on traditional industrial relations, and the 
decision resulted in a major rift between the party and both blue and white collar 
unions.   
The decline in the social bargain between the Social Democrats and the Swedish 
unions is also explained by the decision of the party congress to change the local 
affiliation rules and loosen party membership requirement for union members.  The LO 
pushed for the end of wholesale membership support as it found the party less able to 
guarantee favorable economic arrangements in the changing economic situation; the 
party favored the move towards a more catch all style of political  interaction and saw 
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close association with social segment of the population as insufficient for political 
success (Aylott, 2003: 371).  
Aylott refers the change in relationship between the party and union in Sweden 
post 1990 as a divorce (2003: 375).  The previous foundation for the relationship was an 
economic and political bargain dependent on specific economic and social structural 
factors, as the dynamics of the Swedish economy and industrial relations system 
evolved, the foundation of the bargain eroded and eventually gave way.   
Ideological Exchange Model 
A third account for party-union co-operation speaks directly to situations where 
the bargain of political economy logic or the exchange of rational choice accounts is 
insufficient to explain the relationship between party and union.  The ideological 
exchange account is focused on a shared sense of pragmatic purpose.  Jansen and Young 
characterize this arrangement as a situation where “Labour unions support social 
democratic political parties not in the hope of improving the fate of the unions 
themselves or their workers, but rather as a way of furthering the objectives of social 
democracy – objectives to which trade unionist leaders are generally personally 
committed” (2009:660).  
This logic serves to explain the stubborn tendency of unions to remain loyal to 
left of center parties after election losses or in political situations where social 
democratic parties fail to win elections.  This account understands that both players in 
the exchange are ideologically driven and not motivated in whole or part by concern for 
material benefit (Jansen and Young 2009:660).  Taylor has noted that often a 
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foundational element to union party co-operation is the desire for system wide change.  
Unions and parties engage in pragmatic attempts to build electoral coalitions to bring 
about sweeping system change.  The overlapping policy preferences between the two 
actors override differences and allow both partners in the relationship to focus on an 
ideological vision in the long term (Taylor, 1993: 215).  This ideological vision explains 
why in many social democratic party systems unions tolerate and support post 
materialist agendas, including environmental or gender equality focus when there 
seems to be little benefit for organized labour.  The importance of reinforcing a social 
democratic agenda outweighs any potential negative association (Taylor, 1993, 217). 
Writing about the uphill experience of the Federal NDP, Bernard argues that the 
reason for co-operation between the NDP, federal and provincial unions and other 
“progressive” Canadians was never rooted in the belief that the party could win power 
federally.   Instead, the diverse groups that support the party do so to provide an 
alternative for working people that counterbalances the dominant “neo liberal program 
of free trade, privatization and deregulation” (Bernard, 1995:8).  Bernard argues as well 
that the NDP has allowed labour in Canada to expand beyond the limited policy 
preferences of its core membership.  Today because of the relationship with the party, 
Canadian labour embraces the need to “reassert the social values that should influence 
economic decision making” (Bernard, 1995: 9).  For Bernard the logic for party and 
labour co-operation lies in the mutual realization of a weak position.   
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Conclusion 
 The aim of this chapter was to review theoretical literature pertinent to the 
central question of this project.  The first section presented a brief summary of the 
development of theoretical accounts of left of center mass parties.  By tracing 
evolutionary accounts starting with Duverger on through the literature, a case was 
made for placing the Alberta New Democrats in the Wolinetz derived family of policy 
seeking parties.  We can understand the NDP within the context of a classic mass party, 
which constantly faces the challenges of the Canadian party system that places a 
premium on regional politics and brokerage style parties.  This chapter also presented a 
brief review of the Alberta political economy from a theoretical perspective, placing the 
industrial relations system into the Anglo/American tradition.  The second aim of the 
chapter was to examine the various explanations for union party co-operation.  The 
chapter presented three separate accounts by examining literature based on Western 
and Northern European examples.  With this theoretical backdrop established, the 
project will now turn to an analysis of the history of political parties and unions in 
Canada and more specifically Alberta. 
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Chapter 3: The Historical Interaction of Labour and Political Parties in Alberta 
1901-1971 
Introduction  
Labour unions and political parties in Alberta have a long and colorful history.  
Since Confederation the labour movement in Alberta has worked in the political sphere 
via co-operation with a variety of political parties. Chapter three will focus on the 
historical links between labour unions and left-of-center political parties in Alberta, and 
then explore the relevance of this historical interaction on the current relationship that 
exists between labour and the NDP in Alberta.  For the purpose of analysis, the chapter 
will break the history of parties and unions into three distinct eras:  a formative period 
lasting from 1901-1935; the CCF dominated era taking place from 1935-1960; and finally 
the NDP dominated era that began in 1961 and is still ongoing.  This chapter will focus 
primarily on developments between 1901 and 1971 in order to provide a context for a 
discussion of labour-party relations in the contemporary era.   
The First Era in Party and Union Interaction in Alberta (1900-1935) 
In order to understand the historical foundation to labour and party 
relationships in Alberta it is important to begin with Alberta’s pre-Confederation 
political economy.   During the 1900s, the first labour unions in the province were 
organized in the coal and railway sectors of the economy. This group of unions was 
composed of a radical, anti-eastern, and at times anarchical group of unskilled workers.  
The group’s support base was centered in southern Alberta, particularly in the 
Lethbridge and Crowsnest Pass regions (Plawiuk, 1994: 2).  The earliest major union 
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presence in the coal industry in southern Alberta was the American Western Federation 
of Miners (WFM).  By 1905 the WFM was joined by another American union, the United 
Mine Workers of America (UMWA), as well as an international body, the International 
Workers of the World (IWW). Collectively the three unions represented the coal 
industry and organized the province’s unskilled workers along a militant and radical 
paradigm (Masson and Blaikie, 1979: 272).  Union membership swelled during the first 
decade of the 20th century and reached over 10 000 members in British Columbia and 
Alberta by 1911 (Masson and Blaikie 1979: 272).  The unions relied on pent up hostility 
towards eastern Canadian economic policy, as well as disputes with local ownership to 
keep members motivated for the more radical political position of the labour 
movement. 
This early era in labour politics was marked by industrial conflict in the coal and 
mining sectors.  Early on in the Lethbridge area, the coal miners’ unions were challenged 
by ownership when the worker chosen WFM local was disbanded and replaced with a 
dummy local operated by the company itself.  In an ensuing court challenge, following 
several disruptive strikes, the province pressured the local miners out of strike activity 
and into a third “less international” choice of labour union, effectively replacing the 
radical WFM local (Masson and Blakie, 1979: 275).  The radical nature of the early non-
skilled workers segment was highlighted again in the 1919 when the One Big Union 
(OBU) successfully re-organized existing UMWA local 181 and pushed the coal industry 
into a potentially disruptive position during the First World War.  The posturing of the 
coal industry was of concern for the provincial and federal governments. In order to 
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maintain domestic production and price levels during the war effort, a provincial 
secretary was appointed to prevent stoppages in work and quell labour unrest (Plawiuk, 
1994: 6).  Southern Alberta remained near the top of the country in number of man 
hours lost due to strike activity at several points during the war years while active 
unions collided with the interest 
A second branch of organized labour in Alberta emerged during the early 20th 
century, but had a more moderate political stance and followed a non partisan 
perspective.  This branch of organized labour was heavily influenced by Samuel 
Gompers and the American Federation of Labour in the U.S.  This group of unions and 
labour organizations restricted political activity to bargaining for local membership, 
avoiding the revolutionary tone of their counterparts in the coal industry.  These unions 
had organizational differences with the unions to the south and followed the American 
style of organization by job and skill type called craft unionism as opposed to the mass 
style organization of IWW.  The group of unions and labour organizations was centered 
in Edmonton and Calgary and was mostly composed of skilled workers (Plawiuk, 1994: 
1).   
Both the moderate and more radical branches of Alberta labour movement 
during this initial era pursued political power.  The moderate skilled unions continued to 
pursue a limited level of political action, focusing on the well being of their individual 
membership.  These skilled unions were committed to working within existing political 
channels.  At times, these more moderate unions sponsored a variety of “labour 
friendly” candidates for election to the provincial Legislature.  By 1917, the more 
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moderate international unions had successfully elected a candidate in Edmonton, Alfred 
Farmilo, as well as a candidate in Calgary, Alex Ross (Plawiuk, 1994: 2).  The political 
aims of these labour politicians were to bargain for basic recognition of union rights in 
the province. By 1919 most moderate unions had fallen into the leadership fold of the 
newly formed Alberta Federation of Labour (AFL).  The AFL acted as a moderate voice 
for labour interests in the province and lobbied the municipal and provincial 
governments on a variety of labour issues (AFL interview, May 23, 2008). 
The more radical industrial unions in the south of the province attempted 
political organization in different ways.  The issue of whether to work within the 
national and provincial democratic framework was debated and rejected in favor of 
more drastic revolutionary tactics.  This more radical approach is reflected in the 
formation of the One Big Union (OBU) in Calgary in 1919.  OBU policy was critical of 
central Canadian control of the major national trades and unions council, and played to 
the anti-eastern radical tendencies present in the industrial unions during this period.   
The union was more of a political movement and was designed, sponsored and staffed 
by unions representing the coal, forestry and railway industries in Southern Alberta, 
British Columbia and Manitoba (Milne, 1973: 7). 
Alberta’s moderate unions with their ties to the American Federation of Labour 
were viewed with suspicion by the OBU supporters who advocated a strong Canadian 
labour federation guided by domestic industrial unions rather than craft unions.  
Supporters of the more radical unions tended to view drastic action as the only means 
to achieve political change, and were unwilling to wait for democratic action to bear 
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fruit.   At the formation of OBU in Calgary, union representatives agreed on a set of wide 
ranging policy goals.  These included a sixty hour, six day work week, equal pay as well 
as the right to vote for women, free public education, health and safety legislation, the 
nationalization of major industries especially railroads and utilities, and finally the 
termination of draconian work regulations drafted during the World War I era.  To 
accomplish these ambitious policy aims, the general strike was chosen as the primary 
weapon (Plawiuk, 1994: 8). 
The unexpected Winnipeg general strike of 1919 provided an opportunity and 
united the radical side of Alberta labour into the definitive action of the era.  The 
Gomperist influenced trade and union councils in Calgary and Edmonton saw the radical 
OBU as a direct threat to their leadership in the Alberta labour community.   The debate 
over whether to support the Winnipeg unions became a contested issue that divided 
Alberta labour along radical and moderate lines.  When the issue was put to a general 
vote of Alberta’s union members via the AFL, four to one voted in favor of a general 
strike.   Several important civic unions chose to remain at work, and as a result core 
functions in Calgary and Edmonton remained somewhat operational.  The general 
strikes in Western Canada were quickly labeled as communist plots and the OBU was 
branded a communist puppet in many media outlets by both the provincial and federal 
government.  While the strikes brought national attention to many important issues, 
they failed to result in the system wide change that the radical elements in the Alberta 
labour movement had hoped for.  The public perception of OBU became set in stone 
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during this era and the organization never realized its ambitious goals, becoming 
politically insignificant by the mid 1920s (Morton, 1998: 56). 
The wave of general strikes in 1919 highlighted the dichotomy between 
moderately skilled trade specific craft unions and unskilled mass-organized industrial 
unions in Canada and in Alberta.  The politically conservative national Trades and Labour 
Congress (TLC) with its affiliated links to AFL had worked against OBU to preserve their 
own hold on power in the province.  The political infighting within the labour 
community highlighted the emerging importance of the macro-organizational body for 
the labour community.  The OBU lost a decisive battle with both business and 
government interests and failed to retain control of the labour movement in western 
Canada.  The competition between craft and industrial union organizations would have 
important ramifications for labour politics in Alberta.  After the radicalism of the early 
1900s, both craft and industrial unions became more dependent on larger organizations 
for political direction.   
Following the failure of OBU to unite Western Canadian labour in a common 
front, calls for a national level labour party gained momentum (Milne, 1973: 4).  More 
radical elements in Alberta supported a variety of socialist, labour and communist 
candidates with limited electoral success at the civic, provincial and national level.   
Moderate labour elements in Canada looked to the British Labour party as a template 
for non revolutionary labour action in the political sphere.  The formation in 1919 of the 
Alberta wing of the Dominion Labour Party (DLP) at the behest of the national DLP 
movement was a direct expression of this new political movement.  The Alberta DLP was 
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essentially an extension of the existing craft unions and the AFL, designed to consolidate 
the moderate union voice in the province and attract industrial union support.  
Leadership from the AFL, as well as Calgary and Edmonton trade and union councils, 
made up the leadership of the political party.  Craft and Industrial unions as well as 
individuals were welcome to affiliate (Milne, 1973, 7).   
The DLP only ran candidates in urban ridings where there was a chance of 
victory, often in co-operation with the United Farmers of Alberta (UFA) who agreed not 
to run competitive candidates.  The Alberta branch also took advantage of the multiple 
vote system during the 1920s in Calgary, Edmonton and Medicine Hat that allowed 
minor political parties more of a competitive edge (Loenen, 1997: 155).  DLP and later 
the Canadian Labour Party (CLP) Alberta wing enjoyed moderate political success; in the 
1921 election the party won four legislature seats and was granted the public works 
portfolio from the UFA government.  More importantly the DLP/CLP allowed labours in 
the province a stable and legitimate political voice as the co-operation with UAF 
provided a political legitimacy that had not been present in the past.  The early DLP/CLP 
leadership would also play an important role in the formation of the CCF, including 
providing provincial level leadership in the personage of Elmer Romper (Horowitz, 1968: 
60). 
The first era of party and union politics in Alberta was marked by a clear divide 
between two branches of the labour movement.  A radical element, that grew out of the 
unskilled workers in the south and Crowsnest Pass region of the province, and a more 
moderate craft union movement centered in Calgary and Edmonton.  The political 
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leanings of labour were varied in Alberta during this era.  Moderate craft unions relied 
on the existing electoral system and pursued their political agenda by supporting and 
electing labour candidates and by supporting the DLP/CLP.  The more radical elements 
of Alberta labour movement pushed for improvements in working conditions and labour 
laws with direct action including participation in the wave of general strikes in Western 
Canada in 1919.  Several labour parties, often extensions of federal and provincial 
labour affiliations, emerged in this era. 
The Second Era of Labour and Party History in Alberta (1935-1960) 
The end of this first era in labour party history saw the decline of an overtly 
radical labour agenda and the gradual merger of labour politics with socialist and 
progressive political agendas.  This evolution saw its final expression in the formalized 
AFL support of the UFA during the 1930s (Masson, 1979: 275).  This co-operation of 
labour and farmer for political reasons was the first evidence of a trend that would 
become an important feature of the Alberta political system (Melnyk, 1986: 44).    
The next evolutionary step in Alberta politics came during the late 1920s and 
early 1930s.  The depression on the prairies produced two new political parties with 
competing visions for both the national and provincial course.  First, the Social Credit 
movement, driven by the religiously zealous William Aberhart, reflected a new approach 
to the economic issues facing the region (Bell, 1990: 521).  Second, the Cooperative 
Commonwealth Federation (CCF) took on a distinctly socialist tone and proposed radical 
changes to the Canadian economic system to deal with the depression (Carty, 1992: 
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573)1.  Both parties were grounded in the prairie protest identity and were products of 
the perceived failure of eastern Canadian centered institutions and political parties to 
deal with effects of the depression on the prairies.  In the end, the Social Credit 
movement proved more electorally viable in Alberta, replacing the UFA dynasty and 
forming government from 1935 until 1971. 
Research has demonstrated that much of the labour vote went to Social Credit 
particularly in the early phase of the party during the power transition from the UFA 
(Bell, 1990: 521). This electoral shift predated the formation of the CCF.  That being said, 
official support from the AFL and other major provincial unions for Social Credit was 
short-lived, particularly as the party turned to the right during the Manning years and 
maintained an adversarial position with all things socialist (Caldarola, 1979: 43).  The 
formation of the CCF represented a potential alternative for the labour vote in Alberta.  
The purpose of the CCF was to unite a varied group of people behind a common socialist 
vision, including the labour class of Canada.  At the inaugural meetings in Calgary, 
representatives from farm associations, labour movements, western Canadian socialist 
parties as well as progressively minded groups, including the Fabian society, laid down 
the foundation for the party (Melnyk, 48: 1986).  The CCF from its inception was never a 
labour party per se.  Both groups and individuals were permitted to join; however, by 
default, the party was dominated by the constituency association and individual 
members (Horowitz, 1968: 67). The party constitution was designed in such a way that 
no single group, be it farmer, union or other, could gain outright control of the party.   
                                                          
1
 Appendix 6 presents a graphical summary of Alberta election results since 1935 by party. 
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Labour organizations reacted to the formation of the CCF with mixed enthusiasm 
at the national level.  The TLC was still largely influenced by the American Federation of 
Labour during the 1930s and 1940s.  Gompers’ legacy had left a firm hesitancy towards 
both socialist and labour specific political parties.  However, the TLC had a vocal but 
small socialist faction which resulted in neither an outright rejection of the CCF nor an 
overwhelming endorsement (Horowitz, 1968: 74).   The 1933 TLC convention was 
representative of the national labour federation’s attitude towards the CCF.  The 
convention refused to endorse the party formally but the convention did pass several 
resolutions in favor of a planned economy and co-operative ownership of capital.  At the 
provincial level, the AFL supported a variety of parties swinging from radical socialist to 
moderate left of center.  The AFL formally supported the DLP and later assisted the re-
organization into the CLP, then shifted support to the UFA during the 1930s (AFL 
interview, May 23, 2008).  At the formation of the CCF in Calgary, the AFL moved along 
with the UFA into formal affiliation but chose to continue to support individual non CCF 
labour candidates as well (AFL interview, 2008).      
The relationship between the TLC and the CCF remained strained for other 
reasons.  The rival national organization to the TLC, the All Canadian Congress of Labour 
(ACCL) moved into formal affiliation with the CCF at the party’s inception.  The ACCL was 
formed to produce a Canadian solution (as opposed to the internationally influenced 
TLC) to labour representation in the country and was anchored by the Canadian 
Brotherhood of Railway Employees (CBRE).  The ACCL’s leader A. R. Mosher was present 
at the inaugural CCF meetings in Calgary and made early attempts to affiliate both the 
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ACCL and CBRE (Horowitz, 1968: 64).  The party constitution only allowed union 
affiliation at the provincial level and as a result the CBRE never formally affiliated.  
Despite this, the ACCL continued a close relationship with the party and supported the 
CCF with funds, leadership and volunteers.   
The organizational drama continued as the ACCL disbanded and joined with the 
Canadian branch of the Congress of International Organizations (CIO), whose leaders 
and members had recently been expelled from the TLC.  With the CIO-ACCL merger into 
the Canadian Congress of Labour (CCL) the former members of the ACCL dropped their 
objection to the international labour movement (the entire CIO was international) and 
focused on building a national labour federation that could present a more politically 
active position that the TLC (Horowitz, 1968: 66).   
Of the three founding cohorts of Canadian society present in the CCF (farmer, 
laborer and progressive), the labour support base received the least amount of 
attention during the initial success of the CCF (Horowitz, 1968: 70).  However, an 
ongoing surge in the number of unionized workers during the 1940s and 1950s helped 
bring the union vote back to the forefront of the CCF agenda.  The CCL membership 
numbers grew from 77 000 workers in 1940 to 220 000 in 1942; by 1951 this total had 
reached 350 000, with many of these new CCL members forming a solid support base 
for the party (Morton, 1998: 220).  Despite this increase in labour support, it took the 
unexpected request for affiliation from a small mine workers’ union in the Maritimes to 
make the CCF seriously consider the benefits of union affiliation.  The United Mine 
Workers local 26 in Nova Scotia saw the CCF as the best hope for a political arm for 
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labour interests in Canada.  It agreed to affiliation terms similar to those employed by 
the British Labour party (Archer, 1990: 15).  Union members were not to belong to other 
political parties and a modest two cent per member fee was assessed to the union.  The 
affiliation agreement was drawn up by the party as no existing mechanism was built into 
the party constitution (Horowitz, 1968: 72). 
The CCF made sure when rebuilding the party constitution to allow for union 
affiliation to hedge against the controlling block vote that British union enjoyed in the 
Labour party.  The 1940 CCF national conference adopted a constitutional amendment 
that allowed economic organizations to join national and provincial CCF branches.  
Union representation in convention at the national level was determined by the size of 
the union.  The national executive suggested one delegate per one hundred affiliated 
members, with a minimum of one delegate.   The program had to be approved by 
provincial executives in order to pass.  The individual provinces reacted in accordance 
with the success and strength of union affiliation drives within their respective borders.  
Ontario, for example, benefited the most from union affiliation with twenty three 
individual unions joining.  Accordingly, the Ontario branch of the party adopted the 
recommendation of the National party setting union representation rates at one 
delegate per 100 members.  The Prairies had less success with the affiliation drive.  
Smaller labour populations and a hesitancy towards the new party resulted in a total of 
only fifteen locals joining on the prairies, of which only one came from Alberta.  In 
response, the Alberta CCF changed the recommended one delegate per one hundred 
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members to one delegate for every twenty five, to allow for a more pronounced voice in 
party affairs (Horowitz, 1968: 66). 
The lukewarm reaction to affiliation drives in Alberta was a result of local 
political history.  According to Melnyk, the provincial NDP suffered from its historical 
links to the UFA.  The labour vote could not wholeheartedly support the CCF (which had 
absorbed much of the UFA by 1937) because of the way the UFA had handled several 
labour relations issues while in power.  In particular, the party had brutally put down a 
miners’ union strike in the southern Alberta coal fields with the RCMP.  This acted to 
alienate the more radical element in Alberta labour.  The more moderate side of Alberta 
labour during this period was equally appalled at the way the UFA had handled a series 
of labour supported hunger strikes in 1932, again by relying on brute force tactics and 
the RCMP (Melnyk, 1986: 43).  The UFA was also tarnished by a rather public sex scandal 
involving the party leader as well as a cabinet minister in the mid 1930s.     
Electoral return data from the 1935 election is also revealing.  Bell’s 
comprehensive study of class based voting during the 1935 election has demonstrated 
that the labour class strongly supported the Social Credit movement in all regions of 
Alberta.  In Calgary and Lethbridge, areas with strong union presence during this era, 
the majority of working class voters supported Social Credit (75% and 59% respectively) 
(Bell, 1990: 522).  Furthermore, by breaking down riding by riding and isolating working 
class areas in the South East of Calgary Bell has demonstrated a greater concentration of 
working class dominated constituencies voted for Social Credit (between 75% and 87%) 
(1990: 526).  Social Credit seemed able to consolidate the labour vote in Alberta before 
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the CCF even began contesting elections.  More importantly, this trend was the first 
evidence in an ongoing problem for the CCF, and its successor the NDP; the labour vote 
in Alberta seemed to vote on independent consideration rather than as a block, often 
with the dominant party. 
Hunter has noted that the Alberta labour movement and the provincial CCF grew 
less compatible as time wore on.  As the electoral fortunes of the Alberta CCF declined, 
and it became clear that the party would not be able to challenge Social Credit for 
control of the Alberta legislature, the core of the party began to devote more effort to 
abstract philosophical ideas that were out of tune with labour voters, who were less 
committed to socialist ideals, and more worried about practical daily issues (Hunter, 
1986: 58).  Hunter describes CCF conventions in the late 1940s and 1950s as somber 
affairs with defeatist attitudes attended by a tired and graying party faithful.  The 
Alberta party was prone to more abstract policy ideas than its other provincial counter 
parts.  Harsh criticism of NATO, open support for the USSR, and odd social policies 
including a mandatory wage for housewives never resonated with the majority of 
unions. Hunter argues that this was key to the low level of support by labour voters for 
the party (1986:58). 
Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 present a summary of the electoral fortunes of the CCF in 
Alberta, and at the national level for the life of the party.  Figure 3.1 demonstrates the 
decline in popular support for progressive political parties including the CCF and other 
labour parties from 1940-1959.  Figure 3.2 shows the inability of either labour parties of 
the CCF to gain a stable foothold in the Alberta legislature during the same period.  
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Figure 3.3 illustrates the performance of the Federal CCF, the party peaked in seat share 
and popular vote during the WWII election cycle finally losing momentum during the 
mid to late 1950s    
The party enjoyed a spike in popular support in 1944; for the first time the party 
ran a full slate of candidates in all provincial ridings.  As well, the party enjoyed 
momentum from the recent electoral win by the CCF in the neighboring Saskatchewan 
election in 1944, as well as some hesitancy on behalf of voters to support the new Social 
Credit leader Ernest Manning.  Unfortunately, the huge upswing in popular vote (11.11% 
to 24.24%) only resulted in one additional legislature seat.  The national and provincial 
fates are also nearly parallel.  The 1945 was a breakout election for the national wing of 
the party, the CCF won over 15% of the national popular vote and 28 House of 
Commons seats.  The momentum proved difficult to maintain; by the late 1950s labour 
in Alberta and Canada had ample cause to consider new more electorally viable options 
as the CCF lost the majority of its wartime electoral presence. 
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Fig 3.1 Popular vote during the CCF era Alberta2 (Source: Elections Alberta) 
 
Fig 3.2 Percentage of Legislature Seats CCF era (Source: Elections Alberta) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 In 1959 Edmonton and Calgary switched from a Single Transferable Vote (STV) electoral system to a 
Single Member Plurality (SMP) system. 
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Fig 3.3 Performance of Federal CCF (Source: Election Canada) 
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consolidate the labour vote or build a strong base of affiliated unions, a difficulty that 
currently occupies the provincial NDP.  The tension in Alberta politics between a “labour 
agenda” and the populist leanings of labour voters emerged as well. As Bell’s study 
points out, labour does not always vote for “labour parties.”  Elements within the CCF 
culture did recognize the potential for a party with stronger ties to labour that could 
work with the diverse labour interests.  The second era produced the first electorally 
viable political party with strong labour links; however, the CCF failed to build on its 
postwar momentum and the movement gradually fizzled out in the 1950s.  The 
transition from the second era of labour and party co-operation to the third was 
precipitated by the union of the long time bitter labour federation rivals and the 
consolidation of the Canadian labour behind a single party. 
The Third Era in the Development of Party and Union Relationships in Alberta (1961-
1971) 
The third era of party and union activity is marked by the formation of the NDP 
in 1961.  The impetus for the creation of the new party, as opposed to trying to rebuild 
the electoral fortunes of the CCF, was generated on several different levels.  The first 
push came externally as a result of the consolidation of competing labour federations at 
the national level.  A secondary driving force came internally, by CCF supporters who 
had reconciled with the reality that the old party was at the end of its era as a significant 
force in Canadian politics.   Finally, a third element was the development of new party 
clubs formed by members and non members of the CCF interested in a new outlet of 
progressive thought in Canadian politics (Whitehorn, 1992: 23). By the 1950s old 
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rivalries between the TLC and the CCL were beginning to give way to the logic that one 
united national labour congress could wield considerable political and economic power.   
In the United States the American Federation of Labour had formally joined with CIO, 
setting aside the long held divisions between skilled and unskilled representational 
bodies. This set a new tone for Canadian labour groups (Horowitz, 1968: 170).   
These developments in the United States set the stage for similar co-operation 
between the competing federations in Canada.  The CCL and TLC began negotiation 
aimed at uniting the two organizations in the early 1950s.  This co-operation resulted in 
the formation of the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) on April 23, 1956.    At the 
inaugural CLC conference, held to set down the organizational structure of the new 
organization, the issue of political party affiliation was discussed.  On one side of the 
debate the former TLC leadership, still influenced by its Gomperist perspective, argued 
for a moderate non-partisan approach.  In contrast, the former leadership of the CCL 
had enjoyed a strong relationship with the CCF and believed strongly in a partisan and 
politically active labour movement. The CCF supported the merger into the CLC and 
utilized its existing presence in the old CCL hierarchy to entice the TLC faction in the new 
organization into a position of formal endorsement (Horowitz, 1968: 171).  However, 
the amalgamation of the labour federations came during the twilight years of the CCF.  
In 1958 the CCF held only eight seats in the House of Commons.  In an effort to bolster 
the party’s sagging fortunes at the provincial level, the CLC offered a formal 
endorsement on behalf of organized labour in the Ontario provincial election in 1958; 
however, the party managed to win only two seats.   
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With the electoral performance from the CCF showing a decidedly negative 
trend the CLC began to actively campaign for the formation of new party that could 
absorb the remaining CCF support, while encompassing the new CLC agenda, as well as 
appealing to middle class and progressive voters (Archer, 1990: 23). Reaction to the idea 
of a new party in Alberta was mixed.  The AFL and its supporting cast of unions had 
supported the CCF, but were increasingly worried about the party’s poor electoral 
performance (Melnyk, 1986: 51).  By 1959 the party had no legislature presence and less 
than five per cent of the popular vote (see fig 3.2).  The Alberta CCF leadership was less 
than supportive of the new party idea.  The majority of CCF support in the 1950s had 
dwindled to rural voters concerned with the shift to agribusiness in the province and 
dedicated old guard socialists who believed electoral success was a matter of timing.  
The provincial CCF core supporters were less than enticed by a shift towards union 
politics and the accompanying shift to the center of Canadian politics (Hunter, 1986: 59).    
The drive for the new party in Alberta was largely championed by the labour 
movement.  The early phases of the formation of the new party were organized by the 
AFL which made use of information camps and educational sessions in Medicine Hat, 
Lethbridge, Calgary and Edmonton.  This process was designed by labour to convince 
both hesitant old guard CCF membership and new curious potential support of the 
benefits of a new party (Hunter, 1986: 61).  Alberta’s new party supporters and old 
guard CCF members were divided by old tensions in the Alberta party.  The remnant of 
the CCF was for the most part rural and inclined towards socialist philosophical solutions 
to Alberta economic issues.  The new party supporters saw a shift to the right with an 
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increased appeal to labour and middle class voters as the only way to compete with the 
Social Credit political dynasty (Hunter, 1986: 66).   
By 1960, resistance to labour’s efforts in Alberta had calcified into outright 
rejection of the idea of a new party.  The Alberta CCF committee that was overseeing 
the development efforts of the new party recommended to the provincial party 
leadership that the new party project be abandoned.  The committee charged that the 
new party neglected the core principles of the CCF, and was not representative of the 
policy positions of membership.  The Alberta CCF reasserted its commitment to a 
socialist agenda, and maintained the old position that it was in the best interests of 
unions to join them (Hunter, 1986: 63).   
Provincial drives elsewhere in Canada enjoyed more success.  These efforts were 
re-enforced in 1958 when the CLC decided in conference to put old internal debates 
aside and push forward for the creation of a new party.  The years of 1956 to 1961 were 
marked by an exciting debate among the ranks of labour, the CCF and progressive 
Canadians about how the new party should take shape.  The 1956 CCF conference 
replaced the Regina Manifesto, famous for labeling the Canadian capitalist system a 
“cancer on Canadian culture,” with the more moderate Winnipeg Manifesto.  The 
concession was a step towards the center of Canadian politics and replaced the 
traditional CCF position that socialization of the economy was the only solution to 
Canadian economic and social issues with the admission that a mixed economy could 
hold the same positive and progressive results (Horowitz, 1968: 191).   By 1959, the joint 
efforts of labour, progressive minded old party membership, “New Party” clubs and 
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other interested parties had coalesced behind the leadership of Stanley Knowles and his 
CLC supported National Committee for the New Party (NCNP). 
Knowles led the charge to a new party on through until 1961.  The new party 
movement faced resistance internally from party members who feared the loss of 
control of the party, and a vocal minority who believed the new party’s link to labour 
would result in an influx of American influence (Whitehorn, 1992: 67).  During the four 
day national conference in 1961 held jointly by the CCF, the CLC and the various NCNP 
branches to form the new party, tension between the old CCF membership and the 
labour movement in Alberta hit a boiling point.  The Alberta delegation at the Ottawa 
conference was made up for the most part by new party supporters and labour 
representatives.  However, a vocal contingent from the traditional socialist side of the 
party accompanied the group.   The motion to form a provincial branch of the new party 
passed, with the leader of the labour contingent, Neil Reimer, elected provincial leader.   
A large portion of the old guard Alberta CCF delegates voted against the new 
party motion and held a separate one day convention to determine the fate of the 
resistance to the new party.  The meeting presented the attendees with three options 
to chose from: disbanding the Alberta branch of the CCF and taking up the cause of 
socialism up in other forums; seeking formal affiliation with the new party; or forming a 
study group from the old membership that would seek ways to advance the cause of 
socialism within the structure of the new party.  In the end the study group route was 
chosen, and the Woodworth-Irvine fellowship was created (Horowitz, 1968: 219).  The 
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series of events highlighted a tension between labour and non labour members of the 
new party that exists to this day. 
With the formation of the NDP in Ottawa in 1961, labour politics took a marked 
turn.  In the past unions and labour organizations had to choose between independent 
labour candidates and small parties with little chance of electoral victory, or they were 
forced to work with the socialist agenda of the CCF.  For organized labour the NDP 
represented a party labour could call “their own” (interview with a labour leader, Oct. 
29, 2008). That being said, the NDP did not emerge as a clone of the British Labour party 
as originally intended by the CLC.  A series of compromises between the founding 
members of the party became necessary.  These structural limitations on the ability of 
labour to influence the party were necessitated by the democratic internal nature of the 
NDP.  The NDP maintained the early tradition of the CCF and relied on the convention 
and bottom up policy development to drive the party position.  As well, leadership was 
chosen by party delegates and was relatively free from the influence of the party elite3.  
The non labour contingent that formed the party feared the ability of labour to 
dominate intra party politics.  Therefore, the degree to which party policy could be 
shaped by organized labour was structurally limited by design to allow the equal 
representation of both labour and the individual membership.   
The party was designed without the controlling “block vote” British unions 
enjoyed (Horowitz, 1968: 221).  The NDP looked to its organizational predecessor the 
                                                          
3
 The system of leadership selection was by no means perfectly democratic.  Until 2003 the party 
weighted delegate votes and adjusted the labour percentage to make up a quarter of the total voting 
number.  After 2003 the party shifted to a one vote one member system in attempt to curb labour 
influence in the leadership selection process.  For a complete discussion on intra party democracy see 
William Cross “Political Parties” chapters 3 and 5.    
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CCF for affiliation rules.  At convention federal constituencies’ delegates were to be 
allocated according to a set formula.  One delegate was awarded for every 50 members 
or less up to a total of 200 members, and one delegate for each additional 100 members 
or fraction thereof.  Affiliated organizations were granted one delegate for each 1000 
members or fraction thereof with a minimum of one delegate (NDP Constitution, 2008).  
The NDP, like the CCF, has a unique structure compared to other Canadian parties.  The 
provincial and federal branches are fused with membership at one level defaulting to 
membership in the other level; as a result unions affiliate by local at the provincial level.   
The question of the NDP being a union party or not has been conclusively laid to 
rest in the literature.  Archer argues, in his study of labour the CCF and NDP that “In 
evaluating the linkages between organized labour and the NDP, it becomes obvious that 
the party like its predecessor, the CCF, is not a labour party or a party controlled by 
organized labour.  Rather it is a social democratic party with links of varying strength to 
the union movement, some of which are purposefully weak” (1990:39).  This reality has 
placed the NDP in a constant state of tension.  On one side the party has the labour 
interests and their contributions of money and personnel; on the other side, the party 
deals with the rank and file members whose changing voting preferences must be 
accommodated for the party to stay relevant in the Canadian brokerage style party 
system.   
Archer’s descriptive work on the links between party and union are important to 
understanding the current state of the party.  Political Choices is a strong quantitative 
study of the early era relationship between the NDP and organized labour at the 
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national level.  Archer lists three ways in which the linkage between the NDP and 
organized labour are expressed: personnel relations, financial contributions and 
affiliation numbers (1990:41).  Personnel linkages are, according to Archer, amorphous 
and difficult to measure.  Labour is represented at the various levels of party leadership 
with guaranteed delegate and committee members (1990, 31).  While a there is 
guaranteed presence of organized labour in the leadership and decision making 
structure of the party, it does not compose a majority position.  The legacy of hesitancy 
towards organized labour that dominated CCF era thought permeates the leadership 
structure of the NDP to this day. 
Like the personnel linkages, the financial contributions to the NDP from 
organized labour during the early phases of the party are difficult to measure.  As the 
federal and provincial branches of the party are fused, there is a more pronounced 
sharing of funds than is evident in any other party in Canadian politics.  Contributions 
can come from affiliated locals via a mandatory fee, individual donations, and large 
donations from union head offices to the party.  In general affiliated union dues have 
never made up more than nine percent of the total federal operational budget for the 
party.  One time lump sum denotations from unions predictably ebb and flow with the 
election cycle and have varied from a total of less than    $250 000 to over two million 
during the mid 1980s.  However the bulk of NDP financing has come from individual 
donations from the party faithful4.  Union money has never made up more than 46 
                                                          
4
 A more detailed analysis of the current state of NDP and union financial links at both the federal and 
provincial level will be provided in the following chapter as part of the discussion of the current context of 
the relationship. 
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percent of any total annual operating budget, and at times had dipped in non election 
years to under 20 percent (Archer 1990, 36).  
The final linkage discussed by Archer is the formal affiliation ties between labour 
and the party.  Part of the logic of building a new party was based on the assumption 
that union locals would be more apt to formally affiliate with the party, capitalizing on 
an opportunity the CCF had failed to take advantage of.  Archer’s work does 
demonstrate an increase in affiliation numbers when compared with the CCF era party 
labour relations.  However, the increase, while dramatic, came in one large, early burst, 
and then hit an early plateau.  A similar pattern emerged in Alberta where several locals 
from larger national unions (CUPE and the United Steelworkers) affiliated with the party 
at the behest of their national offices, with few affiliations after the 1970s (Interview 
with a Party, May 24, 2008).  As the overall union population in Canada increased, the 
overall percentage of affiliated union members decreased.  Figures 3.4 and 3.5 
summarize Archer’s research for selected years and summarize the affiliation trend both 
in absolute affiliation numbers with the party and the percentage of the total labour 
population affiliated. 
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Fig 3.4 Growth in Affiliated Union Locals 1961-1979 (Archer, 1992:43) 
 
 
Fig 3.5 Decline in the percentage of total union population affiliated with the 
party (Archer, 1992:43) 
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successful electoral platform.  The electoral performance of the NDP has been mixed.  
At the federal level the party maintained a steady level of performance in the frequent 
elections of the 1960s.  The NDP drew seats from B.C, Manitoba and Ontario but failed 
to produce a breakthrough electoral result in its first four elections5.  The party 
maintained the provincial success the CCF had enjoyed in Manitoba, Saskatchewan and 
British Columbia into the 1960s, but failed to win a seat in the Alberta legislature until 
1971. Figures 3.6 and 3.7 illustrate the performance of the federal party by popular vote 
and by total percentage of House of Commons seats won, and for the Alberta NDP for 
popular vote. (The party did not win a seat until 1971). 
Fig 3.6 Performance of the Federal NDP (Source: Elections Canada) 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 This chapter will place an artificial cut-off date for discussion at 1971.   The 1971 provincial election in 
Alberta was marked by a shift in party dynasty to the Progressive Conservatives.  The 1970s onwards at 
the federal and provincial level will be considered and discussed in the next chapter as part of the current 
context debate. 
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Fig 3.7 NDP Popular Vote Total in Alberta 1959-1971 (Source: Elections Alberta) 
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headed alternative to the socialist policy of the NDP.  The Social Credit party also 
absorbed much of the left leaning vote by implementing popular social welfare policies 
just as the federal Liberals had done.  The 1947 incarnation of Alberta Bill of Rights 
guaranteed every Albertan education, medical benefits, social security, disability 
benefits and access to old age pensions and cut off much of the progressive agenda the 
NDP/CCF had lobbied for (Caldarola, 1979: 43). 
The discovery of oil in the Leduc in 1947 set in motion a cascade of economic 
events that naturally favored the party in power.  American companies rushed into the 
province to explore and exploit the newly found natural resource.  By the 1950s the 
economic effects were in full swing.  Between 1950 and 1968 oil revenues and royalties 
added over 2.5 billion dollars to the provincial coffers (Johnson, 1980: 65).  The sudden 
increase in material wealth combined with the willingness of the Social Credit party to 
spend (by 1968 Alberta spent $100 per capita over the national average on public 
services) made for a difficult environment for labour and progressive politics posited by 
the provincial NDP.  By 1966 the provincial debt was nearly cleared, taxes were reduced 
and there was a 600 million dollar surplus (Caldarola 1979, 44).   
The provincial demographics began to change as well; more and more jobs were 
created in the mostly non unionized oil and gas sector.  Union numbers did increase in 
the province, but this was mostly driven by growth in public sector white collar unions 
which were often less apt to vote for the proposals of blue collar unions (Archer, 1990: 
61).   In addition, the population mix shifted, and for the first time in the 1950s the 
majority of people lived in the major urban centers.  This eroded the traditional rural 
72 
 
support base of the CCF/ NDP and caused an internal tug of war between rural 
agricultural policy positions and the need to attract new middle class city dwellers 
within.  During the 1930s and 1940s Social Credit and the CCF competed as different 
forms of protest against a set of economic and structural factors that disadvantaged the 
province.  The 1960s saw for the first time a materially prosperous province.  The 
natural tendency was for interest to drift away from NDP politics, even with the addition 
of labour support in earnest.  The strong economic performance in the province and 
visible increase in material wealth cemented the Social Credit position of dominance in 
the province until 1971. 
The third era in party and union co-operation in Alberta set the stage for the 
modern circumstances that shape the relationship between the two entities.  On the 
labour front the competing national representational bodies put aside old cleavages 
between skilled and unskilled, national and international sides, and united into one 
cohesive national body.  The newly united labour front precipitated a dramatic change 
in the relationship between political parties and unions.  As the CCF electoral numbers 
continued to decline, the labour movement seized on the opportunity and helped 
promote the creation of new left party designed around formal links with labour.  The 
formation of the NDP was a historic event for labour and party politics in Canada; 
however, the party in practice has failed to evolve into a “union” party in the sense of 
the British labour party in the 1950s.  Affiliation rules in the NDP constitution limited the 
ability of organized labour to control the party, and left the balance of policy formation 
power with the rank and file membership.  Once the party solidified its constitution, 
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union locals did not affiliate with the party in the numbers that the party designers had 
hoped.  Finally, a study of the monetary contribution foundation of the party shows that 
the party is dependent on small individual donations and not beholden to the organized 
labour. 
The impact of the formation of the NDP in Alberta provincial politics was 
minimal.  The left in Alberta was torn between progressive Canadians, labour interests 
and old guard socialists.  The formation of the NDP came at a rather inopportune time 
as the dominant Social Credit party had made a marked shift to the center and was 
spending the new billions that the oil boom had brought to the province.  The NDP was 
painted by Social Credit, like its predecessor the CCF, as socialist and counter to the 
material interests of the province.  The old radical union presence in the province had 
faded as the coal and other mining industries gave way to oil and gas and service 
industries.  The one party tendency in Alberta was shored up by strong economic 
performance, an increase in material well being, and a shift to an upwardly mobile 
urban middle class population.  These structural changes minimized the traction NDP 
politics could gain and held the party to no legislature seats until 1971.   
This chapter has presented a summary of the major events that have shaped the 
relationship between labour and left of center political parties in Alberta.  The evolution 
of labour interests and political parties during this seventy year period was considerable.  
The Alberta economy evolved from an agricultural and mining base to the modern 
service and oil and gas industry we know today.  During this evolution much of the 
militancy in and public support for the Alberta labour movement eroded.  By 1971 
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unions struggled to gain support for their political positions in an economic boom 
environment.  At the party level “labour” politics evolved from single independent 
candidates to small scale socialist parties, and then capitalized on the sense of western 
alienation during the great depression to initiate formal organizational ties with 
organized labour.    This project will now turn to the modern era in Alberta politics that 
began with the Conservative takeover in 1971.  With this understanding of the varied 
history of party and union in the province, the current state and plurality of interests 
and approaches to politics should seem more in context.   
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Chapter 4: The Modern Context for Union-Party Relations in Alberta 1971-2008 
Introduction 
Up to this point this thesis has examined the theoretical explanations for union 
and party co-operation, grounding its analysis in Western European comparative 
literature.  The thesis has also presented an analysis of the various types of modern 
political parties and argued that the Alberta New Democrats should be considered 
primarily a policy seeking party with mass party roots.  The third chapter placed the NDP 
in its historical setting, reviewed the evolution of labour politics in Alberta, and 
examined the links between party and union that have developed over time.   The 
previous chapter confirmed Archer’s conclusion that the NDP can best be understood as 
an ideologically driven left of center party with strong institutional ties to labour, but 
not a “union” party in the sense of the British labour.  The analysis of Alberta labour and 
party history concluded at the 1971 election.  This marked the transition from the Social 
Credit dynasty to the current era of Progressive Conservative domination and the 
modern era in Alberta politics. 
  This chapter will focus on the performance of the Alberta New Democrats in 
this modern era of provincial politics.  In particular the chapter will argue that the 
tension that exists between labour and the party can be traced to the electoral 
performance of the party since 1971.  This era was marked by a peak in party 
performance, when the NDP reached the position of official opposition (1986-1993) in 
the province.  This era was both preceded and followed by marginal electoral results 
that were compounded by the mechanics of the Alberta electoral system.  The peak in 
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the 1980s still acts to divide the various factions in the labour/party relationship.  The 
party and its loyal affiliated unions point to the period as official opposition as evidence 
that the long awaited electoral breakthrough was possible in the past and therefore is 
on the horizon (interview with party official May, 2008).  Skeptics and realists among 
unions argue that the peak of the party’s influence is firmly in the rearview mirror, and 
that the current trend in the party’s electoral performance  points to the need for a 
“new approach” (interview with a union leader, Sept., 2008).   
1971: The Rise of the Lougheed Conservatives and the Emergence of a Competitive 
Party System 
 The most recent party dynasty began in Alberta in 1971 when the incoming 
Progressive Conservatives replaced the outgoing Social Credit dynasty.  The classic 
explanation for Albertan’s electoral behavior prior to the 1971 election was drawn for 
C.B. Macpherson’s analysis of the province’s economic foundation.   Using a Marxist 
analysis of the Alberta political economy Macpherson attributed one party dominance 
in Alberta to two separate characteristics (1953:5).  First, the overwhelming dominance 
of a petite bourgeoisie class, anchored in agriculture and small town dynamic of the 
province.  According to Macpherson this large portion of the population voted nearly in 
unison providing consistent majority results for the dominant party.  Macpherson stops 
short of arguing for a one party system citing small pockets of class resistance to the 
petite bourgeoisie; this fragmented class resistance provided for legislative presences of 
a variety of small parties, a situation that Macpherson calls a quasi party system 
(1953:17).        
77 
 
The second component of Macpherson argument is the province’s semi colonial 
relationship with central Canada (1953:21).  Alberta’s resource and agriculture 
dependent economy placed the province at the mercy of fluctuations in world pricing, 
as well as leaving the province vulnerable to imperialistic tendencies from central 
Canada.  These two factors provided a strong incentive for Albertans to support a strong 
provincial government, resulting in solidarity and uniformity in political behavior 
(Macpherson, 1953:19).   
By 1971, several of the underlying assumptions about the Alberta political 
economy built into the Macpherson thesis had changed, challenging the economic 
underpinnings that supported the idea of the petite bourgeoisie.  The economy had 
undergone a significant shift from agriculture, mining and railroad dependency at the 
turn of the century, to a modern service-based industry with oil and gas extraction, 
transportation and management as the core economic engine.  The resulting economic 
and demographic change in Alberta was striking (Caldarola, 1979: 44).   A complete 
analysis of the change to the Alberta culture and economy is beyond the scope of this 
chapter.  In brief, the results of the changes were a continued shift of rural to urban 
population balance, an influx of new residents from other provinces and abroad, 
diversification of the economy to reflect not only the importance of oil and gas and 
agriculture but also other tertiary and service sector industries, and a dramatic increase 
in provincial and individual wealth and standard of living (Richards and Pratt, 1979: 148). 
These shifts in the social and political make up of Alberta created the need for an 
updated analysis of Alberta’s party system.  Flanagan argues that the single dominant 
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class explanation had been replaced by the 1970s by four distinct geographical, 
economic regions each with their own competitive political leanings in Alberta 
(Flanagan, 1975:16).  This, combined with the changes to Alberta economy during the 
1950s-1970s, redefined the traditional rules for the Alberta party system, setting the 
foundations for a modern competitive party environment (Elton and Goddard, 1979: 
66).       
With this shift away from the quasi party thesis in mind the explanations for the 
Progressive Conservative victory in 1971 has been interpreted different ways.   A 
popular interpretation of the PC takeover is the notion that Alberta began to “outgrow” 
its rural protest identity during the 1960s.  According to this view, the 1971 election 
represented a tipping point for the influence of a new middle class (Richards and Pratt, 
1979: 149).  This view places the victory of the PC party in the hands of new urban and 
middle class voters that saw Social Credit as the party of an older era of agrarian protest 
in Alberta. 
Another variation on this theory focuses on a shifts in the political culture in 
Alberta.  Dacks (1986) argues that the shift in unanimity in the Alberta electorate from 
one party to another during the history of the province has always been a result of two 
dominant cultural factors.  First, Albertans feel a universal alienation from Central 
Canada and see an important utility in equipping the provincial government with a 
strong majority to defend the provincial interests in the national arena. Second, the 
electorate will always act to protect a dominant commodity interest (Dacks, 1986: 188).  
This commodity interest has shifted historically from agriculture and mining to its 
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current form of oil and natural gas.  Dacks argues that the shift from Social Credit to 
Progressive Conservative marks a shift in confidence of the Alberta electorate to a new 
champion and protector of the dominant commodity, similar to the previous shifts from 
Liberal to UAF and UAF to Social Credit (1986: 189). 
  Bell (1993: 458)  and Elton and Goddard (1979: 51) argue that the 1971 election 
was the result of a series of smaller factors that eroded the Social Credit position and 
not a dramatic shift in class support. Utilizing electoral return data from provincial 
elections, Bell argues that many sociological arguments about the PC takeover make 
assumptions about the electorate that are not supported by data.  Bell demonstrates 
that Social Credit outgrew its “rural identity” early on and was never truly bound to a 
single class in Alberta (1989: 47). He goes on to argue that social class voting patterns 
are the best lens for the analysis of Alberta politics during, especially at the end of the 
Social Credit era.  Bell shows that rural and farm support was an important component 
of Social Credit support but was closely matched during both the Aberhart and Manning 
eras with urban support, primarily from working class and labour union dominated 
ridings (Bell, 1993: 457).  The assertion that Social Credit was the party of an older rural 
identity is suspect for Bell as he demonstrates a clear amount of support for Social 
Credit as far back as the mid 1950s from the growing urban middle class. 
Elton and Goddard point to the importance of the lowering of the voting age 
from 19 to 18 along with an influx of first time voters as an important factor in the PC 
win, citing data from the era that demonstrated a distinct advantage for the PC’s in first 
time voters (Elton and Goddard, 1979: 54).  Both Bell and Elton and Goddard argue both 
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that Social Credit leader Strom was not as well received as his predecessor Manning and 
that Lougheed’s leadership and campaign style may have played a decisive role in 
gaining support from centrist voters (Bell, 1993: 466; Elton and Goddard, 1979: 54).  
These elements combined to increase the competitive level of many ridings that were 
long term strongholds for Social Credit.  Both studies point out that the PC take over 
came from a increase of 3.6 per cent in the popular vote from 1967 to 1971 that 
translated into a shift of over 30 seats (Elections Alberta). 
Viewed in this light the PC victory in 1971 represented a more subtle 
realignment of the Alberta electorate behind a new party.  However, like the Social 
Credit takeover in 1935, the realignment did not open any new electoral space for the 
Alberta New Democrats.  Bell’s work has demonstrated that all three key support 
groups that the NDP sought to unite (farmers, labour, and the lower middle class) failed 
to unite behind a single party.  Instead the groups split support between both the Social 
Credit and PC parties, with marginal and geographically dispersed support for the NDP.  
Elton and Goddard’s review of both the 1967 and 1971 elections reach similar 
conclusions to Bell, demonstrating that the target support group of the NDP 
transitioned from Social Credit to the Lougheed Conservatives. 
The 1971 election represented an opportunity for increased competition in the 
Alberta party system, the change in leadership in the Social Credit party, and entrance 
of the Progressive Conservatives created an environment that shook up long standing 
voting behavior.  However, the NDP proved unable to capitalize on the exodus of voters 
from Social Credit.   In particular, the labour movement in the province found difficulty 
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coalescing behind the Notley era agrarian socialist tone to the party and weak 
legislature presence.  Internally, during the late 1970s and early 1980s the party found 
itself balancing calls for a stronger socialist approach including the nationalization of key 
oil companies with the more moderate populist approach of Notley (Tupper, 1986: 91).   
 By 1975 the Lougheed Conservatives were able to solidify their position in the 
minds of many voters as the protector of the Provincial interests; after a lengthy conflict 
with Ottawa over oil price fixing, the Conservatives settled into a dominant position in 
the province’s political system.  Despite early success, the Progressive Conservative era 
has not been absent of periods of electoral instability. The transition in PC leadership 
from Peter Lougheed to Don Getty (1985) produced an opportunity for opposition 
parties in Alberta.  During the mid 1980s, Alberta found itself in the midst of a major 
downturn in the oil and gas industry and reliance on provincial budget deficits.  With 
Social Credit unable to recover from its electoral defeat in 1971, the New Democrats 
were left as the default opposition party (Archer, 1992: 123).   
With new unproven leadership in the government facing an uneasy public, 
concerned about the provincial economy the NDP had its best showing in the party’s 
history.  Under the leadership of Ray Martin, after the tragic death of Grant Notley the 
Alberta New Democrats won 16 seats, with 11 seats in the Edmonton area and 2 in 
Calgary, making an important breakthrough into the growing urban population in 
Alberta (up until this point the party was limited to a base position in Notley’s riding of 
Spirit River-Fairview, and Edmonton-Norwood in 1982).  Under Martin the party 
repeated its electoral results in the 1989 election winning the same number of seats, 
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with only a slight dip in popular vote (see table 4.1).  The seven year period in 
opposition marked a high point in union-party relations, according to many union 
leaders, as organized labour and the party coalesced around the party’s new found 
prominence (interview with union leader Oct. 29, 2008).   
The 1993 election resulted in another realignment in Alberta politics.  The NDP 
lost 11 per cent of its 1989 popular vote total and all of its legislature seats.  The new 
Progressive Conservative leader, Ralph Klein, managed to hold power despite 
surrendering eight seats from the party’s 1989 total.  Klein campaigned on an end to the 
strong state/interventionist style of the Getty Conservatives (Archer, 1992: 114).  
Building on the results of the breakthrough 1998 election, the provincial Liberal party 
overtook the NDP position of natural opposition.   The 1993 election results have settled 
into the norm for Alberta politics despite leadership and policy changes in all three 
major parties.   
One Party Dominance Reconsidered 
The post 1971 party system has shown the potential for increased competition 
(Tupper, 1986: 204); however, the reality has been the opposite.  After the Klein to 
Stelmach leadership transition, even after a leadership change the PC party holds over 
80 per cent of the Legislature seats and continues to hold an uninterrupted majority 
position.   In an attempt to explain the phenomenon of continued single party 
dominance in Alberta, McCormick compared Alberta to other provincial electoral results 
and found that Alberta’s electoral pattern of single party dominance was not unique 
(1980: 84).  McCormick’s research advanced a set of four propositions on the Alberta 
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electoral situation.  First, the tendency toward one party dominance in provincial 
elections was not unique to Alberta.  Secondly, the vote share of the winning party in 
Alberta was comparable to several other provinces.  Thirdly, when examining the seat 
share rendered by the single member plurality (SMP) system, the dominance in Alberta 
was unique.   Finally, the first three propositions led to the study’s ultimate conclusion: 
“It is not that Albertans vote unusually heavily for a single party, or that they give 
unusually few votes to a opposing parties, but that they scatter their opposition votes in 
such a fashion that the each opposition party suffers heavily for the punitive effects of 
the single-member electoral system” (1980: 88).  Effectively, the plurality of party 
choices and the disproportionate results from the SMP electoral system in the province 
act to re-enforce the dominant party advantage.    
McCormick’s work was revisited more recently by Jansen who tested the four 
key propositions in McCormick’s 1980 analysis.  Jansen correctly justifies his re-
examination of McCormick’s conclusion by pointing out that the last 25 years has 
witnessed a new era of volatility in provincial politics outside of Alberta, but 
paradoxically the Conservatives have held power the entire time in province.  Since the 
early 1980s (the period of McCormick’s analysis) Alberta’s tendency towards strong 
single party dominance has become more of a unique feature compared to other 
provinces.  Jansen suggests that McCormick’s singling out of the distortional effects of 
the provincial SMP system as well as the fragmentation of opposition are re-implicated 
as the culprits for the weak opposition presence in the Alberta legislature (2004: 10). 
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The Effects of Single Member Plurality Electoral System 
Archer (1992) and Jansen and Young (2005) have pointed out several ways in 
which the mechanics of Alberta SMP system can distort the relationship between 
popular vote totals and seat allocation.  The “first past the post” nature of the SMP 
system tends to reward parties with geographically concentrated support and punish 
parties whose support is spread out between many ridings.  The degree of competition 
in each riding can also have a distortional effect as well.  In cases where three or more 
parties garner significant portions of the vote, the threshold to win the contested seat is 
reduced (Archer, 1992: 114).   Building on McCormick’s thesis, Archer argues that many 
of Alberta’s ridings were demonstrating competitive characteristics (three or more 
parties with ten percent of the vote or more).  This results in a situation where the 
winning party in a competitive riding may have a relatively small proportion of popular 
support (Archer 1992: 56).  This observation is most applicable to the urban ridings in 
Calgary and Edmonton.  In the 2004 election the Conservatives won eight urban ridings 
with less than a plurality of popular vote; by 2008 the total increased to 15 (Elections 
Alberta).   
Chalmers highlights a secondary effect of the weak opposition positions inherent 
to the Alberta system, the propensity of the dominant party to govern with little regard 
for consultation with the opposing parties.  The British parliamentary system, built on 
the concept of confidence, inherently grants a monopoly on policy formation to any 
majority party.  This is balanced in theory with the assumption that a strong opposition 
will include alternate perspectives in question period, with committee membership, and 
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by other means including media coverage.  However, in Alberta the opposition is so 
weak and fragmented that the governing party is able to force legislation with little or 
no debate.  Tupper has noted the propensity for a “business” approach to politics that 
began with the Manning era Social Credit party and has continued with the Conservative 
party.  Opposition leadership have charged the government with a style of leadership 
that builds policy behind closed doors, leaving debate in Legislature as an afterthought 
(Tupper, 1986: 94).   Chalmers lists the lack of debate over the details of the formation 
of the Heritage Fund, the dissolution of the Environmental Conservation authority, and 
the decision to build the Red Deer River dam in an environmentally sensitive location as 
examples of the strong arm tactics utilized by the PC party in Alberta, despite resolute 
opposition to and lack of public support of such plans (Chalmers, 1986: 173).   
This behavioral pattern by the government has been particularly pronounced in 
its dealings with organized labour.  Unions in the public sector faced a series of strong 
arm tactics in the 1990s including budget cuts and wage reductions despite concerted 
efforts to open public debate (Reshef and Rastin, 2003).  The recent revisions to the 
Alberta labour code aimed at curbing union rights in construction and ambulance 
services in the summer of 2008 are another example of this trend.    This behavior has 
the effect of compounding the psychological effects mentioned by Jansen and Young.  
When a controversial policy is enacted with little consultation, opposition parties seem 
even more useless in their ability to influence the political system. 
A portion of the post 1971 electoral results in Alberta are demonstrated in 
figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3.  Figures 4.1 and 4.2 present the total number of seats won by 
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the NDP and the Progressive Conservatives since 1971 in proportion to popular vote, 
while figure 4.3 presents the voter turnout.  At first glance figures 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate 
the general trend of a dominant position the PC party has occupied and also highlight 
the ongoing marginal position of the New Democrats.  Since 1971 the Alberta New 
Democrats have managed a peak performance of 16 seats (19.28% of the legislature) on 
a popular vote total of 29.22 per cent.  The party repeated the electoral success of 1986 
in the subsequent election, holding 16 seats despite a slight dip in popular support to 
26.29 per cent.  This era in the 1980s represents the best performance for the CCF/NDP 
in Alberta politics; however, the foothold as the official opposition party in the 
Legislature was short lived.  The New Democrats were completely wiped out of the 
Legislature in the 1993 election, and saw their share of the popular vote plummet to 
11.01 per cent.  Since this boom and bust cycle, the party has maintained a small 
position of two to four seats in the Legislature and surrendered the official opposition 
position to the Alberta Liberal Party.  Since 1971, the Alberta New Democrats have 
averaged 14.61 per cent of the popular vote and a meager 5.52 per cent of Legislature 
seats.  The performance of the PC party has been the opposite extreme; the party 
formed a majority government in 1971 and has not been defeated since.  The party has 
held a peak Legislature seat share of 75 (95%) and has averaged just fewer than 80 per 
cent of the Legislature seats since 1971. 
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Fig 4.1 Alberta New Democrat's Electoral Performance Post 1971 (Source: Elections 
Alberta) 
 
 
Fig 4.2 Alberta Progressive Conservative Electoral Performance 1971-2008 (Source: 
Elections Alberta) 
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Fig 4.3 Voter Turnout in Alberta Provincial Elections 1971-2008 (Source Elections 
Alberta) 
 
 
 
The charts also present the popular vote in each election during the era.   The 
data presented illustrates the distortional effects of the single member plurality (SMP) 
system in Alberta pointed out by McCormick, Archer, and Jansen and Young.  When 
comparing the two charts, the natural advantage of the dominant party becomes clear.  
Assuming that a party’s percentage of popular vote in an election should result in a 
relatively comparable percentage of seats in the provincial legislature is desirable (the 
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the popular vote.  In effect, the electoral system has over rewarded the PC’s by an 
average of about 21 seats per election since 1971.  These seats come at the expense of 
opposition parties whose support is too geographically spread out to capitalize on 
election results properly (Jansen, 2004:16).  The Alberta New Democrats, for example, 
have won a respectable average of 14.61 per cent of the popular vote from 1971 to the 
present; however, this has only translated to an average of 5.52 per cent of the 
Legislature.  The Alberta Liberal party has faced much the same issue, in the 2008  
election, despite winning more than a 26 per cent of the popular vote the party only 
holds 10 per cent of the Legislature seats.  
To summarize, the electoral position of the NDP in provincial elections since 
1971 has been mixed.  The party enjoyed its greatest success when the NDP reached the 
position of official opposition for two consecutive elections.  However, the success was 
short lived, and like the CCF, the NDP has failed to capitalize on any weaknesses the 
dominant party revealed.  The trend of strong dynasty era governments has continued 
in the modern era with the Progressive Conservatives taking over the dominant position 
from Social Credit.  As Jansen (2004: 15) has pointed out, no conclusive explanation has 
been established for the enduring presence of the PC’s in Alberta.  Even the notion that 
leadership (Bell 1993: 471), combined with the Albertan need to protect dominant 
resource interests against Central Canada (Dacks, 1986: 190) seems in doubt.  The 2008 
election saw an increase in Legislature presence and popular vote for the PC’s despite 
the exodus of an iconic leader in Klein and his replacement with the less than 
charismatic Stelmach.  As well, the election was contested on the heels of the 
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government’s decision to raise the cost of oil exploration and extraction in the province 
via changes to the royalty package.  The government made this change despite stern 
opposition from a variety of industry and financial groups.  The structural contours of 
the Alberta party system place all opposing parties, in particular the NDP, in a 
perpetually weak position.  Compounding the NDP electoral problems is the re-
emergence of the Alberta Liberal party.  The Liberals have occupied second party status 
since the early 1990s.  
Finally, as it pertains to party and union linkages the weak legislature position 
occupied by the Alberta New Democrats has had lasting ramifications for the 
relationship.  The party has been unable to constantly provide real policy influence 
during the era of Tory rule.  This has come at the expense of  organized labour directly, 
as in case of recent legislation curtailing the rights of unionized ambulance and 
construction workers  in the summer of 2008, and indirectly because of small “c” 
economic policy.  The final portion of this thesis will examine how unions and the party 
interact given the weak position of the party. 
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Chapter 5: The Union-Party Relationship in the Modern Era of Alberta Politics and 
the Importance of the Rational Exchange 
Introduction 
Chapter 5 will build on the contextual background, both historic and theoretical, 
established in the previous sections of this thesis and bring the discussion of the 
relationship between organized labour and the Alberta New Democrats into its current 
context.  In particular, this chapter will argue that the relationship between the NDP and 
unions in Alberta is strained, internally by fragmentation in the labour movement itself, 
and externally by the difficult political and economic environment unique to Alberta.  
After reviewing interview data, party literature, and party and union financial data, this 
chapter will argue that a clear split is emerging in the political behavior of Alberta’s 
labour movement.  On one side, some unions are continuing long established patterns 
of support, and in some cases aligning for the first time with the party.  Research 
presented in this chapter will show that these unions are participating in an 
asymmetrical exchange, betting that the party represents the best course of action in 
the difficult Alberta context, despite the lack of policy return on material investment.  
For these unions concerns over the lack of return of policy are lessened out a shred 
sense of ideological commitment.  
On the other side many of Alberta’s unions as well as the provincial labour 
federation are acting on a long standing history of disappointment with the party.  A 
new strategy premised on unilateral action within the labour movement, absent of any 
party input, based on rational calculation has begun to gain momentum. Ultimately, if 
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the current trend in the union-party relationship that has emerged since 2001 is allowed 
to continue, the long term viability of the relationship could be in doubt.  
Methodology  
 Primary research for this thesis was conducted two different ways.  First, a 
series of interviews was conducted from April 17th, 2008 till November 30th, 2008.  
Interviews were conducted with leadership from both the labour movement and the 
party in Alberta, with particular attention to unions and labour organizations with a 
history of interaction with the party or active political agendas.  Additional interviews 
were done with rank and file membership of a variety of politically active unions to 
collaborate information gathered from interviews with leadership.  All interviews 
followed a semi structured format, based on a standard questionnaire (available for 
review in Appendix 1) with participants allowed a period for open comments.  
Permission to present data and quotes obtained in interviews was granted via signed 
consent, with confidentiality guaranteed in the same document.   
Secondly, a review of party financial data and party records was conducted to in 
an attempt to quantify some of the links between the party and unions.  Research on 
financial and party records was also used to cross reference data produced in interviews 
whenever possible1.  Research is presented in two forms, first in the following section of 
the thesis and secondly in a series of appendixes at the end of the thesis which contain 
summary information on the labour movement as well as financial data. 
                                                          
1
 For example, party leadership claimed in the 2008 election close to half of all candidates had ties to 
organized labour, in order to verify this claim a review of candidate bios and information was done.   
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The selection of Alberta as a case study was based on several factors.  
Historically the province has been home to a long tradition of labour activism, and the 
birthplace for an important component of the Canadian left in 1932, with the formation 
of the CCF, and the Calgary Manifesto.    Success for the labour movement’s political 
ambitions has been elusive; as a result the labour movement in Alberta has developed 
into a small, divided, but effective and active portion of the Alberta political economy.  
Despite this history, and resulting unique labour movement, the relationship between 
unions and political parties at the provincial level in Alberta has not enjoyed a significant 
amount of scholarly inquiry.   
This long-term strain in the relationship between the two players creates an 
interesting window into the factors that maintain the relationship in Canada, but on a 
more manageable scale for study.  Unlike its western Canadian counterparts and in 
Ontario and Nova Scotia, Alberta has never had a CCF or NDP government.  Therefore 
the ties that bind labour and the federal party can be studied at a provincial level under 
a similar, if not more difficult situation.  In both federal and Alberta provincial politics, 
labour and the party must cooperate in an environment where tremendous pressure 
from within and outside the party is present, but where neither side can point to 
obvious tangible rewards that would could counterbalance the difficulty of the 
relationship (votes and substantial financial support for the party and policy and access 
to power for unions).    
From a contemporary perspective, the 2008 election cycle and the Albertans for 
Change movement represent a new and unique strategy for provincial labour 
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movements in Canada.  The full merit of this will be discussed in the following chapter, 
and could have implications in other provinces, and in the relationship that exists 
between unions and political parties at the federal level.  Primary research and 
interviews immediately after the 2008 election could lend an important insight into a 
new development in the links between political parties and civil society.     
The case suffers from some limitations.  With regards to comparisons to the 
Federal example, the current trend in minority governments has dealt the NDP a 
valuable position, that the party has successfully leveraged in several budget 
negotiations with both Liberal and Conservative governments.  The Alberta New 
Democrats do not benefit from a similar short-term stable access to decision making.  As 
well, the federal party has seen a steady increase in the last decade in both seat count 
and popular vote, the Alberta new democrats have stagnated and cling to a small core 
of support in Edmonton.  Notable differences exist in the way money flows between the 
federal party and unions that the Alberta equivalents.  Bill C-24 fundamentally limits the 
flow of money at the federal level, while Alberta is home to a lightly regulated and wide-
open campaign finance regime.  Finally, where in the federal example we find a notable 
hesitancy towards overt references to “union friendly politics” we find in Alberta a 
situation where party leadership is attempting to expand and capitalize on historic 
bonds. 
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Theoretical Models and Practical Application 
A variety of shaping factors, including the size of the legislature presence of the 
party and the political economy in Alberta, continue to influence the relationship 
between the NDP and its union support.  Chapter 2 discussed several theoretical models 
that explain the logic for relationships between political parties and unions.  Applying 
these models to the current Alberta situation is problematic, as many structural factors 
in the province, both political and economic are fairly unique.  To begin, we will consider 
the political economy explanation.  In this model, the logic for party and union co-
operation is predicated on an exchange, or social bargain.   The relationship between 
unions and left of center parties is a result of structural economic factors (Howell, 2001).  
Unions provide wage restraints and work force stability, while political parties (when 
able to influence policy making) provide a stable voice at the seat of power, maintain 
the welfare state that provides many public union sector jobs, and provide a well 
balanced structured environment where business, unions and government can 
effectively participate in a tripartite corporatist environment (Haugsgjerd, 2007). 
The historical, political and economic context discussed in the previous chapters 
of this thesis has demonstrated that necessary elements for a European type corporatist 
relationship have failed to develop in Alberta.  The current context in Alberta does not 
demonstrate any change in this trend.  Alberta’s union density is far less than most 
industrial economies (see table 5.1). Comparatively, with other provinces Alberta’s 
union density is the lowest in Canada (see table 5.2), Manitoba has the highest rate in 
the region and the second highest in the country at 36.9 per cent, Saskatchewan and 
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British Columbia are both well above the national average of 29.7 per cent at 33.4 per 
cent and 31 per cent respectively (Statistics Canada, CANSIM: 2008).  The percentage of 
unionized workers in Alberta has not shown signs of growth during the most recent 
boom cycle as some labour analyst have expected (Grant, 2005).  Despite an increase in 
demand for unionized workers in building and construction related industries the 
unionization rate in Alberta shrank .01  per cent from 1997 to 2008 (Statistics Canada 
CANSIM 1997-2008).   
Figure 5.1 Union Density as a Percentage of Total Workforce for Selected Countries 
(Pontusson, 2005; Statistics Canada CANSIM, 2005) 
Country Union Density 
  Sweden 79 
Denmark 74 
Belgium 56 
Norway 54 
U.K 31 
Canada 30 
Germany 25 
Australia 25 
Netherlands 23 
Alberta 22 
U.S.A 13 
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Figure 5.2 Union Density by Province 2008 (Akyeampong, 2008) 
Province Union Density 
  Newfoundland 36.6 
Manitoba 35.9 
Quebec 35.8 
Saskatchewan 33.4 
BC 31 
PEI 29.5 
Nova Scotia 28.9 
New Brunswick 27.1 
Ontario 26.8 
Alberta 22.3 
 
 
The industrial relations system in Alberta has developed along adversarial lines 
as opposed to the European model of co-operation.  Alberta’s unions behave in a similar 
fashion to their federal and American counterparts.  Negotiations between employers, 
unions and governments are seldom proactive.  Unions rely on strikes and disruptive 
activity to pressure concessions out of employers (Siaroff, 1999: 184).  From 2003 to 
2006, 743 individual work stoppages occurred in Canada, of these 622 (84%) were 
initiated by unions (Statistics Canada, 2006).  Strike activity in Alberta tends to come in 
spurts when large public sector unions enter into contract disputes with the provincial 
government.  For example, from January to May in 2001 over 76,000 days labour were 
lost to strike activity when transit and provincial workers could not reach contract 
agreement with the government.  But, from 2003 to 2005, only 115 000 total days 
labour were lost in the province, marking a period of stability (Statistics Canada, 2006).  
The government and private employers in Alberta view unions as obstacles and 
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expenses, and generally avoid co-operative behavior with unions and government (Cox, 
1974; Thompson, 1993).    
The weak position of labour in the provincial economy does not allow unions to 
participate in industrial relations the way the more strongly positioned European and 
British unions were able to historically.  Additionally, the Alberta labour movement lacks 
the cohesiveness of many European examples.  Alberta’s unions are represented by a 
several organizational bodies including the Alberta Federation of Labour (AFL), the 
Christian Labour Association of Canada (CLAC), and the Alberta Building Trades 
Commission (ABTC).   The result is a labour movement that is characterized by infighting 
(this will be explored in depth later in the chapter).    
Research on the specifics of the Alberta case has revealed an additional 
constraining factor.  Because of the small scale of the labour movement and the 
consolidation of power into several competing poles (the labour population in Alberta is 
less than 370 000 members concentrated in few large unions2) the relationship between 
elites in the party and labour movement can have an important shaping factor on the 
relationship. The phenomenon can both strengthen and weaken the formal links 
between party and union, research on the Alberta context points to destabilizing effect 
on the relationship.  In particular, the weak relationship between the party leader and 
the leadership of the AFL will be shown to be eroding traditional bonds between the 
two players.  In a similar situation the previous president of AUPE had strong negative 
                                                          
2
 Appendix 1 presents a breakdown of unions by population and number of locals, when such information 
was made available.  The combined population of AUPE, CUPE, ATA, and UNA for example make up over 
60% of the total union population in Alberta 
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personal views about the NDP, and a strained relationship with the party, this resulted 
AUPE’s decision to withdraw from AFL and distance itself from the party, pulling the 
largest union in the province out of the union and party dynamic.            
These structural factors, the electoral performance of the party, the political 
economy reality in the province, strained personal relationships, and the adversarial 
industrial relations system common in Canada quickly erode the elements necessary for 
the exchange that the political economy theory is predicated on.   
The ideological affinity theoretical model proposed in chapter 2 highlighted the 
ability of common goals and beliefs to influence union and party relations.  By default 
this seems to be strongest explanation of party and union behavior in Canada in the 
past, as the party has never seriously challenged power at the federal level (Bernard, 
1991: 108).  The Alberta context does provide some evidence of this type of exchange, 
especially between long term supportive unions and the party, interview data will be 
presented later in the chapter as support of this.  Ultimately, this theoretical framework 
fails to explain the most interesting phenomenon that this study has produced: the fact 
that many unions with shared ideological positions with the NDP choose not to work 
with the party.  To explain this trend we again return to the weak electoral position of 
the party.  The Alberta case seems to indicate that no matter what the shared 
ideological position of the actors, after a period of mediocre electoral performance by 
the party the rational tendencies of unions take priority in political interaction with a 
few exceptional cases. 
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By default this leaves us with the rational choice account for union and party 
interaction.  This theoretical model highlights the rational utility maximizing efforts of 
both unions and the party (Quinn, 2002: 209).  It predicts than when unions can offer 
votes, and resources, and the party can provide policy and access to power the two 
actors will cooperate out of mutual benefit.  More importantly, for our discussion of the 
difficulties facing Alberta union and party linkages the model predicts that the 
cooperation will break down when the exchange is not effective.  The political, 
economic and electoral context developed in the previous chapters of this thesis has 
demonstrated that the party has been historically incapable of supporting its end of the 
bargain via its Legislature position.  The union end of the bargain is less conclusive; 
unions in Alberta do not have the sheer numbers or resources to push the party into 
power but have made small but consistent donations of money and resources to the 
party.  I will argue based on research presented in this chapter that this dynamic, the 
inability of the party to uphold its end of the rational exchange, is driving the calculation 
made by many unions to pursue unilateral action.  Pooling the influence of the labour 
movement without the party is the rational course for union leaders that base political 
interaction on utility and not ideology.        
The Current Context of the Alberta Labour Movement 
The next section of this chapter will present a brief sketch of the current state of 
the Alberta labour movement based on interviews conducted as part of the primary 
research component of the project.  The Alberta labour movement is far from a 
homogeneous entity and is heavily divided on how to participate in the political arena.  
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As one union leader explained it “there are lots of family fights in the house of labour” 
(interview with a union leader Sept. 14, 2008).  We would expect in a normative sense 
that the AFL should act as the coordinating body for political action by labour in the 
province, mirroring the role of CLC at the Federal level.   In reality, Alberta unions are 
split into competing camps, with competitive organizational bodies including the 
Building Trades Council and the Christian Labour Association of Canada.  The result is a 
situation where the AFL is the major voice for labour in Alberta but not the only voice, 
and it is difficult if not impossible to aggregate the variety of union positions into a 
single voice. 
  The AFL is the provincial branch of the CLC and thus is affiliated with the party 
at the provincial level (NDP Constitution).  The AFL is by far the largest representational 
body for labour in the province. The organization represents 27 unions, 186 locals and 
approximately 136 990 members (AFL, 2008).  Unions in the AFL are from a diverse set 
of industries including healthcare, manufacturing, public service, and construction.  
However, only a small percentage of the unions that AFL represents are affiliated with 
the NDP.  This places an immediate strain on AFL and NDP links in the province.  AFL 
must balance the competing political leanings of all members of the house of labour (its 
primary responsibility is to unions and not to the party), while also attempting to 
promote the party to its members.   
The second largest representational body for labour in the province is the 
Alberta Building Trades Council. The ABTC represents 16 unions, 22 locals and 
approximately 55 000 members, all concentrated in the residential and commercial 
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building sector (ABTC, 2008).   The ABTC historically has had a mixed relationship with 
the NDP.  The organization has donated money to the party and represents one 
affiliated union, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers local 424 (IBEW 
424), but also represents several unions with loose ties to the Liberal and PC parties, the 
organization is also a strong supporter of the emerging non partisan trend in labour 
politics that will be explored in the next section of this chapter3. ABTC enjoys more 
internal cohesiveness than AFL as all represented unions participate in the same section 
of the economy.  In general the leadership from individual unions in ABTC are more 
concerned with effectively representing their individual membership and are less 
concerned with supporting a wide variety of policy positions, a stance that constrains 
the potential for wholesale support for the party (interview with union leaders, April 
17th-October 29th, 2008). As well,  the building trades often find their policy leanings at 
odds with the environmental focus of the NDP creating a natural tension between the 
two (interview with a union leader, May 22, 2008).     
The Christian Labour Association of Canada represents the fastest growing 
portion of the organized labour movement in Alberta, and unlike ABTC or AFL does not 
maintain a relationship with the CLC or the AFL.  CLAC Alberta represents 3 locals with 
around 27,000 members concentrated in the service industry, construction and the 
Save-on-Foods retail grocery chain (correspondence with CLAC Executive Director, June 
2009).  The organization is based on a less adversarial model than its counterparts in the 
                                                          
3
 Appendix 2 presents a breakdown of the membership of most major labour bodies in the province.  The 
approximate size (when available from the organization) is provided along with a brief note about the 
union’s relationship with the party.   
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Alberta labour movement, and as a result has found itself the target of significant 
negative attention from both the AFL and ABTC.  CLAC avoids direct partisan affiliation, 
preferring to focus on the needs of its individual membership and the profitability and 
viability of the business as a whole (correspondence with CLAC Executive Director, June 
2009).  
 The largest single union in the province, the Alberta Union of Provincial 
Employees (AUPE), has severed its ties with AFL, and since the mid 1990s has supported 
candidates for all major political parties.  AUPE represents around 76 000 provincial 
employees in 28 different locals, all concentrated in the provincial public service 
(correspondence with AUPE Director of Communication, October 2008).  The non 
affiliated state of AUPE is a major stumbling block to cohesive action in the Alberta 
labour movement.  The Alberta Teachers Association (ATA) represents another major 
component of the labour population with over 44,000 members in 64 locals all focused 
in the public teaching and support system. Like AUPE, the union avoids direct partisan 
support.  ATA members have run and have been elected for all major parties in the 
Alberta party system.  In sum, labour in Alberta is divided, and does not demonstrate 
one single means of interacting with political parties.  The movement is sub divided by 
several labour federations with contrasting approaches to partisan politics.  The 
movement is further divided by several large public unions with non partisan policy and 
little interest in coordinated activity.    In general, unions in Alberta employ a plurality of 
strategies determined by the individual calculation of unions or groups of likeminded 
unions.   
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A Three Part Division in Alberta Labour 
Making sense of the labour movement in Alberta as it pertains to its links to the 
NDP is a difficult task.  Based on interview data and a review of financial contributions to 
the party since 1993, I will argue that three distinct groups are apparent.  The groups 
are differentiated by their contrasting partisan strategy and outlook on the future for 
the political engagement of organized labour in the province, but do not necessarily 
break down neatly according membership in labour federations.  IBEW 424, one of the 
most vocal supporters of the party for example is a member of both ABTC and AFL.  The 
largest union in the AFL (an affiliated organization to the party) is the provincial nurses 
union which maintains a non partisan perspective.  Because of this reality in the Alberta 
labour movement the focus of this project is on the partisan tendencies of individual 
unions and not the provinces three labour federations.  The first of the three groups is 
marked by clear partisan ties to the party.  The group consists of unions that are 
formally affiliated with the NDP and unions that are not affiliated, but support the party 
with money and volunteers. The second group is largest in the provinces and is marked 
by non partisan or multi-partisan approaches to politics.  The final group is made up of 
the CLAC affiliated locals that choose to avoid political engagement4.    
   The first group is those unions that are openly loyal to the party.  The group is 
comprised of both blue and white collar unions that have chosen direct affiliation, 
choose not to affiliate but continue to donate material support, or are forced at a 
                                                          
4
 Appendix 2 presents the suggested breakdown of most major unions in the province into three grouping 
affiliated/loyal unions (group 1), non partisan/multi partisan unions (group 2), and neutral/CLAC affiliated 
unions (group 3). 
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certain level via national leadership to show party support.  Figure 5.3 presents a 
summary table of all unions affiliated with the Alberta NDP.  The patterns of financial 
support can be examined during election and non election years in appendixes 3 and 4.  
The union leadership in this grouping is cognizant of the fact that the party has little 
ability to promote policy in the legislature.  However, as the recent election has 
demonstrated, the PC party is as dominant as ever.  These unions continue to support 
the party out of the belief the party still fights to keep a “progressive” and labour 
friendly agenda safe against the dominance of “conservative” economic and social 
thought that currently dominated the Alberta party system (interview with a party 
official, May 22, 2008).  This relationship is the clearest evidence for an ongoing 
ideological linkage discussed in the theoretical section of this thesis.  These loyal unions 
maintain that the party represents the best electoral choice for its membership and 
actively campaign for the party within organizational ranks.   
Figure 5.3 Affiliated Unions to the Alberta NDP (Source NDP Alberta Party Records) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             Union  
 
Membership 
CUPE Alberta 
 
26000 
UFCW  401 
 
8000 
IBEW 424 
 
6000 
USW Dist 3 
 
1500 
COPE 458 
 
100 
CEP 777 
 
3000 
CEP 855 
 
500 
Insulators Local 110 
 
2500 
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The second and largest group is made up of unions that maintain either non 
partisan policy, choosing to avoid support for any single party, or opportunistic partisan 
policy, altering party support to fit individual situations. This group includes the largest 
union in the province, the Alberta Union of Provincial Employees (AUPE), as well as the 
health care and teacher unions and the majority of the building trades.  This group is 
politically active, believing that defensive action must be taken to protect individual 
members from the right-wing economic policy of the government, or to promote 
advantages in bargaining with public and private employers.  The political interests of 
this group are primarily issue focused.   These unions see little utility in supporting the 
New Democrat agenda wholesale. At times the group of unions finds the interests of its 
members at odds with some of the environmental and social policy of the party 
(interview with a union leader, October 29, 2008).  These unions seek out political 
entities (individual MLAs, interest groups and political parties) that are receptive to their 
issue based negotiating, or run candidates themselves for a variety of parties.   
AUPE, for example has supported “union friendly” candidates that ran for all 
three major provincial parties in the last two elections (interview with a union leader, 
Oct. 24, 2008).  AUPE has institutionalized a multi-partisan approach by allowing a two 
day pay allowance for any union members who chose to work in a “labour friendly 
campaign” (AUPE Constitution, 2008: 23).  In contrast, the ABTC represent unions that 
have run candidates for the Liberal party, as well as the NDP. This group of unions has 
adopted an anti-Progressive Conservative outlook for the most part, but believes that 
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the provincial Liberal party represents an acceptable alternative (interview with a union 
leader, May 28, 2008).    
The group in general is governed by a rational approach to politics and believes 
that the party system in Alberta offers few tangible rewards for “dogmatically 
supporting the weak position that the NDP occupies” (interview with a union leader, 
April 27th, 2008).  The rational tendencies of this group of unions illustrate the weak 
conditions that exist in Alberta for the exchange type relationships explained in Chapter 
2.  The group of unions prefers to view themselves an important portion of the Alberta 
political economy that is often overlooked and misunderstood (interview with a union 
leader, May 23rd, 2008).  Preferring to lobby the government for labour issues, the 
group of unions is reminiscent of the Gomperist tradition in the province’s history.   
The union leadership in this non aligned group seem more aware that 
membership does not always follow even the best planned voting cues.  Union 
members are educated about important political issues via email, print and direct mail 
campaigns organized by political action committees (PACs).  Several interviews with 
union leaders revealed that union membership views being urged to vote for a single 
party negatively (interviews with union leaders, March 17, 2008 and May 29, 2008).    
Paradoxically, this group includes both members and non-members of the AFL 
and also members of parallel organizations including ABTC.  The non-partisan position of 
some of these unions impacts the political positioning of the AFL.  For example, the 
United Nurses of Alberta (UNA) are recent additions to the AFL fold and have added a 
distinct non-partisan style to AFL policy.  The pull of the rational non-partisan approach 
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is gaining support within AFL, at the expense of support for the provincial New 
Democrats.  At times it appears that the organizational body prefers coordinated 
unilateral action within the house of labour as a primary political strategy with only a 
thin attempt at party support (interview with a party official, May 23, 2008).  This trend 
will be supported with an analysis of the events of the most recent election, and in 
particular the Albertans for Change (AFC) campaign in the following section of this 
chapter. 
The final component of the Alberta labour movement is single group of union 
locals organized by the Christian Labour Association of Canada Alberta (CLAC).  The 
union has a fundamentally different approach to industrial relations compared to 
conventional unions.  According to the CLAC website, “CLAC is an independent Canadian 
labour union that applies Christian social principles of justice, respect, and dignity to the 
workplace community. It provides quality representation and a wide range of benefits 
and training for its members, and active member advocacy that strives to build healthy 
work communities based on mutual respect and partnership” (CLAC website). CLAC 
implements an open shop policy in its locals and allows individuals who do not want to 
be in the union to opt out of signing union cards; their union dues are donated to a 
mutually agreed upon charity, and the individual is exempt from the decision-making 
process in the work place.  In place of traditional adversarial negotiations with 
management, CLAC promotes a co-operative process that seldom if ever results in work 
place stoppages.   
109 
 
 CLAC is viewed with open hostility by the conventional labour movement in 
Alberta.  In fact, anti-CLAC feelings are one of the few universal commonalities in the 
Alberta labour movement.  Alberta’s conventional unions charge that CLAC is an “anti 
union” more concerned with appeasing management and ownership than fighting for 
workers’ rights.  CLAC’s open shop policy “undermines the democratic rights we have 
fought for over the last century” according to one union leader (May 23, 2008).  CLAC is 
officially non-partisan; the organization’s leadership believes in applying the same 
cooperative labour principles it directs at employers to its relationship with government.  
Although the CLAC affiliated unions represent the smallest group in Alberta, they are of 
concern to both organized labour and the party as the organization is growing and has 
become the preferred choice of some fabrication and construction companies in the 
northern Alberta oil sands producing region.  The group’s significance is found in its 
growing popularity and its perceived threat status to conventional labour relations 
structures in the province. 
Some interesting patterns emerge when examining patterns of support for the 
NDP among Alberta unions (see Appendix 2).  First, the important influence of 
federalism in Canadian politics becomes evident.  Unions that are provincial branches of 
larger federal bodies are sometimes compelled to support the party because of national 
focus, regardless of any calculation of benefit for the local union branch.  This trend is 
clearly demonstrated by ongoing support from CUPE, UFCW, CEP and USW.  Interviews 
with leadership from some of these unions indicated that support for the party was a 
result of national policy as oppose to local sentiment (interview with union leadership 
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April 17th-May 25th, 2008) Close examination of financial data presented in Appendix 3 
reveals that the national body of unions often matches or exceeds donations from local 
chapters.  It is also interesting to note the core of independent and non partisan unions 
is made up of Alberta specific unions and labour organizations, AUPE, UNA and the 
teachers unions being the most obvious examples.  Also a clear divide between public 
and private unions can be seen.  The non partisan trend is strong among large public 
unions that have regular dealings with or are directly employed by the provincial 
government (AUPE, UNA, Teachers Association), small private unions seem split on 
political strategy.  
The Alberta New Democrat’s Perception of Party-Labour links 
With a three part division in the labour movement in Alberta established, I will 
now turn to an analysis of the party’s perception of its relationship with the various 
labour components in Alberta. To begin, a summary of party literature that pertains to 
union party linkages in print and from online sources will be presented.  Current NDP 
federal party doctrine seems to downplay union links in favor of appealing to “working 
Canadians.”  Most recently, NDP policy has emphasized environmental issues, 
progressive economic policy to promote job creation and retention, reduction in 
corporate tax breaks, social equality policy for women and minorities, and an increased 
focus on affordable housing (NDP National Platform, 2008).  The federal party literature 
deals with issues in which unions have a direct interest, but does so by grouping issues 
by sub topic not as a union specific policy set.  These issues include workplace safety, 
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protection for full time jobs from outsourcing, and government support for major 
industries under stress in the current market (NDP National Platform, 2008).   
At the federal level, receptive unions will include similar policy positions in 
campaign literature (Boatright, 2009: 28).  In the post C-24 era of campaign finance 
unions are now more reliant on parallel issue advocacy to promote the party to 
individual membership where desirable. The CLC, for example, issues a “Better Choice” 
campaign for all membership outlining party positions on a variety of issues and 
encouraging membership to vote their conscience.  The campaign contains significant 
rhetorical overlap with the party platform and acts as an indicator for union support for 
the party without urging membership towards a single party (Jansen and Young, 2009: 
662), while still allowing strategic voting where the NDP stands little chance of victory 
(Boatright, 2009: 29).  Some unions employ a more direct means of party support at the 
public level.  The Steelworkers and UFCW actively promote party membership and offer 
paid time off and internal training for members who wish to work in NDP campaigns 
(Boatright, 2009:29).     
The Alberta wing of the party has a more direct approach to its relationship with 
labour when compared with the federal example.  The ANDP lists provincially specific 
goals in keeping with the national focus.  The Alberta party’s four main priorities are: 
“making life affordable, a green energy plan, full value from oil and gas royalties, and 
taking big money out of politics (Alberta NDP on Your Side, 2009).  For the most part the 
Alberta party literature adopts the “working families” language and approach of the 
federal party. However, the provincial site contains a link to labour specific concerns.  At 
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the center of this literature is the party position that “Alberta's labour laws are designed 
to placate large corporations,” and that “Alberta has the worst labour laws in Canada” 
(A Fair Deal for Working People, 2009).  Along with this position the literature lists four 
policy planks aimed at issues Alberta unions have taken up with the Progressive 
Conservative government.  These include an increase to the provincial minimum wage 
to $10.00/hr, amending the labour law that allows twelve-year-old children to work in 
restaurants, the establishment of “first contract” legislation to protect newly formed 
unions (Alberta lags behind most other provinces in this regard), and modification to the 
labour code to provide construction workers equal rights with other job sectors.  In this 
way the provincial party literature provides more overt support for unions than the 
Federal party (Alberta NDP on Your Side, 2009).  The provincial party website and 
literature seem more apt to display direct policy linkages between union concern and 
party policy. 
This trend in overt support for organized labour in Alberta can be traced back 
through party campaign literature, but has enjoyed a renewed emphasis since 19935.  
This recent party support for organized labour has been based on two separate themes.  
First the party has been critical of governemnt attempts at heath care privatization, 
showing direct support for public sector unions from a variety of fields (Prairie 
Manifesto ABNDPAB93YPPa-ABNDPABO4PPa).  Secondly, the party has included a 
section on workers’ rights in all platforms since 1993.  The tone has changed according 
to the state of the economy; in general, policy is directed at two major themes.  First, 
                                                          
5
 Primary document evidence for this portion of the project was sourced from the Prairie Manifesto 
project housed in the University of Calgary and directed by Jared Wesley.    
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the party has pledged to improve the safety of workers in the province arguing that 
health and safety standards in the province have slipped under Tory rule.  Secondly, the 
party has taken a strong stance against government policy that has made the 
organization of new unions difficult.  These policy positions have become more 
pronounced since 1997 as the Alberta economy reentered a boom cycle with climbing 
revenue from oil and gas project expansion (Prairie Manifesto ABNDPAB93YPPa-
ABNDPABO4PPa).        
It is important to note that recent provincial party literature also contains policy 
positions unfavorable to unions.  The Alberta New Democrats are campaigning to have 
large corporate and union donations to political parties eliminated in the province, in 
keeping with the spirit of Federal Bill C-24, and campaign law changes made at the 
provincial level in Manitoba (Alberta NDP On Your Side, 2008).  If the party succeeds in 
this attempt, it will eliminate one of the main elements of support that currently exists 
between the provincial party and unions.  Interviews conducted with party officials 
demonstrated a unique logic for the proposed move.  Party representatives were quick 
to point out their gratitude for campaign donations from unions, but argue that severing 
financial links between political parties, unions, and big business stands to hurt the 
Progressive Conservatives and Liberals far more than it would harm the New Democrats.  
The Alberta New Democrats have proven successful at raising money from a large 
number of individual small donations, displaying a similar pattern to the federal party 
(Boatright, 2009: 29), (Jansen and Young, 2009: 663).  In the end, severing financial ties 
would hurt the party’s finances, but the damage to the competition should corporate 
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donations be eliminated would be far greater.   The move is motivated by rational 
political strategy calculation, and after some initial hesitation has been approved by 
labour in the province and adopted by both parties at the 2006 NDP convention 
(interviews with party and union leaders, May 26-29, 2008).  What remains unclear is 
the potential impact severing financial links between party and union would have on the 
Alberta dynamic.  The party seems to assume a “business as usual” perspective. 
Interviews with party representatives revealed a more nuanced perception of 
the relationship with organized labour in the province than the party literature would 
suggest.  In general, provincial party officials and leadership seem divided into two 
different viewpoints.  One group was quick to point out recent positive trends in 
financial contributions, union candidate numbers and affiliation numbers.  This group 
argues that organized labour represents an important strategic partner whose 
relationship needs to be cultivated in order for the party to succeed.  The second group 
seems more pessimistic about the future of the relationship and holds the belief that 
the relationship will grow apart as the party regains popular support, even going so far 
as to attribute some of the weakness of the party to the lackadaisical attitude of 
organized labour in the province towards the party (interview with a party 
representative, April 17, 2008).   
Both groups within the party hold the view that the relationship between the 
party and unions in Alberta has “languished badly” (interview with a party official, May 
26, 2008).  As discussed in Chapter 3 the agrarian socialist base of support for the CCF 
did not always view labour in the most favorable light, resulting is a rocky transition in 
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Alberta from CCF to NDP (Plawiuk, 1995).  This being the case, some party leaders that 
were interviewed blamed the weak history of party and union in the province for the 
current state of the relationship. One representative went so far as to call the 
relationship stillborn (interview with a party leader, May 28, 2008).   
  The group within the party that holds a positive view of building up the 
relationship with organized labour can claim the support of the party’s current 
leadership.  Under the leadership of Brian Mason the party has assumed a more 
cooperative tone with organized labour.  Mason is a member of the Edmonton local for 
the Amalgamated Transit Union, and has a history of activism for the labour movement.   
At the 2008 party convention Mason argued, “In my view, we need to get better at 
building affiliations to our party.  This is how we strengthen our relationship with the 
broader left, and how we better work together”(NDP 2008 Convention).   Under Mason, 
the party has a renewed program that encourages affiliation among union locals, and is 
encouraging union members to run for the party.  These actions are based on strategic 
calculations and are intended to counterbalance the increase in union support for the 
other parties in Alberta and to provide a counterbalance to the natural advantage the 
PC party has from its vast network of corporate support.  As one party representative 
commented, “union support can represent an equalizing force for us; they can’t 
completely counterbalance the effect corporate support has for the Conservatives, but 
they can help us stay in the game” (interview with a party official, May 26, 2008). 
  As well, Mason characterizes the increased emphasis on relationship building 
with an overall strategy to counteract the growing influence of the non partisan union 
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movement. At the 2008 party convention, Mason stated: “I think the tendency towards 
non-partisanship on the left is causing harm. We need to focus on building an 
organization that has the capacity to elect MLAs. We need to concentrate on political 
change, not just raising issues. In a word, we need to focus on building the NDP” (NDP 
Convention, 2008).  For Mason, the party should have a realistic view of its current 
political situation.  The party leader encourages the NDP to adopt a strategy that 
provides a viable alternative to the right in Alberta, which in his view includes the other 
three major parties--the Liberals, PC, and Wild Rose Alliance.   
 The first group within the party, led by Mason, holds a positive and optimistic 
view of the union-party relationship. This group views the relationship between the 
party and unions as a continuation of an important historical trend that began with the 
metamorphosis from the CCF to the NDP.  The relationship, according to this group of 
interviewees, is symbiotic, with labour supporting the party with donations of money 
and volunteer support, with the party providing a “voice” for unions in government.  In 
this sense, the party leadership seems to hold the view that a rational exchange is 
possible in Alberta between unions and the party.  The idea of NDP Legislature 
representatives providing a voice for labour was a recurring theme during interviews.  
The Alberta New Democratic leadership understands and is realistic about its weak 
position in the Legislature.  The party holds the belief that the quality of their MLAs and 
access to media allows them a much larger voice than would be expected from a minor 
party.  Because of their willingness to be advocates for labour, interviewees felt that the 
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weak legislature history should not be a decisive issue in the relationship (interview with 
a party representative, May 27, 2008).  
Party leaders were quick to point out their willingness to lend support to issues 
brought to their attention by union supporters.  Interviewees listed party support for 
policy change on offshore workers, construction site safety rules, twelve-year-old 
service workers, anti “scab” legislation, and anti CLAC policy as times when the NDP has 
taken up the labour cause in the Legislature.  Another official pointed out the many 
times current and former MLAs lent their personal support during strikes by major 
unions.  In particular the NDP MLAs spent time on picket lines, brought issues to debate 
in the Legislature and drew media attention to striking CEP union members during the 
2005 strike against Telus, and again in 2006 with UCFW workers who went on strike for 
fair wages in Brooks.  NDP MLAs have also taken the opportunity to promote union 
specific issues to the media, on the internet, in radio interviews and in editorials in 
Alberta papers (Martin, 2006).  These combined efforts represent an important 
commodity that the party brings to exchange table with labour.   
The direct interaction between unions and party leadership during important 
union events also acts to encourage union members to consider running for the party in 
elections.  Party leadership explained this as another important element the exchange 
between unions and the party (interview with a party official, May 26, 2008).   According 
to an interviewed official, the party can find it difficult to find candidates in ridings 
outside of Edmonton. Unions provide an important pool of potential candidates that 
already have a relationship with the party and a similar set of personal political values.  
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Several party officials were quick to point out that in the 2008 election over 40 per cent 
of NDP candidates had union affiliation, the highest total ever (interview with a party 
official, May 26, 2008).  This claim can be corroborated with data in Appendix two which 
presents a summary of all NDP candidates in the 2008 election along with links the 
candidate have with organized labour.  The data in Appendix two shows that 39 per cent 
of union candidates in the 2008 election came from union backgrounds or had clear 
links to organized labour.           
Interviews conducted with party officials revealed that the party has noticed an 
increase in support from unions in Alberta over the last four years; they perceive this as 
a result of ongoing support from the party on important issues.  As Mason stated at the 
2008 convention, “I’ve worked hard over the last several years to strengthen our party’s 
relationship with labour, and it’s paid off”. The increase in support can be measured by 
examining the change in campaign donations since the last election in 2004, as well as 
the recent affiliation of new union locals to the party.  At the 2008 party convention 
Mason summarized the emerging trend: “Over half of our candidates in the last election 
were labour candidates. Union contributions tripled over the last election, and we 
achieved our first new labour affiliation in years – local 424 of the IBEW” (NDP 
convention 2008).  
The increase in support claimed by party leadership can be analyzed by 
examining union donations to the party from 1993 to the present6.  A moderate 
increase in monetary contributions during election cycles is present; however, it is not 
                                                          
6
 All data was sourced from Election Alberta financial disclosures reports and was adjusted for inflation to 
2009 
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as dramatic as indicated by party leadership.  Figure 5.2 indicates union donations over 
$3757 did increase in 2008 by    $10 196, representing an increasing from 32.37 per cent 
to 37.58 per cent of party finances from donations over $375. The total number of union 
donations increased for the 2008 election as well.  In 2004, 27 unions made donations 
over $375; in 2008 this figure grew to 32.  Finally, the average size of union donations 
grew. In 2004 the average donation over $375 from unions was $3396. In 2008 this 
average increased to $3420.  Based on these figures, despite raising less money in the 
2008 election cycle, the party was able to make marginal gains in financial links between 
party and union as expressed in overall donation amount, average donation and overall 
number of donations.  The current level of financial support during election cycles 
represents a gradual climb up since the 1997-2001 era and has placed the party $1000 
shy of its 1993 level of support. 
It is important to note that in Alberta, there are currently only yearly caps of 
$15,000 annually, plus another $15,000 during election years for that govern individual 
as well as union/corporate donations to political parties.  No restrictions on third party 
advertising during campaigns currently exist.  Yet, in Alberta we do not find strong 
pattern of financial support during non election years.  In the Jansen and Young (2009) 
analysis of party and union interaction before campaign finance reform at the federal 
level, the party-union relationship was described as an asymmetrical exchange, with 
unions providing money and volunteers, without the benefit of access to government 
                                                          
 
7
 Alberta election law requires parties to list all contributions from individuals or organizations over $375. 
Smaller donations are listed under a single category.  These donations totaled $189 542in 2004 and $172 
173 in 2008. Although these are significant monetary figures, party officials indicated in interviews that 
the category was made up of individual donations and not corporate or union contributions. 
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and decision making.  From 1975-2002 Unions contributed an average of 18.1% of the 
non election year federal budget for the NDP, (Jansen and Young, 2009: 674).  The 
research in this thesis demonstrates a similar trend in Alberta, but with lower levels of 
overall support.  During non election cycles from 2004 to 2008, union donations only 
made up a tiny percentage of party funds, averaging 5.6% of donations over a 5 year 
period (Elections Alberta).  In an environment with fewer restrictions on campaign 
finance, unions in Alberta have been less supportive on average than their federal 
counter parts.  
Appendix 4 lists all donations by unions to the Alberta NDP during campaign 
cycles and for yearly operations since 1993.  Summary data from Appendix 4, for 
election years, and yearly operational budgets is presented in Figures 5.5 and 5.6.  The 
Tables present the largest contributions by organizations.  Union financial support for 
the party for yearly operating budgets has been inconsistent.  The party’s current yearly 
totals lag behind the 1993 totals by well over $17 000.  Union support for the party is far 
less pronounced for yearly budgets never exceeding $30 000, and hovering under $5000 
during non election years.  Fig 5.5 demonstrates yearly budget financial data for the 
party from unions.  A clear level of support during election years is evident; however, 
the totals are modest at best.  
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Fig 5.4 Donations by Source over $375 for Election Years 1993-2008 ANDP in Constant 
2009 Dollars (Source: Elections Alberta) 
 
 
 
 
Fig 5.5 Union Donations to NDP for Yearly Operational Budgets, 1993-2008 in Constant 
2009 Dollars (Source: Elections Alberta) 
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Figure 5.6 Donations from Selected Unions and Labour Organizations for Campaign 
Budgets 1993-2008 (Source: Elections Alberta) 
Organization 
 
Total Donations 1993-2008 
   AFL 
 
$12,811.00 
AUPE 
 
$14,522.00 
ATU 
 
$10,500.00 
CEP 
 
$43,700.00 
CAW 
 
$19,750.00 
CUPE 
 
$24,800.00 
Carpenters Union 1325 
 
$19,400.00 
Iron Workers 
 
$11,000.00 
IBEW 424 
 
$18,250.00 
Plumbers and Pipefitters 
488 
 
$24,750.00 
UFCW 
 
$21,250.00 
USW 
 
$16,500.00 
 
 
Figure 5.7 Donations from Selected Unions and Labour Organizations for Yearly 
Operational Budgets 1993-2008 (Source: Elections Alberta) 
Organization 
 
Total Donations 1993-2008 
   ABTC 
 
$22,590.00 
CEP 
 
$33,690.00 
CUPE 
 
$14,245.00 
IBEW 424 
 
$4,030.00 
Plumbers and 
Pipefitters488 
 
$3,830.00 
UFCW 
 
$16,760.00 
USW 
 
$40,425.00 
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The party leadership points to the increase in union affiliation as evidence for 
the improving relationship between the NDP and unions in Alberta, and the vibrancy of 
the exchange mentality.  The total number of affiliated union members has grown by 
over 5000 since 2006 (NDP Convention, 2008).  To date only Alberta CUPE and 
steelworker locals were formally affiliated with the party, a result of national union 
policy rather than local initiative.  In reality, the growth in affiliated membership is a 
result of the affiliation of two large locals, the International Brotherhood of Electrical 
Workers 424, as well as United Food and Commercial Workers local 401.  The addition 
of IBEW 424 in particular provides what party leadership hopes will be a visible cue to 
other union locals about the benefits to formal affiliation to the party (interview with a 
party official, May 26, 2008).   
The Alberta New Democrats have been successful to a limited degree at re-
building the relationship that existed between the party and unions during the peak 
electoral performance of the party from 1986-1993.  As of the 2008 election, the party 
can point to modest increase in financial donations, a significant number of union 
candidates, and a rise in affiliated unions locals and members.  The increased effort by 
the party to promote traditional links between party and union is a strategic move to 
encourage unions to view the party as the best way to protect their interests from 
current government policy (interview with a party official, May 26, 2008).   
The second group in the Alberta NDP party movement views the increased 
efforts by the party leadership at rebuilding the relationship with organized labour with 
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hesitancy.  This second group within the party is forward focused, believing that 
attracting voters who are disenfranchised with the majority tendency of the Alberta 
system should be the party’s top priority.   Interviews with party representatives 
revealed that some in the leadership ranks of the Alberta NDP view organized labour as 
a stable “basement of support.”  These interviewees felt that the party would regain the 
second party position in the province eventually, at this point the links with labour could 
become more “expendable” (interviews with a party officials, May 22-29, 2008).   
Several interviews with party representatives revealed that this hesitancy towards 
increasing formal links with organized labour is based on a perception of scarce party 
resources.  Interviewees indicated the party has a stable base level of union support, 
and that committing resources to growing the relationship may at best produce 
marginal results.   
This second grouping in the party is instead focused on re-connecting with 
grassroots, non union support in Alberta.  In an analysis of the 2008 election, a party 
official argued that over-emphasis on generating labour support produced a situation 
where the party was talking to itself and not focusing on connecting with new voters.  
The attempts to generate labour support by adjusting campaign strategies to attract 
union votes resulted in a healthy dialogue between progressive elements in the 
province, but failed to speak to the general public (interview with a party official, April 
17, 2008).  This scenario is reminiscent of the parties past during the final days of the 
CCF.  While new party clubs sprang up, connected with new voters and highlighted new 
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policy positions, the old guard CCF supporters stubbornly maintained an agrarian 
socialist perspective.  
Critics within the party who disagree with the continued favoring of the labour 
movement also offered a geographic argument for reallocating resources away from 
party-union projects.  The current base of support for the party is concentrated in 
Edmonton.  Even during the peak electoral performance of the party from 1986-1993 
only 5 of the 32 seats won by the party were in non urban ridings.  In the 2008 election 
the party’s Edmonton popular vote share was 18 per cent, 7 per cent greater than any 
other region.  As well, in the 2008 election the party was only able to place second in a 
single riding outside of Edmonton (Elections Alberta, 2008).  That year also saw the 
party surrender two legislature seats from Edmonton ridings on slim margins.  In 
Beverly-Clearview, Ray Martin lost by 300 votes, and in Calder, David Eggen was only 
204 votes short.   
The Alberta New Democrats have always suffered from the distortional effects of 
Alberta SMP electoral system (see chapters 3 and 4).  The strategy of devoting resources 
to a geographically dispersed union population that resides in many ridings where the 
NDP is far from competitive “plays to our historic weakness” according to one 
interviewed party representative (interview, May 22, 2008).  The simplest strategy for 
immediate elections should focus on winning ridings where the party is competitive.  
These urban Edmonton ridings respond to the progressive policy position of the party 
much more than to labour issue advocacy.    
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The argument is made by some within the party that overemphasis on union-
party relations comes at the expense of relationships with other progressive movements 
and organizations within the province.  Several party representatives commented on a 
growing division between those concerned with progressive social and environmental 
policy and union supporters in the party (interview, April 17, 2008).  Most recently this 
trend has been expressed by the distancing of the party and the Sierra Club prairie 
chapter.  In an Edmonton newspaper interview the president of local Sierra Club, 
Lindsay Telfer commented that the group enjoyed a strong relationship with former 
NDP MLA David Eggen, but not with the current leadership.  Tefler states: 
Brian Mason has never met with us or done any significant outreach to 
us. The Sierra Club has never been contacted by Rachel Notley or her people 
either. We now have a better relationship with the Liberals than we do the NDP, 
and that is really sad, seeing as the NDP is the party that is supposed to be 
connected to social movements. (Phillips, 2008).  
 
The party’s attempts to strengthen its relationship with unions also place strains 
on the already difficult relationship between environmental policy advocates within the 
party and union support.  The central issues for these two groups are policy positions on 
the development of the Alberta oil sands (interview with party official, April 17, 2008).  
Unions benefit from the development cycle in the oil sands, while environmentally 
concerned elements in the party favor a moratorium on further development.  The 
current leadership of the party has come under criticism by some elements within the 
party over a softening of policy on the environment and the oil sands.  In particular, in 
the most recent election, the party abandoned its previous position that called for a 
hard cap on C02 emissions. The differing views on development of the provinces fossil 
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fuel resources have clashed over the issue of the nuclear power in the Athabasca region 
as well.  The development of nuclear power in province would represent a significant 
amount of work for many unionized sectors.  Environmentally concerned party 
supporters oppose the project citing environmental impact and hazardous waste 
disposal concerns. 
Union Perceptions of Links with the Party  
Reducing down the plurality of opinions on the NDP that exist in the Alberta 
labour movement was a difficult task.  Often during interviews divergent views were 
expressed by leadership in the same union or labour organization.  This demonstrates 
the fractured nature and lack of coherency inherent to the Alberta labour context.   
Despite the variety of represented industries, interests and policy preferences, some 
commonalties emerged during interviews.  Most union leaders that were interviewed 
for the project echoed the party analysis and agree that the relationship between party 
and labour is weaker than it was in the past.  In nearly all interviews union 
representatives pointed out the weak position the party has occupied in the Legislature 
since 1993.  Most union leaders were aware of the party efforts to advocate labour 
issues in the Legislature; however the majority of union leaders were pessimistic about 
the effectiveness of the party’s ability given its modest legislature presence (interviews 
with leadership, May 25 to October 29, 2008).   
The majority of union leaders that were interviewed explained that organized 
labour in the province operates in a difficult environment; often, union leaders 
explained their situation as a “state of siege.”  They cite the 1993 election win by Ralph 
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Klein as the starting point for an overt offensive on the rights of unions and unionized 
workers in the province (interview with a union leader, Oct 29, 2008).  During the Klein 
era, public sector unions were targeted with wage roll backs and other punitive 
government action as part of “Klein Revolution” aimed at reducing the government 
deficit by curbing spending on social programs and Medicare.  Large public unions 
reacted with a series of legal and illegal strike actions, along with public awareness 
campaigns held in conjunction with social awareness including The Friends of Medicare.  
The era after 1993 has been marked by a new era of antagonism between unions and 
government. 
  The recent boom cycle in the Alberta economy has had mixed results for 
organized labour in the province.  The building boom in commercial and residential 
projects has created a strong demand for labour in sectors that are represented by 
unions (AFL, 2008).  However, this demand for skilled labour has been used by 
government and large corporations as a tool against unions in the province.  Many 
union leaders pointed out the government strategy of promoting temporary foreign 
workers (TFW) as a way of dealing with perceived skilled labour shortages in the 
province during the recent boom cycle.  Large corporations argue that there are 
insufficient numbers of skilled workers in many fields and are relying more and more on 
non union TFWs.  These workers perform the same job as their domestic unionized 
counterparts but at a lower total labour cost.  The strategy has been capitalized on by 
companies like Canadian Natural Resources Limited which has used labour sub contracts 
that   use TFWs even when domestic skilled labour was available (AFL, 2008).  Union 
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leaders also charge that the provincial government maintains legal loop holes that make 
it easy for companies to use management supported “dummy unions” or associations.  
As well, the provincial government via the Alberta Labour Board granted formal union 
status to CLAC, whose locals are generally more cost effective and less likely to strike 
than its conventional union counterparts (AFL, 2008).  Union leaders argue that 
provincial government support for CLAC and TFW’s are part of an overall strategy aimed 
at reducing the strength of unions in the province. 
Union leaders also point to recent amendments to the Alberta labour code in 
2008, found in Bill 26 which restricted unionized workers’ rights and pushed the 
provincial labour code further behind the national standard as further evidence of the 
hostile environment facing organized labour in the province.  Bill 26 targeted three 
sectors of unionized workers.  In the construction sector, employees who have worked 
for a construction company for less than 30 days are now prohibited from participating 
in a certification vote. The bill also gives 90 days following the vote for workers to 
rescind their certification vote.  Bill 26 also eliminated the ability of ambulance workers 
to strike and forced all ambulance drivers into binding arbitration in the event of conflict 
over employment contract.  Finally, Bill 26 eliminated the use of market enhancement 
recovery funds (MERFs).  MERFs were a tool used by employers and unions to ensure 
the competitiveness of union bids on construction contacts (interview with an AFL 
representative, May 28, 2008).  Bill 26 represents the first amendment to the provincial 
labour code in over 20 years.  The bill was tabled and passed in three days, right before 
the summer Legislature break.  The swift passage eliminated any public debate or 
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enquiry in the bill, and represents another attack on the rights of union in the province 
by the provincial government.  As well, the swift passage of the bill reinforced the 
perception that the NDP is unable to protect unions from Conservative policy (interview 
with a union leader, May 22, 2008). Conservative policy that contains a restriction for 
farm worker from collective bargaining is an ongoing example of the hostile position 
towards organized labour by Alberta’s government.  As well, the legislation that 
designated all post secondary students as employees of the provincial government 
effectively eliminating their ability to sue post secondary institutions in the event of 
negligence, is another cited example of the government’s attitude towards workers 
rights.     
 This hostility from the provincial government towards labour placed into the 
context of a numerically small labour community in Alberta places provincial unions in a 
difficult position. The constant “state of siege” has also taken a toll on solidarity within 
the labour community.  The largest union in the province, AUPE and the largest union in 
Canada, CUPE have been engaged in a bitter rivalry for the last ten years.  The AUPE 
under the leadership of Dan MacLennan actively raided CUPE locals for members 
(Hampshire, 2005).  Interviews with CUPE leadership revealed that the union leadership 
perceived the raiding as a bi-product of the difficult environment labour faces in 
Alberta. CUPE leaders viewed AUPE’s raiding as a rational response to provincial 
government policy.  As one leader put it, “organizing new locals in Alberta has been 
made nearly impossible by the provincial government; AUPE was doing the next best 
thing to increase their numbers” (interview, Oct 29, 2008).  AUPE leadership claims that 
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CUPE locals approached their leadership for better representation, and are motivated 
by wanting to provide the best representation for unionized labour in the difficult 
environment in Alberta (interview with a union leader, Oct 24, 2008).   
These difficulties that have faced organized labour since 1993 have resulted in 
the three part split explained in the beginning of this chapter. Interviews with labour 
leaders revealed the emergence of two different strategies among politically engaged 
unions.  The first strategy is predicated on increased support for the Alberta New 
Democratic party.  Interviews with union leaders representing organizations with long 
history of support for the party most commonly argued this view. These unions seem to 
ignore the broken exchange, or accept the party belief that the lack of legislature 
presents can be offset by the quality, and activity level of the parties two MLA’s.  Both 
affiliate and non affiliated union leaders argue that “the party represents the 
progressive voice for labour in the political sphere; they lobby what we ask them to” 
(interview with a union leader, May 25, 2008).  In this strategy the effectiveness of the 
party seems to be irrelevant.  Interviewed union leaders indicated a perception of utility 
in the efforts of the party to lobby labour issues, buttressed by a share ideological view.  
When asked about the ineffectiveness of the NDP at protecting labour from government 
policy one leader explained that the movement faced “a constant ebb and flow in the 
effectiveness of lobbying labour interests to the provincial government, when 
government seems less receptive, it is all the more important to work for progressive 
policy with our partners in the party” (interview with a union leader, May 28, 2008).  
Leadership from this group of unions were quick to cite examples of times when the 
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party brought direct attention to specific issues of concern for unions, the most recent 
being temporary foreign workers in the oil patch (interview with a union leader, May 24, 
2008).  The TFW issue provides a good example of the combination of shared world view 
and perception of exchange that drives loyal unions in the province.  Union leadership 
seems satisfied that their material support is buying party action despite the lack of 
tangible reward in government policy.  One union leader explained the TFW issue 
campaign as a situation where the party and the unions were “partners in moral 
struggle” (interview with a union leader, May 24th, 2008).  This pattern of a somewhat 
asymmetrical exchange buttressed by a shared ideological view is common among 
supportive unions in the province.    
Loyal unions return support from the party in several ways. Unions lobby their 
membership to volunteer during elections and highlight ANDP policy during elections.  
This cooperative approach can be traced through union communications with 
membership via newsletters and through campaign issue communication. For example, 
UFCW 401 makes regular favorable references to the party in its publication Directions.  
Other unions like CUPE and IBEW list the party as a strategic partner on union websites.  
The Steelworkers promote an internal program that selects and trains union members 
for campaign work for the party (Boatright, 2009: 30).      
Support for the party also comes from shared personnel.  The project 
interviewed two employees of the party that held day jobs in unionized environments.  
These employees played an important role in linking union PACs with party fundraising 
and membership drives.  Interviews with party officials revealed that CEP Edmonton 
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locals shared several personnel linkages with NDP campaign staff; these relationships 
strengthened the bond between the party and union during the Telus strikes three years 
ago (interview, May 26, 2008).    
Within the divided and difficult environment in the province, many labour 
leaders in Alberta are also developing a second strategy and are beginning to look for a 
“new way forward”. These unions and their leadership are made up of the second, 
larger group in the Alberta labour movement that has an increasingly strong non 
partisan attitude (interview with a union leader, May 22, 2008).  The leadership in this 
group of unions is critical of the decision of some unions to increase levels of support for 
the party.  One interviewee characterized the actions of newly affiliated IBEW 424 in 
particular as a “circling the wagons” mentality, indicating that the party was in serious 
decline and looking for any kind of support, the interviewee argued that the strategy 
lacked “forward focus” (interview with a union leader, Sept 24, 2008).  Many union 
leaders expressed skepticism over the benefits of renewed levels of support for the 
party.  The potential for unions to be influenced by new affiliations to the party appears 
to be constrained by divided opinion over the motives of new affiliates for joining the 
party.  One union leader pointed out that the provincial secretary of the Alberta New 
Democrats and a member of IBEW 424’s leadership were married.  Another union 
leader pointed out that the relationship was based on a single issue (TFWS) and that if 
the Liberals seemed to be a viable successor to the PCs in the future and could address 
union concerns over TFW’s, the relationship would fall apart (interview with a union 
leader, May 22, 2008).   
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  Leadership in this group held a negative view of the potential of the NDP to 
regain its 1986-1993 legislature levels and political influence.  Interviewees likened the 
party to the Titanic in one instance, stating that “going down with the ship may not be 
the best way of representing your membership” (interview with a union representative, 
May 22, 2008).  Proponents of a new approach to union politics in Alberta explained 
union and party linkages historically in Alberta as an asymmetrical relationship.  In this 
account, the labour movement has acted as a base of support for decades, providing 
money, votes and volunteers.  In return labour would supposedly benefit from a 
sympathetic NDP government.  One union representative referred to this exchange 
model as the “cookie cutter approach in Canada,” explaining that the labour movement 
at the federal level in Canada “has suffered the same lack of return on investment” 
(interview with a union leader, Oct 29, 2008).   
The decision to support the NDP seems to be an increasingly difficult 
commitment for labour in the province.  As one labour leader explained “the dichotomy 
facing labour is whether labour should be the organizing arm for the NDP, or whether 
labour should focus on effective policy change that affects our membership” (interview 
with a union leader, Oct 29, 2008).  Another emerging tension that was referenced by 
several interviews was the lack of interest in partisan politics by individual membership.   
Several union leaders explained that their membership preferred their leadership to 
work in a way that maximized the gains for individual members, in place of blanket 
support for a single party.  This assessment was collaborated with interview data with 
rank and file union members.  Few of these interviewed union members were dedicated 
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supporters of any party.  Instead, concern for individual issues seemed to be the primary 
focus (interviews with union leaders, May 23 and Oct. 29, 2008).   
The issue facing union leadership in the province is how to respond to both the 
pressure from government and business, member apathy and the weak performance of 
the party.  As a result, the priority for many labour leaders has become uniting the 
“house of labour” in Alberta against the policy position of the provincial government, 
with the hopes of re-engaging membership by providing some tangible results 
(interviews with a union leader, May 27 and Oct. 29, 2008).  A union leader explained 
that the last three elections have been “disappointing from the perspective of organized 
labour.”  According to this leader, “quietly over the last ten to twelve years labour 
leaders in the province have begun to ask some serious questions about labour’s 
approach to politics” (interviews, Oct 24, 2008).  Interviews with leadership from a 
variety of factions within the labour movement revealed a desire to work from within 
the labour community itself in place of co-ordination with the NDP as a future political 
strategy (interviews, May 27 to Oct. 29, 2008).    
A New Strategy for Organized Labour: Albertans for Change, and Uniting the Left  
 Against a backdrop of continued debate both within the party and the labour 
movement over how best to develop an effective strategy of cooperation in the 
increasingly difficult Alberta polity a series of events surrounding the 2008 election cycle 
unfolded that will have lasting implications for the future of the relationship.  Interviews 
with leaders from several unions in Alberta revealed that the movement had begun to 
consider a different approach following the disappointing results of the 2004 election, 
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citing the broken exchange present in Alberta and the continued inability of the party to 
protect unions from undesirable government policy (interview with a union leader, May 
25th, 2008).  The manifestation of this new strategy was the Albertans for Change 
campaign (AFC), and the “unite the left” movement.  
The AFC campaign represented a coming together of the diverse interests in the 
Alberta labour movement.  The AUPE, which is multi partisan and not affiliated, 
partnered with the ABTC and AFL on a new campaign strategy for the 2008 election.  
The campaign was divided into two phases. The first featured prime time television ads 
that criticized the Stelmach government for having no plan on healthcare and the 
economy.   The second phase was made up of 130 000 direct mailed pamphlets that 
paralleled the TV ads.  The actual cost of the campaign was never released to the public, 
but several interviewed union and party officials estimated the total cost at over one 
million dollars (interview with union leaders April 17th-May 26th, 2008).  Direct funding 
by AUPE for the second phase of the ad campaign alone was more than $300 000 (AUPE 
AGM minutes). 
The campaign was non partisan and had no party branding and at no point 
consulted the Alberta New Democrats.  Contrary to conventional union sponsored third 
party campaign advertising patterned after the federal union-party relationship the 
party was not offered any opportunity for policy tie in.  Interviews with party officials 
revealed that many in the party learned about the campaign for the first time while 
watching TV at home (interview, May 26, 2008).  AFC was of particular concern to the 
party when the material costs of the campaign are compared with the donations made 
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by labour to the NDP campaign.  Total union donations to the party were only $109 450, 
barely one-tenth of the estimated cost of the AFC campaign.   
By far the greatest concern within the party was the willingness of an affiliated 
organization (AFL) to keep the campaign secret from the party.  Unions frequently run 
parallel add campaigns at the federal level and in other provinces. Alberta is unique as 
the union sponsored ad campaign was done without consulting the party and was not 
part of overall strategy for the election generated by both unions and the party.  Union 
leadership that was willing to comment on AFC explained the rational for the campaign 
in the following terms.  First, AFC represented an important “coming together” of the 
diverse elements of the labour community in Alberta.  Union leadership explained that 
uniting the various elements of the Alberta labour movement behind a single set of 
agreed upon goals as an important step for the provinces unions.  Secondly, union 
leadership explained that despite the lack of tangible impact of the campaign (the 
Conservatives won an even larger majority) AFC represented an important test of a new 
style of political engagement that would be geared at harnessing the collective 
resources of the labour community to pressure for specific policy gains.  Union 
leadership argued that this represented a more efficient way of promoting labour 
interest in the province (interview with union leaders, May 24-Oct 25th, 2008).     
AFC had a secondary effect of increasing tension between the party and the 
supportive elements in the labour movement of the campaign. The tension between AFL 
and the party was increased after the election through a series of exchanges between 
the party leader Brian Mason and AFL leader Gil McGowan at the party convention.  In 
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his opening address, Mason condemned the non-partisan approach of AFL and 
denounced the AFC campaign (Mason, 2008).    The AFL is a formally affiliated member 
of the party and therefore has the right to introduce binding motions for membership 
voting at party conventions. McGowan used this ability to introduce a motion that 
would unite the Alberta New Democrats, the Green Party and the Alberta Liberals into 
one umbrella left-of-center party, effectively dissolving the party from the inside in the 
short term, and supplanting the current party leadership.  The plan called for the 
separate members of the coalition to agree not to run candidates against each other in 
competitive ridings and attempt to divide up the various seats in the legislature.  The 
final aim of the motion was to win power for the coalition and enact proportional 
representation through a democratic vote in the Legislature or public referendum.  
Once this was achieved, the coalition would be dissolved and the parties would compete 
separately again in a more competitive and equal environment (Resolution 01, 2008 
Alberta NDP convention).  
The resolution was defeated in a floor vote and dismissed by party leadership as 
ill-advised.  However, the move by a formally affiliated member of the party and 
coordinating body for organized labour in the province was telling.  Critics of the 
motives of AFL within the party after the AFC campaign saw the move as further 
evidence that much of organized labour in the province was not truly committed to the 
party.  Some within the party blamed the move by AFL on the ongoing poor relationship 
between Mason and McGowan (interview with a party official, May 26, 2008).  Union 
leadership that were supportive of the “unite the left” attempt at the party convention 
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explained the action as part of the “new approach” of labour in the province.  The 
perception among these union leaders was that the Conservative government 
represented the greatest threat to union interests, and that pushing the party out of 
government should be the number one goal for the movement over the next four years.  
Dissolving the NDP to achieve this goal was acceptable for these union leaders as the 
benefits to membership outweighed the negatives of losing the party (interviews with 
union leaders, September 10-October 25th, 2008).    
The tension between elements of the labour movement and the party spilled 
over into the media following the 2008 election campaign and party convention over 
the issues of campaign finance reform.  As stated previously, NDP provincial policy has 
called for an end to donations from unions and corporations.  The party expanded this 
policy to include a moratorium on third party campaign spending, a direct rebuttal to 
the AFC campaign.  This places the provincial New Democrats in the interesting position 
of supporting Conservative policy aimed at curtailing labour’s ability to spend unlimited 
amounts of money in election campaigns.  In interviews in the Calgary Herald and 
Edmonton Journal, Mason argued that the AFC campaign worked against the party and 
represented a threat the democratic process in Alberta (McLean, 2008).  Mason argues, 
“The main conversation that took place in the election was not between the opposition 
parties and the government; it was between Albertans for Change and the government, 
and I think that had a serious impact on the election" (McLean, 2008).   
Support by the party for the elimination for third party advertising is surprising.  
Even in the most recent election, a rhetorical overlap clearly existed between some 
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third party advertising created by unions and party policy.  The IBEW, for example, ran 
an ad campaign on TV and radio criticizing the government support of temporary 
foreign workers and unsafe working conditions for the electrical trades in the province.  
The ads did not mention any party but fit neatly in with NDP campaign literature.  At the 
federal level both the Steelworkers and UFCW have run supportive ad campaigns with 
clear links to NDP policy in the past (Boatright, 2009: 31; Jansen and Young, 2005: 667).  
Large scale third party advertising at the federal level designed to present election 
issues has been done for the most part with consultation with the party.  The CLC, for 
example, spent over $400 000 in the last federal election on a “Labour Issues” campaign 
that had no party branding, but was still designed with the party’s full knowledge and 
input (Boatright, 2009: 28).  The move by AFL, AUPE and ABTC to devote millions of 
dollars to a third party labour issue campaign without consultation with the party at all 
represents a clear emerging rift in the relationship between the two political entities.  
The attempt at uniting the provincial Liberals, Greens and the NDP during the 
2008 convention, the AFC campaign and the subsequent media spat can be understood 
as a call to action by elements in the Alberta labour movement who are considering new 
approaches to politics in Alberta.  As one labour leader explained “I think you have to 
look at what Gill did in a more nuanced way.  Of course the party did not react positively 
to the move.  What the party has to understand is that we have been doing the same 
thing for over 40 years now; I think it’s obvious that it’s time for a change” (interview, 
Oct 29, 2008).                                                                                                                      
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Conclusion  
Research on conducted on the Alberta NDP and the provinces labour movement 
for this thesis suggest some interesting features and emerging trends in the 
relationship.  The previous chapters in this thesis established the unique and difficult 
nature of the Alberta context for both party and unions, the long term effects of this 
context is producing some lasting effects.  First, research indicates that despite the 
fractured nature of the labour movement in the province, unions that are politically 
engaged align along one of two strategies.  Unions that are affiliated or loyal to the 
party are responding to the ongoing weakness of the party by re-enforcing the long 
term strategy used in Alberta.  This study has labeled this the asymmetrical exchange; 
unions provide resources and attempt to lobby their membership to support the party.  
In exchange the party provides a voice for labour concerns in the legislature, and used 
the media access of Legislature members to lobby union issues.  The exchange is 
asymmetrical as the donations of money and resources by unions have seldom been 
offset with real changes in government policy.  This chapter has argued that the political 
and economic reality in Alberta has become more difficult since 1993.  Unions that 
support the party justifies this reality by arguing that the party is an important partner 
against the difficult conditions in Alberta, that both parties are “fighting the good fight” 
(interview with a union leader, May 28, 2008).   
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Returning to the theoretical discussion presented earlier in this chapter this 
behavior by unions and the party represents an interesting hybrid of the rational choice 
and ideological affinity explanations.  An exchange of sorts is present, union contribute 
resources while the party provides access and support but not policy.  The shortcomings 
of the relationship are overlooked because of the importance of a shared world view 
and value set.  The approach is proving somewhat effective for the party, research for 
the this thesis has demonstrated a modest increase in the financial relationship 
between unions and the party, a strong presents of union members among NDP 
candidates in the most recent election and  a sizeable increase in the number of 
affiliated union members to the party. 
In contrast to this phenomenon is the emergence of a non partisan style of 
political engagement by unions without strong ties to the party.  The ongoing weak 
Legislature position of the party was implicated as the primary driver for this new 
strategy in the research presented in this thesis.  The 2008 election cycle bore witness to 
a substantial expression a “union only” style political engagement, in the form of the 
Albertans for Change campaign.  Further evidence of decline of support for the party by 
this group of unions was manifested in the attempt to “unite the left” at the 2008 NDP 
party convention.  These new developments in the relationship between the party and 
some unions in the province highlight one of the principal elements of the rational 
choice theoretical model.  If either side of the exchange is unable to hold up the bargain 
the logic for cooperation is eliminated and eventually the relationship will sour. 
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In both cases research presented in this chapter points to the importance of the 
union perception of the exchange that occurs between the party and unions.  Unions 
that are loyal to the party perceive the lapse in the exchange as a result of the difficult 
conditions in the province, and adjust their expectations.  Unions that are less 
understanding are pushing for a formal divorce from the party in favor of a unified 
labour movement with political engagement geared towards benefiting individual 
members.     
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Chapter 6: Conclusion  
The central aim of this thesis was to analyze the difficult relationship that exists 
between the NDP and organized labour in Alberta, and to examine why the two entities 
continue to co-operate in such a difficult environment. After an analysis of the historical 
and contemporary context of the relationship it is clear that no single parsimonious 
explanation is forthcoming.  Research has revealed a complex relationship, which faces 
strains internally and externally, and a general lack of cohesiveness in the labour 
movement itself.  We can, however, draw a series of conclusion about the interaction 
between the Alberta NDP and their links to organized labour that may shed light on 
what the future holds for party-union interaction in the province. 
 The first conclusion is the ongoing importance of the rational exchange 
theoretical model to the understanding of the Alberta union and party relationship.  The 
review presented in this thesis has argued that the conditions necessary for the bargain 
that exists in the political economy argument are simply not present in Alberta.  The 
province has a very low union density, while the labour movement is divided into 
competing federations.  Research has also shown significant tension between elites in 
the relationship that act to push unions away from the party.  The Alberta economy, 
with its dependency on oil and gas, and tertiary service jobs does not show any future 
potential for strong growth in union influence.  Alberta is also home to the longest 
standing center-right government in Canada with a long standing tradition of business 
friendly policy, and little to no history of corporatist style behavior. 
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 Interviews with union leadership revealed an ongoing concern over the 
legislature presents of the NDP in Alberta and the inability of the party to protect the 
labour movement.  This structural feature of Alberta politics seems to drive union 
calculation on how to interact with the party more than anything else.  In some cases, 
unions have chosen to remain loyal to the party and to encourage other members of the 
movement to affiliate or support the party.  The party argues that the ongoing weak 
legislature position is offset by the ability and willingness of Legislature members to 
bring union issues to debate and to the media.  Loyal unions seem to accept this 
explanation, and see utility in financial and organization support for the party in 
exchange for “a voice in the legislature” (interview with a party representative, May 
26th, 2008). 
 The relationship between these loyal unions and the party represents a hybrid of 
the rational exchange and the shared ideological position theories.  This study has 
labeled this phenomenon an asymmetrical exchange.  Unions remain loyal to the party, 
donate money, volunteer support, run supportive parallel add campaigns, and 
encourage members to run for the party.  In exchange, the party offers a voice for 
unions in the political sphere, but not policy guarantees.  The party maintains the loyalty 
of some unions despite the irrationality of the exchange by relying on a perception of a 
shared world view.  Loyal unions accept this logic citing the difficult nature of the 
Alberta context and the importance of having partners that “fight the good fight” 
(interview with a union leader, May 28th, 2008). 
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 This reliance on ideological affinity has obvious limits in the context of Alberta.  
The majority of unions that were interviewed explained a preference for representing 
the needs of their respective membership even at the expense of partisan ties to the 
NDP.  Leaders from these unions referenced the inability of the party to protect the 
labour movement from unfriendly government policy as the most important factor in 
deciding how to engage in the political sphere.  This demonstrates a practical example 
of an important facet of the rational choice theory; when one party in an exchange is 
unable to provide the desired commodity, the relationship will break down.  The 
irrationality of the exchange, and subsequent decision by some unions and labour 
federations in the province to pursue a new strategy for political engagement is 
evidence of this.  In particular, the 2008 election campaign saw a major third party 
advertising campaign by elements of the labour movement in Alberta, aimed at toppling 
the government without the consultation or support of the NDP.  This political strategy 
was complimented by a labour driven attempt at “uniting the left” by dissolving the NDP 
from within at the party’s 2008 convention. 
 These efforts by the AFL, ABTC and other elements in the labour community 
were ultimately unsuccessful, the party voted down the “unite the left” motion at the 
convention and the Conservatives won a strong majority in the 2008 election.  The 
lasting importance of the events is found in their expression of a new strategy in the 
Alberta labour movement aimed at healing old divisions and uniting disparate parts of 
the community without any involvement with the NDP.     
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The research in this thesis also reinforces our understanding of one of the more 
obvious characteristics of Alberta politics: overwhelming single-party majorities. 
Building on McCormick’s thesis presented in chapter 4, research in this thesis has shown 
that while the labour movement is not strong enough to push the NDP into power, it 
does have the numbers and resources to keep the party alive.  Interviews and financial 
data presented in chapters 4 and 5 reveal that after the disastrous 1993 election for the 
NDP the labour movement was instrumental as a life support role for the party.  In 
practical terms, this has resulted in the party maintaining a small foothold of between 
two and four seats in the Legislature concentrated solely in Edmonton, with around 10% 
of the popular vote.  This small percentage of popular vote is critical when considering 
some of the close margins at the riding level in the 2004 and 2008 elections, where the 
Liberal party placed second to the Progressive Conservatives and may have fallen 
victims of opposition vote splitting.   In effect, the labour intervention after the 1993 
election results may have hurt the prospects for a change in government. The continued 
and reduced presence of the NDP in the provinces politics acts to fragment opposition 
vote, the 2008 election saw the Tories gain considerable legislative presences, in part by 
capitalizing on the increasingly fragmented opposition. 
Research in this study has also highlighted the continued importance of 
federalism to the study of Canadian politics.  In our review of the partisan tendencies of 
Alberta’s unions, the study revealed that many large national unions support the party 
due to their Canada wide policies.  This study revealed a long history of financial support 
by the locals of large national unions including CUPE, CEP, and UFCW despite the lack of 
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tangible rewards for the provincial arms of the unions.  Inversely, the drive for an 
independent and unified Alberta labour movement has been supported primarily by 
provincially based unions.  The AFL with support from AUPE were major financial 
backers of the non-partisan AFC ad campaigns.  Leadership from the AFL in particular 
explained their actions during the 2008 election cycle as part of an overall strategy to 
develop an Alberta specific, new way forward.  The simple continued presence of the 
provincial NDP despite decades of poor electoral performance demonstrates the strong 
influence federalism can have on provincial politics. 
Finally, this thesis may have provided some insight into what the future holds for 
the party-union relationship.  2008 saw Alberta enter into another economic downturn 
as oil and gas prices depressed in response to a global downturn in demand.  
Traditionally, these cyclical downturns favor opposition parties; unfortunately for the 
Alberta NDP the effects of the recession may have subsided before the next scheduled 
election in 2012.  The legacy of the downturn however will linger on into the next 
decade, as was the case in the 1990s.  The current rash of public spending and the 
accumulating public debt should result in a new emphasis on cost cutting by the 
provincial government as the provincial economy recovers.  If the pattern of the 1990s 
holds this should result in a difficult environment for public sector unions in the 
province as the government decreases public spending in response to debt load.  This 
set of events could exasperate the already tense relationship between unions and the 
NDP in Alberta that this project has presented.  If the party continues to be unable to 
protect unions from government policy, the pattern of independent action seen in the 
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2008 election may continue, resulting in long term damage to the existing weakened 
power dynamic.   
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Appendix 1: Sample Questionnaires 
 
Semi Structured Interview Questionnaire Labour Component: 
 
1. Does your organization formally co-operate with the NDP in Alberta? 
2. How would you characterize your organization’s interaction with the NDP in Alberta at 
the provincial and national level? 
3. Can you comment on the past relationship between your organization and the NDP? 
4. How important is this relationship to the future of your organization?  Would you 
characterize the relationship as healthy and growing, in a holding pattern, or in gradual 
decline? 
5. What are some of the benefits your organization has enjoyed from the relationship with 
the NDP? 
6. Why is it important for organized labour to participate in the political process? 
7. Is supporting a single party an important part of this political activity? 
8. How does your organization interact with individual members who have questions 
about Alberta’s political movement? 
9. What benefits do you feel the NDP enjoys from the ongoing relationship with your 
organization? 
 
 
Semi Structured Interview Questionnaire NDP Component 
 
1. How important is labour to the success of the NDP in Alberta? 
2. What do unions contribute to the party? 
3. How would you characterize the relationship between the party and labour in Alberta? 
Is the relationship strong and growing, in a holding pattern, or in gradual decline? 
4. How would you describe the benefits of the relationship between organized labour and 
the party? 
5. How important is it to have more union locals affiliate with the party?   
6. Should more locals be encouraged to join?   
7. What is the best way to approach this? 
8. Are there any impacts positive or negative to an association with labour in the eyes of 
the average non labour voter in your opinion?  
9. Given the difficult political climate in Alberta what do you feel organized labour gains 
from the ongoing relationship with the party? 
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Appendix 2: Summary Table of Union Patterns of Support for the NDP  
 
Union  
 
    
Size 
  
#  of 
Locals 
L
Loyal 
to 
NDP 
Non 
Partisan/Non 
Affiliated 
 
Explanation 
Alberta 
Federation of 
Labour Unions 
      
United 
Nurses of Alberta 
 
UNA 
 
24000 1 
 
x 
Non
partisan 
tradition in 
party 
constitution 
United 
Food and 
Commercial 
Workers 
 
UFCW 
 
21000 6 
x
x 
 
History 
of financial 
contributions 
and volunteer 
support, 
formally 
affiliated with 
the party 
Canadian 
Union of Public 
Employees 
 
CUPE 
 
20000 
 
24 
x
x 
 
Affiliated with 
party, strong 
financial links 
Health and 
Sciences Association 
of Alberta 
 
HSAA 
 
1500 1 
 
x 
Non 
partisan 
tradition in 
party 
constitution 
 
Communications, 
Energy and Paper 
Workers Union of 
Canada 
 
CEP 
 
10000 
 
29 
  
Strong 
financial 
relationship 
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International 
Brotherhood of 
Electrical Workers 
 
IBEW 
 
10000 4 
x
x 
 
Some 
recent 
affiliations with 
party, strong 
financial 
support for 
party 
Public 
Service Alliance of 
Canada 
 
PSAC 
 
7000 
 
42 
 
x 
Non 
partisan 
tradition in 
party 
constitution 
United 
Steelworkers 
 
USW 
 
5000 
 
12 
X
x 
 
Long 
history of 
support for 
federal, and 
provincial  
party, some 
locals affiliated 
with the party 
Canadian 
Union of Postal 
Workers 
 
CUPW 
 
4500 
 
11 
 
x 
Non 
partisan 
tradition in 
party 
constitution 
 
Telecommunications 
Workers Union 
 
TWU 
 
4500 1 
X
 x   
 
Strong 
relationship 
build after 
party support 
during Telus 
strike 
Canadian 
Auto Workers 
 
CAW 
 
4000 
 
18 x x 
Party 
leadership 
encourages 
strategic voting. 
Despite a 
strong history 
of financial 
support for the 
party 
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Amalgamated 
Transit Union 
 
ATU 
 
3000 3 
X
x 
 
Party 
leader is a 
member of this 
Union, strong 
financial 
support after 
election of 
Mason to 
leadership 
 
International 
Association of 
Machinist and 
Aerospace Workers 
 
IAM 
 
3000 6 x x 
Weak 
financial 
support 
 
International 
Association of Fire 
Fighters 
 
IAFF 
 
1700 7 x x 
Some 
financial 
support 
 
International 
Alliance of 
Theatrical Stage 
Employees, Moving 
Picture Technicians, 
Artists and Allied 
Crafts of the United 
States, its Territories 
and Canada 
 
IATSE 
 
1200 2 
 
x 
Little 
evidence of 
party support 
 
International 
Brotherhood of Iron 
Workers IBI 
 
600 1 
x
x 
 
History 
of support for 
federal and 
provincial party 
Bakery, 
Confectionary, 
Tobacco and Grain 
Millers International 
 
BCTGM 
 
560 1 
 
x 
Weak 
history of 
support 
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UNITE-
HERE * 
 
350 1 
x
x 
 
 
Financial 
support for 
party 
Athabasca 
University Faculty 
Association 
 
AUFA 
 
250 1 
 
x 
No 
clear links 
 
International Union 
of Painters and 
Allied Workers 
 
IUPAW 
 
250 1 
 
x 
Some 
Financial 
Support 
 
International 
Brotherhood of 
Boilermakers, Iron 
Ship Builders, 
Blacksmiths, Forgers 
and Helpers 
 
IBB 
 
240 3 
s
x 
 
Party 
officials report 
strong support 
United 
Transportation 
Union 
 
UTU 
 
220 3 
X
x 
 
Recent 
modest 
campaign 
contributions 
Canadian 
Union of Office and 
Professional 
Employees 
 
COPE 
 
200 4 
x
x  
 
Some 
locals affiliated 
with the party 
Media and 
Communications 
Workers of Alberta 
 
MCWA 
 
150 1 
 
x 
 
Teamsters 
Canada * 
 
100 1 
x
x 
 
 
Support for 
party at federal 
and provincial 
level, financial 
donation 
history 
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United 
Mine Workers of 
America 
 
UMWA 
 
100 1 x 
 
History 
of support for 
progressive 
parties 
Grain 
Services Union 
 
GSU 
7
0 1 
 
x 
 
       
Alberta 
Building Trades 
Unions 
      
 
International 
Brotherhood of 
Boilermakers  
 
IBB 
 
1000 1 
X
x 
 
Party 
officials report 
support 
 
International Union 
of Bricklayers & 
Allied Craftsmen - 
Local 1 
 
IUBA 
 
2 
 
x 
Little 
evidence of 
support 
Operative 
Plasterers and 
Cement Masons 
International  
 
OPCM 
 
1 
 
x 
Little 
evidence of 
support 
UNITE-
HERE  * 
 
1 
X
x 
 
History 
of financial 
support 
 
International Union 
of Elevator 
Constructors  
 
IUEC 
 
2 
 
x 
Little 
evidence of 
support 
 
International 
Brotherhood of 
Electrical Workers  
 
IBEW 
 
5000 1 
S
x 
 
Recent 
affiliation with 
party, strong 
financial 
support 
 
International Union 
of Operating 
Engineers  
 
IUOE 
 
1000 1 
x
x 
 
History 
of financial 
support 
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International 
Association of 
Bridge, Structure 
and Ornamental 
Ironworkers  
 
IABSOI 
 
2 
 
x 
 
United 
Association of 
Plumbers and 
Pipefitters  
 
UAPP 
 
10000 1 
X
x 
 
Emplo
yees work in 
NDP office, 
financial 
support 
 
Construction & 
General Workers  * 
   
x 
 
Internation
al Association of 
Heat and Frost 
Insulators  
 
IAHFI 
 
1 
 
x 
 
Internation
al Union of Painters 
and Allied Trades  
 
IUPAT 
 
1 
X
x 
 
Recent 
increase in 
financial 
donations 
Internation
al Brotherhood of 
Teamsters  * 
 
2 
X
x 
 
Party 
officials report 
support 
The Alberta 
Regional Council of 
Carpenters and 
Allied Workers  * 
 
10000 1 
X
x 
 
Party 
officials  report 
some support 
Millwrights, 
Machinery Erectors 
and Maintenance 
Union  * 
 
1 
 
x 
 
 
Financial 
donations and 
NDP candidate 
Sheet 
Metal Workers 
International  * 
 
1 
 
x 
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Christian 
Labour Association 
of Canada Unions 
      
Local 63 
Construction 
 
2
0,600 1 
 
x 
Non
partisan, non 
affiliated 
history 
Local 56 
Transportation and 
related 
 
1
200 1 
 
x 
Non 
partisan, non 
affiliated 
history 
Local 301 
Service and retail 
 
5
325 1 
 
x 
Non 
partisan, non 
affiliated 
history 
       
       
Alberta 
Union of Provincial 
Employees 
      
Provincial 
Government Sector 
 
AUPE 
2
3000 9 
 
x 
 
Withdrew from 
AFL, multi 
partisan 
support clause 
in Constitution 
Health Care 
Sector 
 
AUPE 
 
36500 8 
 
x 
 
Withdrew from 
AFL, multi 
partisan 
support clause 
in Constitution 
Education 
Sector 
 
AUPE 
 
8000 6 
 
x 
 
Withdrew from 
AFL, multi 
partisan 
support clause 
in Constitution 
Boards, 
Agencies and Local 
Government Sector 
 
AUPE 
 
5000 5 
 
x 
 
Withdrew from 
AFL, multi 
partisan 
support clause 
in Constitution 
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Alberta 
Teachers 
Association Unions 
      
       
Alberta 
Teachers 
Association 
 
ATA 
 
44000 
 
64 
 
x 
Non 
partisan history 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
157 
 
Appendix 3: Summary of NDP Candidate Ties with Organized Labour 2008 
Provincial Election                                                              
 Riding  Name Occupation/Union Affiliation 
Airdrie-Chestermere   Bryan Young None 
 Athabasca-Redwater   Peter Opryshko  Alberta Teachers Association 
 
Banff-Cochrane  Anne Wilson 
None, defense lawyer 
practicing in Canmore and 
Banff 
 
Barrhead-Morinville-Westlock  Rod Olstad 
Edmonton Musicians' 
Association, local 390 
 
Battle River-Wainwright  Doris Bannister  
None, self-employed business 
woman, now semi-retired.  
 
Bonnyville-Cold Lake  Jason Sloychuk 
Fourth class power engineer, 
CNRL 
 Calgary-Bow  Teale Phelps Bondaroff Student 
 
Calgary-Cross   Shelina Hassanali 
Canadian Union of Provincial 
Employees 
 Calgary-Currie  Marc Power Social Activist 
 
Calgary-East   Chris Dovey  
Board Member 17th ave 
Planning Committee 
 Calgary-Egmont  Jason Nishiyama Alberta Teachers Association 
 
Calgary-Elbow   Garnet Wilcox 
 Manager within a large 
Canadian retail company 
 
Calgary-Fish Creek   Eric Leavitt  University Professor 
 Calgary-Foothills  Stephanie Sundberg Member of ATU local 583 
 
Calgary-Fort   Julie Hrdlicka 
Southern Alberta Outreach 
and Promotion Coordinator 
for the Parkland Institute 
 Calgary-Glenmore  Holly Heffernan Nurse (board with AN, AFL) 
 Calgary-Hays  Tyler Kinch Second year student at SAIT 
 Calgary-Lougheed  Clint Marko Electrician with IBEW  
 
Calgary-Mackay   Daena Diduck 
Program Delivery Specialist 
(AUPE) 
 Calgary-McCall  Preet Sihota Realtor 
 Calgary-Montrose   Al Brown Electrician IBEW 
 Calgary-Mountain View  John Donovan  Retired  
 Calgary-North Hill  John Chan  Civil servant (AUPE) 
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Calgary-North West   Collin Anderson  
 Communications Electrician 
(TELUS) 
 
Calgary-Nose Hill   Tristan Ridley 
Works at an acupuncture 
clinic and a health food store 
 Calgary-Shaw  Jenn Carlson Not Listed 
 
Calgary-Varsity  Tim Stock Bateman  
 University of Calgary as the 
Director of Development for 
Corporate & Foundation 
Relations 
 Calgary-West  Chantelle Dubois  Rail Traffic Controller  
 Cardson-Taber-Warner   Suzanne Sirias  Registered Social Worker  
 
Cypress-Medicine Hat  Manuel Martinez  
Owner-operator of two small 
businesses  
 
Drayton Valley-Calmar  Luann Bannister 
Works at an acupuncture 
clinic and a health food store 
Works for judicial system 
 
Drumheller-Stettler  Richard Bough 
 Former Amalgamated Union 
of Engineering Workers 
 Dunvegan-Central Peace  Nathan Macklin  Farmer  
 Edmonton-Beverly-Clareview Ray Martin Former Teacher 
 Edmonton-Calder  David Eggen Former Teacher 
 Edmonton-Castle Downs  Ali Haymour  Owns a small business  
 Edmonton-Centre  Deron Bilous Alberta Teachers Association 
 Edmonton-Decore  Sid Sadik  Hayati Homes  
 Edmonton-Ellerslie  Marilyn Assheton Smith Former University Professor 
 Edmonton-Glenora  Arlene Chapman   Registered Social Worker 
 
Edmonton-Gold Bar  Sherry McKibben  
 Health and social services 
administrator  
 Edmonton-Highlands-Norwood Brian Mason Tranist Workers Union 
 
Edmonton-Manning Rick Murti   IAM Local 1579 
 
Edmonton-McClung  Bridget Stirling 
Editor with an Edmonton-
based non-fiction publisher 
 Edmonton-Meadowlark  Pascal Ryffel  Language instructor 
 Edmonton-Mill Creek  Stephen Anderson   Millwrights Local 1460  
 
Edmonton-Mill Woods   Christina Gray 
Computer programming 
instructor  
 
Edmonton-Riverview  Erica Bullwinkle 
Works in the office of 
Edmonton-Strathcona MLA 
 Edmonton-Rutherford  Michael Butler  Small business owner  
 Edmonton-Strathcona Rachel Notley Labour Lawyer 
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Edmonton-Whitemud Hana Razga 
Human Resources Consultant 
for the federal government 
(former CUPE) 
 
Foothills-Rocky View   Ricardo deMenezes 
 United Food and Commercial 
Workers Local 401  
 
Fort McMurray-Wood Buffalo  Mel Kraley 
International Brotherhood of 
Electrical Workers 
 
Fort Saskatchewan-Vegreville Clayton Marsden 
United Association of 
Plumbers and Pipefitters 
Local 488 
 
Grande Prairie-Smoky  Neil Peacock 
Owns and operates a ranch in 
the TeePee Creek area, and 
works for Safeway 
 Grande Prairie-Wapiti  Manuela Campbell Social worker 
 Highwood  Carolyn Boulton Student 
 
Innisfail-Sylvan Lake  Tophie Davies  
 Professional figure skating 
coach 
 Lac La Biche-St. Paul  Della Drury Forestry 
 Lacombe-Ponoka  Steve Bradshaw Transit Workers Union 
 Leduc-Beaumont-Devon  Lisa Erickson Farmer 
 Lesser Slave Lake  Habby Sharkawi  Café Owner 
 Lethbridge-East  Tom Moffatt I.T. Systems Administrator  
 
Lethbridge-West James More 
 Home business, Distancedge 
Communications. 
 
Little Bow Duane Petluk 
Community Health Team 
Leader 
 Livingston-Macleod  Phil Burpee Singer/Song writer 
 
Medicine Hat  Diana Arnott Retail sector manager.  
 Olds-Didsbury-Three Hills  Andy Davies Artist 
 
Peace River   Adele Boucher Rymhs  
Former Teacher, Business 
Owner 
 Red Deer-North  Shawn Nielsen Student 
 Red Deer-South  Teresa Bryanton  Alberta Teachers Association 
 Rocky Mountain House  Jorge Sousa UofA Professor 
 Sherwood Park  Katharine Hay AUPE 
 Spruce Grove-Sturgeon-St. Albert  Peter Cross Graphic Designer 
 St. Albert  Katy Campbell Student 
 Stony Plain  Shelina Brown Faculty UofA 
 Strathcona  Denny Holmwood Student 
 
Strathmore-Brooks Brian Stokes 
Sub contractor family 
business 
 Vermilion-Lloydminister  Wendy Myshak AUPE 
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West Yellowhead  Ken Kuzminski  Apprentice carpenter 
 Wetaskiwin-Camrose  Sarah Mowat  Student 
 Whitecourt-Ste. Anne  Leah Redmond  Not Listed 
 
Total Number of Union Links: 
 
  37 
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Appendix 4: Union Contributions to NDP Campaigns 
Union Local/Labour Organization 1993 1997 2001 2004 2008 
 
Total Per 
Organization 
        CLC 
   
$10,000.00 
  
$10,000.00 
AFL $1,411.84 $1,000.00 $4,400.00 
 
$6,000.00 
 
$12,811.84 
Alberta Building Trades 
  
$4,500.00 
   
$4,500.00 
Mcmur Labour Council 
  
$2,500.00 
   
$2,500.00 
Yellowhead Labour Council 
  
$1,250.00 $500.00 
  
$1,750.00 
Edmonton Labour Council $600.00 
  
$750.00 
  
$1,350.00 
Medicine Labour Council $1,650.00 
 
$800.00 $1,500.00 
  
$3,950.00 
Red Deer Labour Council $1,000.00 
   
$1,000.00 
 
$2,000.00 
AUPE PROVINCIAL 
 
$4,022.58 
  
$5,000.00 
 
$9,022.58 
AUPE CAMROSE OFFICE 
 
$1,000.00 
    
$1,000.00 
AUPE 002 
 
$1,000.00 
    
$1,000.00 
AUPE 39 
 
$500.00 
 
$3,000.00 
  
$3,500.00 
ATU 569 
  
$1,000.00 $2,500.00 $2,500.00 
 
$6,000.00 
ATU 583 
  
$1,000.00 
 
$1,500.00 
 
$2,500.00 
ASBESTOS WORKERS 110 
    
$2,000.00 
 
$2,000.00 
CECU COALITION 
  
$400.00 
   
$400.00 
ADVANCMENT LABOURS 
  
$1,500.00 
   
$1,500.00 
CEP SASK 
    
$2,000.00 
 
$2,000.00 
CEP ALBERTA 
 
$2,500.00 $3,000.00 $1,000.00 $5,000.00 
 
$11,500.00 
CEP NATIONAL 
  
$4,000.00 $11,000.00 
  
$15,000.00 
CEP 855 
   
$2,000.00 
  
$2,000.00 
CEP 1900 
   
$500.00 
  
$500.00 
CEP 1118 
 
$500.00 
    
$500.00 
CEP 777 
 
$6,700.00 $2,000.00 
 
$3,500.00 
 
$12,200.00 
C&GWU 92 $500.00 
     
$500.00 
CAW NATIONAL $5,000.00 
  
$8,000.00 $5,750.00 
 
$18,750.00 
CAW 99 $1,000.00 
     
$1,000.00 
CECU  
   
$1,000.00 
  
$1,000.00 
CEPU $6,000.00 
     
$6,000.00 
CMPL 
   
$5,000.00 
  
$5,000.00 
CSU 
   
$1,000.00 
  
$1,000.00 
COPE $8,700.00 
     
$8,700.00 
CUPE ALBERTA $750.00 $1,400.00 $1,200.00 $5,000.00 
  
$8,350.00 
CUPE 3197 
    
$750.00 
 
$750.00 
CUPE 30 $2,250.00 $3,900.00 $650.00 
   
$6,800.00 
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CUPE 38 
  
$1,700.00 
   
$1,700.00 
CUPE 1505 
  
$500.00 
   
$500.00 
CUPE EDMONTON  
 
$1,200.00 
    
$1,200.00 
CUPE 417 $500.00 
     
$500.00 
CUPE NATIONAL $5,000.00 
     
$5,000.00 
CUPW $500.00 
     
$500.00 
CARPENTER UNION 1325 $500.00 
 
$1,500.00 $3,400.00 $14,000.00 
 
$19,400.00 
ECWU 777 $950.00 
     
$950.00 
Edmonton Fire Fighters $5,000.00 
  
$4,000.00 
  
$9,000.00 
IRON WORKERS 720 
   
$3,000.00 $8,000.00 
 
$11,000.00 
IAMAW NATIONAL  
  
$1,000.00 
   
$1,000.00 
IAMAW 2583 $1,000.00 
     
$1,000.00 
IAMAW 721 $1,000.00 
     
$1,000.00 
IUPAT 177 
    
$5,000.00 
 
$5,000.00 
IWA 1-207 $2,000.00 $5,000.00 $1,000.00 
   
$8,000.00 
IUEC 130 
    
$1,000.00 
 
$1,000.00 
IBEW 424 
 
$1,750.00 $1,500.00 
 
$15,000.00 
 
$18,250.00 
IUOE 955 
    
$3,000.00 
 
$3,000.00 
OPCMIA 222 
    
$1,200.00 
 
$1,200.00 
TEAMSTERS 362 
    
$1,000.00 
 
$1,000.00 
CDN MACHINISTS UNION POL 
LEAGUE $500.00 $3,000.00 
 
$5,000.00 
  
$8,500.00 
UNA PROVINCIAL 
   
$500.00 
  
$500.00 
STEEL WORKERS NATIONAL 
   
$500.00 
  
$500.00 
UNA 183 
   
$500.00 
  
$500.00 
PLUMBERS/PIPEFITTERS 488 
  
$2,000.00 $14,000.00 $8,750.00 
 
$24,750.00 
UFCW NATIONAL $15,000.00 
     
$15,000.00 
UFCW 401 
  
$500.00 
 
$2,000.00 
 
$2,500.00 
UFCW 1118 $12,756.56 $2,500.00 
 
$500.00 
  
$15,756.56 
UFCW 280P $1,750.00 
     
$1,750.00 
USWA PAC 
   
$500.00 
  
$500.00 
UFCW 380P $1,250.00 
     
$1,250.00 
USWA (COPE FUND) $3,000.00 $2,000.00 $3,000.00 
   
$8,000.00 
USWA 3 
   
$500.00 $7,000.00 
 
$7,500.00 
USWA 6034 
   
$500.00 
  
$500.00 
UNITE HERE 47 
    
$5,000.00 
 
$5,000.00 
UTU  
   
$1,500.00 
  
$1,500.00 
WUT (WORKERS UNOIN TELECOMMUNICATIONS) 
  
$10,500.00 
  
$10,500.00 
        TOTAL $79,568.40 $37,972.58 $40,900.00 $97,650.00 $105,950.00 
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$362,040.98 
        Appendix 5: Union Contributions to the NDP Non Election Donations 1993-2000 
and 2001-2008 
 
 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
1993-
2000 
AFL COPE FUND 1200 400 
      
1600 
AFL 500 
   
2400 
   
2900 
FT MCMUR LABOUR 
COUNCIL 1135 
       
1135 
YELLOWHEAD 
LABOUR COUNCIL 
    
1210 
   
1210 
Medicine Labour 
Council 500 
       
500 
Red Deer Labour 
Council 500 
       
500 
CEP ALBERTA 
    
2850 
  
1218 4068 
CEP 707 2639 
       
2639 
CEP 1118 
        
0 
CEP 777 
    
425 
   
425 
CEPU ALBERTA 
     
1000 
  
1000 
CMPL 
        
0 
CSU 52 
       
1000 1000 
COPE 
        
0 
CUPE ALBERTA 
  
450 550 525 
 
420 
 
1945 
CUPE 30 
    
800 
   
800 
CUPE EDMONTON  500 
       
500 
ECWU 501 1200 
       
1200 
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IAMAW 99 
      
500 
 
500 
PLUMBERS/PIPEFITT
ERS 488 500 
       
500 
UFCW 401 
    
700 
   
700 
USWA (COPE FUND) 15000 
     
500 
 
15500 
USWA 7226 
    
1075 
   
1075 
USWA 7621 
    
2150 
   
2150 
USWA 3 
 
1300 
      
1300 
TOTAL   23674 1700 450 550 12135 1000 1420 2218 
  
 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total 
2000-
2008 
          AFL 690 
     
730 
 
1420 
ALBERTA BUILDING 
TRADES  
   
4000 
 
4000 14540 
 
22540 
ATU 569 
     
2000 
  
2000 
ASBESTOS WORKERS 
110 
      
620 
 
620 
CEP ALBERTA 
  
1100 4000 
 
4118 
  
9218 
CEP FT MAC 
  
1000 
     
1000 
CEP NATIONAL 
  
450 10000 
    
10450 
CEP 777 5000 
 
500 
   
380 
 
5880 
CECU  
      
1200 
 
1200 
CUPE ALBERTA 
      
10000 
 
10000 
CUPE 30 
 
1000 
      
1000 
IBB 146 
      
890 
 
890 
IAMAW NATIONAL  
       
750 750 
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IBEW 424 
      
4030 
 
4030 
CDN MACHINISTS 
UNION POL LEAGUE 
     
2000 
  
2000 
SMU 
       
900 900 
PLUMBERS/PIPEFITTERS 
488 
     
2250 680 400 3330 
UFCW NATIONAL 
     
2000 
 
5000 7000 
UFCW 401 500 
     
4460 4100 9060 
USWA (COPE FUND) 
      
3000 
 
3000 
USW 207 
     
1000 
 
900 1900 
USWA 5885 
      
500 
 
500 
USWA 7621 
      
10000 
 
10000 
USWA 3 
     
5000 
  
5000 
TOTAL   6190 1000 3050 18000 0 22368 51030 12050 
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Appendix 6: The Alberta Party System Since 1930 
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1
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3
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2
1
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5
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1
9
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1
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6
3
1
9
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7
1
9
7
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9
7
5
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
7
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
8
Alberta Alliance
Representative
Coaltion
Progressive Conservative
Independent Social Credit
Canadian Forces
Vetrines and Active Forces
NDP
CCF
United Farmers of Alberta 
Independent
Labour 
Conservative
Liberal
Social Credit
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